

# LIVING AGE

*The World in Review*

## Inside Britain's Secret Service

*By Frederic Sondern, Jr.*

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Defence of the Left Flank	<i>Liddell Hart</i>
Race Building in a Democracy	<i>Henry Pratt Fairchild</i>
Apostle of the 'Total War'	<i>General von Ludendorff</i>
Russia's Aims on the Baltic	<i>Max M. Laserson</i>
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—Hoy, Mexico



# THE LIVING AGE

*Founded by* E. Littell

In 1844



March 1940

Volume 358, Number 4482

## The World Over

THE American press associations, certain newspapers' special correspondents in Europe and editorial writers here are responsible for an unconscionable distortion of the importance and potential influence of the visit abroad of Sumner Welles, Under-Secretary of State. Any foreign correspondent or press-association writer knows full well that the "reaction," if any, of the British, French, German and most of the neutral governments to Mr. Welles' tour is one of almost complete disinterest, if not hostility. To state anything else—and a fabulous lot has been stated—is to mislead the public of the United States, to provoke totally unwarranted cries of alarm from isolationists, and to suggest forcefully that this Government can exert much more influence abroad than any good reporter knows to be true.

What has happened, obviously, is this: when Mr. Welles' tour of survey was announced at Washington, foreign news editors of the press associations and cable editors of the few American newspapers with their own correspondents abroad, demanded that their London, Paris, Berlin, Rome and other bureaus "rush reaction Welles visit." This is invariably regarded as tantamount to a command performance, and obedient correspondents cabled back whatever they could suck from their thumbs, falling back on those old reliables, "well-informed circles," "semi-official sources," et cetera. European "reaction" to a given piece of American news is not to be concocted at a moment's notice, particularly today with two wars in Europe's front yard; European editorial writers on foreign affairs—that is to say, those who are largely responsible for "foreign opin-

ion"—write more thoughtfully and expend more time than most of their American brethren; and, contrary to what many foreign-news and cable editors here may like to believe, the chancelleries in European capitals do not have a man on duty, night and day, to serve as an official sounding-board anytime an editor in New York wants to blow up a Washington story into a world-shaker. Under normal conditions, this "reaction" nonsense would be unimportant; at times, every foreign correspondent is forced to grind his teeth and file some inoffensive hokum to keep the home office convinced of its omniscience and the ingenuity of its ideas.

At a time like this, however, there is no excuse for disseminating throughout this country a myth that the rulers of Europe have been convulsed over the possible results springing from the tour of Mr. Welles. The British Government has been pictured as "enormously relieved" at the Under-Secretary's "intervention," and far too much has been made of Prime Minister Chamberlain's perfunctory statement in Parliament (February 13) that he would "welcome" the London call by the American official; a coast-to-coast news-broadcaster, digesting the press-association "reaction," has even declared that Germany would certainly withhold her spring offensive until the Wilhelmstrasse had enjoyed the advantage of an exchange of views with Mr. Welles—evidently forgetting, among other things, that this is the same Mr. Welles who, scarcely a year ago at Washington, gave the German chargé-d'affaires a highly unpleasant half hour.

If the United States believes that the governments of Europe are greatly concerned what moves this nation makes at this time—short of military intervention—it is suffering from malignant *folie de grandeur* or, at least, from a complete ignorance of what is being thought and written about us abroad.

Neither Britain nor France wants any peace proposals from the United States. They don't want us at the eventual peace conference and, right or wrong, their reasons are explicit and they have no hesitancy in uttering them. *The Times* of London and *Le Temps* of Paris, which in this day of censorship would not be permitted to attribute views to their respective governments without full authority, have made that abundantly clear, as have other sections of their daily and monthly press. A host of influential writers, as well as an army of authors of letters-to-the-editor, are unanimous in forthright insistence that the United States stay out of their current affairs and remain out of the peace.

Allied sentiment at this time, on the subject of the next shape of Europe at peace, is close to agreement with this opinion of Pertinax (André Géraud):

Some of the "material and positive" guarantees that must be contained in any peace settlement can be prophesied: First, the co-operation of France and Great Britain, which has become so close in military, financial and economic affairs, must be maintained after the battle has been won, and must become the chief instrument in the reconstruction of Europe. The Franco-British alliance must be preserved as a nucleus of the new international organization that will have to be created. Second, the principal duty of the two Western Powers will be to keep immune from all attacks the small

nations of Central and Eastern Europe, the really dangerous zone of the Continent, the zone in which an energetic German empire might find the key to European dominance. Third, France and Great Britain must not dilute and eventually lose their alliance in another League of Nations, but they must maintain its full vigor and act as the executive branch of such an organization.

It does not follow that they are to constitute by themselves a closed club where none may gain admittance; on the contrary, they will welcome particularly the association of those states qualified to help them build a military preponderance in the Rhineland, intended to safeguard the new territorial and political structure of Europe. They will see to it that they keep in intimate touch with the League of Nations, reformed or unreformed, which may survive; but no longer will their actions be made conditional upon the deliberations and compromises of Geneva. Fourth, a serious attempt will have to be made to federate Poland and Czechoslovakia, to resuscitate and extend the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente. . . . I have endeavored only to find the line of approach toward the settlement of the overwhelming problems that will face us whenever Hitlerism Germany falls to pieces—a line of approach that French and British statesmen, acting in a realistic spirit, are likely to follow.

The kind of a peace that arrives may not be a peace worth having. But we are deluding ourselves if we believe that whatever Americans think should be enacted in Europe—in the realm, say, of "federation"—carries any weight in Europe today. Consider these recent lines of Mme. Odette Keun, who is about as perceptive a writer on the political scene as any in France today:

Everything I come across bears me out in the extreme resoluteness of the French view—conversations, letters, the press, the articles of reputable writers, the comments of unbiased observers who visit France. I present this summary to readers in the intention I have already stated: as a warning. It is vital that

public opinion in this country [England] should be acquainted with the inflexible aim of France, and check its chronic propensity to wander off among incoherent visions which the French cannot comprehend and that are becoming a source of perplexity, and of some irritation, to them. . . . Do the English seriously suppose that France, who has five million men under arms; several million women struggling single-handed to raise their families, keep up trade, dig and sow the fields; a national economy infinitely more disrupted than England's; individual financial difficulties and the emotional stresses incomparably more numerous (for everybody in France, not only a part of the population, is shatteringly affected by the mobilization), is going to ask from this war—and obtain—*anything short of complete physical security?* [Emphasis by author.] I repeat that she will insist upon, and carry out, whatever the method, such guarantees as will make a fourth aggression of Germany literally impossible. Impossible for good.

On the other hand, it is conceivable that what the United States, as the most powerful neutral, thinks the future shape of Europe should be may carry some weight if and when Europe reaches the point of exhaustion. But that point does not lie in the predictable future, and may be a matter of decades.

Meanwhile, to picture Europeans as much exercised over the peregrinations of Under-Secretary Welles is unadulterated falsehood. Prime ministers and other potentates are the daily diet of the Continent and familiar as old shoes. Mr. Welles is a capable diplomat, but the under-secretary of state of a neutral power is pretty small potatoes on European soil. He will be listened to politely—but not overlong. Europe is busy and preoccupied with slaughter, and the suggestions of neutrals in the line of peace are a dime a dozen, to the belligerents.

*Peace and a Third Term*

THAT being so, will anyone pay much attention to the conclusions Mr. Welles may draw while abroad? At the moment the soothsaying industry is not in good repute, but we venture to predict with some assurance that Mr. Welles will return from Europe long before the Democratic convention at Chicago, and that he will present Mr. Roosevelt with a peace plan of disarming simplicity. The President will embrace its chief stipulations, season it after his own recipe, and disclose it to the country as a feasible proposal that needs perhaps six months' labor for a happy conclusion. After pulling this rabbit from his hat, a third term for Mr. Roosevelt will be regarded as mandatory by more than half of the electorate.

*Battle Lines*

THE battle lines between the two largest political camps in the United States have been sharply drawn by Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes and Ernest T. Weir, chairman of the board of the National Steel Corporation and president of the American Iron and Steel Institute. These two gentlemen stated succinctly their opposing views at a dinner of the Economic Club of New York, unconsciously proposing not only divergent political philosophies but also alternate ways of life.

This little contest may well grow into the most important event of the year thus far. It seems altogether probable that what these men said will provide the basis for political platform-makers at both the Democratic and Republican conventions. But more important than that is the clear-

cut statements of belief upon which the American public may mobilize in the coming struggle for power.

Secretary Ickes, the more perceptive of the two, stated the American problem—which in fact is a world problem—of whether it is better to buy off the restless masses, or let them howl while the economic system tries to sell them a large birthday cake.

All this is very well. But with the examples of Russia, Germany and other European dictatorships as guiding stars these parlous futilities seem like the academic discussion by two doctors of the relative merits of various anaesthetics, while their patient lies dying for lack of surgery.

Mr. Weir accuses the Roosevelt administration of "a purge of property which is not far removed in principle from human purges of the German and Russian type." No doubt about it, economic violence often hurts quite as much as physical violence of a mild order. But history is filled with examples of individuals who gladly surrendered their worldly goods to be freed of the rack or torture chamber. And it is a sad commentary on human ingenuity, ideals and desires that man has continued, in the twentieth century, to think it worth while sacrificing everything, even unto life itself, to defend a mass of intrinsically worthless possessions. All of which brings us to the disease which is consuming the world today.

Measuring his "success" by tradesmen's standards, the average individual (unable to win sufficient acclamation from his fellows) feels that he is a failure as compared to the few who have set up the materialistic measure of human values. This sense

of failure drives him into the arms of various crack-pot movements such as Fifty - Dollars - Each - Friday, in America; Führer instead of Food, in Germany; or Brother Joe is safer than Jesus, in Russia. In these movements the "failure" finds folk who agree with him, and success is measured only by loquacity. Thus, as individuals, these economic procession-trailers submerge their failure-sense. But the group assumes the same economic attitudes that their individual members sought to escape. Basically, all ideologies whether Communist, Fascist, Nazi, Democratic or Republican measure all things by gold, silver or chewing gum.

When the major parties of America, Europe and Asia set themselves the task of solving the large problems, the real problems, of mankind (which are inherent in the previous paragraph), neither Mr. Weir nor Secretary Ickes need bother whether the 90 per cent or the 10 per cent of the population should be won over to confidence in the government. Men will have confidence in themselves and nobody will listen to speeches on economics.

#### *The "Anticipatory War"*

THE present might seem a fitting time to resurrect one small part of an interview of Josef Stalin by Roy Howard, chairman of the board of the Scripps-Howard newspapers, which took place in the Kremlin on March 1, 1936. On that occasion, Mr. Howard asked Stalin:

"May there not be an element of danger in the genuine fear, existing in what you term capitalistic countries, of intent on the part of the

Soviet Union to force its political theories on other nations?"

The answer is unequivocal.

"There is no justification for such fear," said Stalin. "If those to whom you refer believe that the people of the Soviet Union have any desire to alter the face of things by force or to change the established order in surrounding states by force, they are entirely mistaken. . . . To presume that we want to bring about revolution in other countries by interference with their national life is unwarranted."

Mr. Howard explains that the interview was checked and rechecked by Stalin, who "read, revised and materially strengthened the original text." There was never any question that Stalin was misquoted, and the interview was published all over the world, in some twenty languages, while in pamphlet form more than five million copies were sold within the U. S. S. R.

In fairness, however, it should be admitted that a man cannot be held to utterances that are four years old. In that period of time, obviously, the international situation as it affects the Soviet Union may have changed. For one thing, the safety of 170,000,000 Russians has been endangered by the terrorist activities of some 3,800,000 Finns, and under such threatening circumstances of "capitalist encirclement" Stalin cannot be expected to abide by his avowed determination not "to change the existing order in surrounding states by force." For another thing, the entire situation has been changed fundamentally by the fact (says *Pravda*, January 16) that "the toilers of Finland regard the Red Army as their liberators from



the monstrous oppression of the capitalists and landlords inspired by British and French imperialists." Or consider, if you like, a view of the realities as seen by *Izvestia* of the same date: "Fighting against a malignant and perfidious enemy, the valiant warriors of the country of socialism are fulfilling their sacred duty with credit. With Stalin's name on their lips, they go into battle and crush the wasp-nests of the Finnish White Guards."

And the newspaper *Trud*, in explanation of the conflict forced upon the U.S.S.R., revives a distinction and a prophecy of Lenin's. The distinction is between "unjust imperialist wars" and something described by the founder of the Soviet Union as "just anticipatory wars," a good example of which, it appears, is the present little contretemps in Finland. And the prophecy is this: "The most just of all wars will be the war fought by the U.S.S.R. against imperialist aggressors, should they infringe on our peaceful labor." For the rest, the Moscow press of the same date carefully explains that the Red Army is engaged in "emancipatory work in Poland," while in Finland it "is carrying out an honorable international duty."

Whatever the outcome of the struggle, the resistance of the Finns will remain a sobering reminder that the democratic way of living is not to be defended lightly. So long as that way of living is cherished in this country, valiant Finland will remain a symbol and an example to us that,

just as its conception and establishment demanded maximum sacrifice, so does its defence.

### *No News Is No News*

OUR hats are off, editorially speaking, to newspaper editors in Czeckia. Each day new prohibitions are imposed on them by Berlin, yet by some sort of journalistic sorcery they succeed in filling their columns with news of a sort. In the last batch of orders from Germany, Czech editors were given a list of forty-four new categories of news that are *verboten*.

For example, no reprint of speeches expressing a desire to reform existing conditions; no "ambiguous remarks," which will be punished as sabotage; no accounts of Gestapo activities; no discussions in print of anti-Semitic measures; no mention of suicides or of arrests; no remarks on unfavorable economic factors, no criticism of officials, even by inference, and no mention of conditions in industry, methods of education, food prices, railroad schedules, state of public health or of disrepair of roads: in other words, no news on the home front.

These regulations are an attempt to lessen the dangers that Germany is subjected to every day, in Bohemia and Moravia. No news emanates these days from Prague, but it should be clear that in seeking to keep one population of approximately ten millions in bondage, the Reich has a much tougher assignment there than it has currently on the Western Front.

THE LIVING AGE was established by E. Littell, in Boston, Massachusetts, May 1844. It was first known as LITTELL'S LIVING AGE, succeeding Littell's *Museum of Foreign Literature*, which had been previously published in Philadelphia for more than twenty years. In a prepublication announcement of LITTELL'S LIVING AGE, in 1844, Mr. Littell said: "The steamship has brought Europe, Asia, and Africa into our neighborhood; and will greatly multiply our connections, as Merchants, Travelers, and Politicians, with all parts of the world; so that much more than ever, it now becomes every intelligent American to be informed of the condition and changes of foreign countries."

Limitation of national authority is  
a basic essential for world peace

# The Collapse of Sovereignty

By STORM JAMESON

From the *Fortnightly*, London Independent Monthly

IT IS possible that Europe cannot now be saved. The most optimistic, the best-grounded belief in the victory of France and England, cannot make less of the fact that we English have been driven into a position of extreme danger. The course of the war can be predicted with confidence but not with certainty. Western civilization has made the mistake of having a second great war, and such persistent silliness might turn out to be incurable. Our civilization—it is conceivable—might be too silly to live. Its future historian, probably Chinese, would disentangle the various causes of its decay, economic nationalism, the shortsightedness or ignorance of some national leaders, the power lust of others. He would find that in the First World War men who proposed to study and attempt to cure the deeper causes of the instability leading to war were rebuked for not realizing that the important thing was to win; that precisely the same argu-

ments were urged in the Second World War. He might perhaps decide that the root cause of the decay of civilization in the twentieth century was nothing more and nothing less than atrophy of the imagination.

The grounds on which we hope for a military victory are good. It would be foolish to expect defeat and damned foolish to count on easy or even on wholly satisfactory victory.

It is difficult to be sure on what English people do now count. The lack of visible excitement, the matter-of-fact patience, on which foreign observers have commented, are not the whole story. Very many people, not pacifists, are profoundly perplexed. They accept the fact of war, they do their duty by the war, but they remain baffled, deeply uneasy, often without being able to put their bewilderment into words. The fault is not theirs. It is not their fault that the words, "We are fighting to end Hitlerism," wake an echo—"We are fighting to end Kaiserism"—and that

with the echo comes the hollow feeling of standing in a place of echoes. The labor of a Churchill to roar loud enough to drown it, is wasted. You cannot silence an echo by shouting. Every young man leaving his house in new khaki uniform is accompanied by one or two or three dead young men, also in khaki, and it is in fact their presence, their constant mute "What, again?" which gives us this sense of emptiness, of questions unanswered. As the war goes on, this feeling will spread and strengthen. There are ways of dealing with it. One is to go on talking with blithe fourth-form cheerfulness about destroying Hitlerism. Another is the Churchill way of calling up contempt and hatred of the enemy. Both are the worse for wear, and the second corrupts.

THE immediate cause of the war is the inflamed nationalism which divides the States of Europe politically, economically and to a varying extent, socially. The situation was always dangerous. It became more dangerous at each stage of the policy of financial and economic restriction. It became abnormally dangerous after March 1933.

Governments which adopt policies of restriction may do so in defence of the existing power and interests of their country. Or with the deliberate intention of establishing a self-sufficiency which will aid them in extending their power by force. In the Marxian thesis governments are the facade behind which "monopoly capitalism" ruthlessly pursues its own interests, and precipitates war when these interests are threatened by external rivals or by internal revolution.

This thesis is too crude to be valuable. There can be no question that the influence of powerful interests on a national government is socially anarchic and a threat to peace. The influence of a Great Interest is not used with a view to benefiting the nation as a whole. It is used to advance the power of the particular Great Interest. The member of the *Comité des Forges* who said, "*Monsieur, quand les intérêts atteignent à l'ampleur des nôtres, ils se confondent avec l'intérêt national*," was talking through his balance sheet. It is to the interest of a particular industry to acquire subsidies, to set up tariff walls against foreign competitors, and a powerful industry does not hesitate to bring pressure on its government to achieve these ends. It urges arguments of national interest. If it were possible for Great Britain to pursue policies of restriction in isolation it would have an advantage over the rest of the world. But restriction is countered by restriction; trade barriers rise everywhere; international commerce and finance are dislocated; unemployment, temporarily relieved, worsens. That the aggravated state of tension, political and economic, will encourage and seem to justify warlike policies in one or more countries is inevitable.

We are accustomed to regard as normal and proper that aspect of economic nationalism which a government pursues when it takes steps to see that the country is not excluded from trading with and investing in territories abroad or cut off from essential supplies. So long as the world is partitioned between rival sovereignties it is clear that a government which neglected its opportunities in this struggle for economic

strength would be behaving with a highmindedness it could not justify to its traders when these were excluded from a valuable territory by some other Power, or to its Defence Council when this saw itself deprived of necessary raw materials. We accept as natural the risks of tension and conflict with another Power equally anxious about its prosperity and defence. An ideal solution—the recognition by responsible statesmen that they must agree to adjust their respective claims—used to hang suspended in our minds like Olympus watching the duels of Greek and Trojan. Bismarck's Germany had no use for these charming cloud-forms; the Third Reich has made an end of them. After 1933 the normal economic tensions were aggravated by the triumph in Germany of a nationalism divested of any rags of liberal thought or respect for the rule of law. The motives and intentions of Germany's new leaders in their struggle for power, contained, from the first, elements it would be inadequate and silly to call economic. As inadequate as it was to interpret the Nazi triumph as a subtle conspiracy of German industrialists—"the death throes of monopoly capitalism," or whatever the neo-Marxian formula was. Nazi Pan-Germanism, busy about rebuilding the Holy Roman Empire, desired power for the sake of power. Its economics are those of a barbarian leader in search of wealth. It wishes *Lebensraum* not only to make sure of unhindered access to raw materials and economic opportunities but to seize and portion among its own people the territory of defeated and dispossessed nations, as in Poland, and to impose forced labor on its subject

racess, as it is doing on the Poles and Czechs. The imprisonment, pillaging and killing of Jews and political opponents in these countries, and in Germany and Austria, is a yet cruder form of the Nazi reversion to methods of conquest more familiar in the earlier history of Western Europe than—before 1933—they were to us.

Even now the British Government talks of crushing Hitlerism as though, that done, we should have no more serious trouble in the world. Obedient literate apes support it in this and reprove an attempt to raise the wider issues. So do interested industrialists—interested only in reducing a formidable and unscrupulous rival. It cannot be said too often or too energetically that by itself military victory will settle nothing, except—for a time—the hopes of the Pan-Germans. If nothing comes of victory but a reshifting of the balance of power the war will have been fought in vain, as was the last war, and the most we can hope for is an interval of peace long enough to get the war memorials unveiled. Unless the principles of economic nationalism are reversed, unless nations resign their absolute power to disorder the living conditions of the whole world to their own temporary profit, we shall simply repeat, at a more despairing level, the experience of 1919-29 and of 1929-September 1939.

**I**N the proper sense of the term, there is no economic organization in Europe; the international cartels set up to deal with certain basic raw materials have not been proof against sectional pressure. There are a number of independent States, whose economic arrangements are made and

needs satisfied (or not) in a disorderly and grotesquely uneconomic fashion.

The choice between anarchy and some measure of federalism cannot wait. Whatever the internal politics of the chief European nations at the end of the war, they must either sacrifice as much of their sovereign independence as will allow them to establish the framework of an economic order, or perpetuate a Europe strangled by traffic barriers and crushed by the burden of defending its right to choke to death. If it were merely a question of slaughtering every twenty years an unstated number of men, women, children, our statesmen would doubtless resign themselves to the disagreeable necessity. But it has become a question of the survival of States, that is, of statesmen. If we do not organize Europe it will fall to pieces. The process, even for statesmen, will be damnably unpleasant.

It is possible to argue that the economic federation of Europe is impossible—that Europe is past praying for. It is not possible to argue that it is not desirable and not urgent. There is no palatable alternative. A German hegemony in Europe would impose on its subject races the order now existing in Czechoslovakia and turn Europe into a concentration camp. An Allied victory which does not establish international economic co-operation will settle nothing but the date of the next war. There must be an end to the present uneconomic and brutish disorder with its waste of life and wealth. The readiness with which people have seized on the ideas of federal union now current is a measure of our past hopelessness.

The ideas are not new. The form given them by the English Society for Federal Union and in Streit's *Union Now*, and their eager acceptance in this crisis of Europe by people of all sorts, are new. Streit's book, and an excellent book, *The Case for Federal Union* by W. B. Curry, provide the material on which people may form their own judgment.

In my opinion it is rash to base any hopes on the willingness of America to enter into any form of federal union with the European democracies. If the chances of economic reorganization in Europe are bound up with America they are nonexistent, and Europe is done for. It would be better to leave completely aside any notion of inducing the United States to co-operate in this form and at this stage. That co-operation in some form between a federated Europe and America could and would be established I have no doubt. But Europe ought, before inviting the participation of America, to cleanse herself of her disease of economic nationalism. The co-operation of the self-governing Dominions of the British Empire is, on the other hand, essential; appeals addressed to the United States to support a policy of economic and social reconstruction would be better directed to them.

THE first essential of peace and order in Europe is a limitation of sovereignty. States must be prepared to resign their powers to adopt financial and trade policies which, whatever temporary advantage they offer to the particular nation, are certain to end badly. International conferences and leagues or associations of independent States are useless without



the machinery of economic co-operation. The power to control trade and finance, to deal with other States and groups of States, to control and limit armaments, to enforce respect for international law, to control the use of raw materials, to govern and educate in colonial territories and to prepare them for self-government, to reconstruct and develop certain social services in Europe (*e.g.*, communications, medicine), should be handled by a federal European Council, or Parliament—what does the name matter? With effective economic and social co-operation the political causes of friction between member States would be reduced to a minimum. But unless the nations of Europe are able to limit their sovereignty to the minimum degree necessary for the establishment of a central economic and financial authority, they are done for. We are done for. And serve us right. There is no room now in Europe for the destructive quarrels, economic and military, of gangs of armed States. (Valiant efforts to prove that England is not part of Europe and could remain profitably neutral, have been silenced by the logic of events.) There must be order and there must be economic co-operation. Without it, western democracy is at an end.

It will not be easy to replace uncontrolled State sovereignty by some form of economic and social federation, but nothing less is worth fighting for. Without the hope of such a new departure, the irony of this war following the war to end war would be unbearable. We have been brought to the edge of despair in the last few years. The maiming and slaughter of children and defenceless people in the streets and fields of their countries, the

misery and humiliation of tens of thousands of exiles, the suicides, the foulness of concentration camps, the torturing of prisoners—these things have made our lives bitter, have made the spectacle of Europe a horror. The ideals of social justice, tolerance, freedom, are being ground to dust between the fragments of a disordered Europe. A mad and destructive nationalism has done this. Nothing matters but to get rid of it.

The League of Nations failed to achieve order in Europe because its most powerful member States were not willing to act with the self-restraint of civilized individuals. In fact they could not. Individuals have common interests. States, as sovereign bodies, have an immediate interest in preserving their power which overrides their interest in keeping the peace. Each member of the League did as it pleased and—as long as it was convenient—paid Geneva the civility of meeting there to discuss the resulting conflicts. The League's power to act as a living body resided only in its members. We were lately invited by our Government to lament the failure to function of a power it had consistently misused and neglected. The League never had an economic organization, nor means to create one. Its dusty state now does not alter the fact that one half of the machinery of international co-operation, and an invaluable knowledge and experience—it would be out of place to speak of the hopes of permanent officials and common men—is in existence, to be reconditioned and put to work.

In a federated Europe enough would be saved on armaments to provide a Reconstruction and Develop-

ment Fund that would not be a mockery. We must be prepared to achieve federal union in Europe by stages. A basis exists in the Oslo Group, and in the re-created mechanism for Franco-British co-operation. It is not utopian to make plans for the common economic and social organization of Western Europe, including Norway, Sweden—and Germany. Germany cannot be left outside, and we ought to agree that we are fighting this war to compel her to come in. It cannot be ignored that there is a German problem distinct from the Nazi problem. That extraordinary German mysticism which poisons her with the idea of her "higher right" to conquer the world, can only be cured by living in company with other nations. Germany must be held open, must be denied opportunity to shut herself up and breed maggots. No matter what politicians who dislike having to think about the beastliness of concentration camps may say, the internal policy of Germany has become very much our concern. Her frontiers must be kept open to the passage of ideas, and freedom of speech and opinion demanded as part of the reparation she owes the rest of Europe. (It seems sometimes that the only thing to do with Germany after this war would be to insist on

the children being educated abroad. I fear it is impracticable—but what a pity.) For the sake of Europe, of which she is an integral part, we cannot allow Germany to go on corrupting herself with lies. No more than we can plan the organization of Europe—it is silly to speak of reorganizing what has never been organized—without her energy, her capacity for idealism, her decent virtues. Ruritanian plans to dismember Germany, put about by a few persons not notable for their political sagacity, will—if they are given enough publicity—stiffen German resistance. Is this what their authors want?

To say that the obstacles to inducing States to limit their sovereignty are too great is to say that we cannot save Europe. If the war were to end this week, some measure of federation would still be an instant practical necessity. This war, in effect a civil war, will decide the issue between civilization and anarchy.

It is not simply a question of peace terms to end this war, but of terms of peace for Europe. The peace terms themselves must provide the *conditions* for organization and reconstruction. It is unlikely that we shall be given another chance. Possibly we have not been given one this time. We must assume that we have.

### THE ANIMAL KINGDOM?

"When victory comes, our task, in my view, will be only just beginning, and the continuance of such old institutions as fox-hunting will go a long way toward building up the hopes we all have for a new and better world."

—Lord Cromwell in *Rugby Advertiser*

After Finland, the Soviet armies may  
occupy Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia

## Russia's Aims on the Baltic

By MAX M. LASERSON

**I**T may be taken as inevitable that if Finland continues to fight a single-handed battle, without the active support of her neighbors or of other States, the Red Armies will conquer that small nation.

Should that happen, the next step of the U.S.S.R. may be the sovietization or even the occupation of the Baltic States, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, where the Soviet Union has now established naval bases. Occupation would be a comparatively simple matter, because the Baltic States were always closely connected with Russia by way of the navigable stream Dvina emptying into the Gulf of Riga, and the three main railroads. These railways were built during the reign of the czars and they connect the Baltic ports of Riga, Libau (Liepaya) and Windau with the Ukraine, central Russia and the district of the middle Volga.

Occupation would be further simplified because strong ties, economic, cultural, political and technical, have

always existed between these Baltic countries and Russia. These ties, incidentally, were always stronger than those that ever existed between Russia and Finland.

For the moment, the Baltic States may be sure of their independence, in spite of the naval bases and the presence of Russian garrisons on their soil, because during this invasion of Finland, Soviet Russia wants to demonstrate her loyalty to the principle of self-determination of peoples. (This is less contradictory than it sounds because, in the Russian view, the only legitimate Finnish Government is the one the Kremlin has set up at Terioki, the so-called Peoples' Democratic Republic.) It may be stated with assurance that as long as Soviet Russia remains alone in her fight against Finland and is undisturbed by the Allies, her position in the Baltic will grow increasingly powerful.

The struggle between Finland and the Soviet Union is a struggle of un-

equal forces. A small nation with a hundred years of political and parliamentary experience, a tiny country, where universal literacy and great skill prevail, is fighting a world Power, where literacy and skill were an invention of a fictitious socialism proclaimed in the 1918 constitution. It is evident that it is not as simple to polish off Finland as it was to finish off Poland. But Soviet Russia's assault on her little Northern neighbor is only an incident and, short of Allied intervention, there is no doubt that the preponderance of the Russian masses will ultimately crush Finnish forces, no matter how excellent the quality of these forces may be. Finland as an isolated political unit may be unable to hold back the Russian hordes for long and may be crushed when these lines appear in type.

One thing must be borne in mind. Russia never won a war with a country technically her superior. In the Crimean War, in which Turkey was supported by England and France, Russia was beaten. Similarly, in the war with Japan, 1904-05, and in the World War, in 1914-18, she was beaten.

During the twenty-year period of bolshevism, Soviet Russia, of course, raised the standard of technical education; she developed her industries and spread literacy. The Russian soldier of today is more intelligent than his predecessor of czarist Russia. But those in command of the Russian army lack the proper training and tradition. The officer personnel trained in the military academies was wiped out during the Russian Soviet Revolution and during the subsequent purges. And even if the present technical

standard of the Russian army is higher than in czarist times, the Russian soldier cannot be compared with the long-civilized Finn as a fighting man. It is now clearly evident that not only in equal numbers are the Finns incomparably better soldiers than the Russians, but even in the proportion of 1:4 or 1:5. The present odds of 1 to 45, however, will eventually make the situation hopeless. For one must remember that Finland has a population of 4,000,000, while Soviet Russia has 180,000,000.

**B**UT even if Finland is crushed by the Soviet steam-roller, Russia will have lost much military prestige, for she has already demonstrated that she is unable to defeat easily a modern motorized, technically well-equipped European power, even a small one.

There is, however, a moral side to this situation. The Finns are defending their soil; the Russians are fighting on foreign soil. The Soviet soldier is impressed by the doctrine of the Soviet State that he is fighting the "bourgeois" White Finns, but he lacks the elemental feeling that he is defending his own soil, and his heart is not in the present struggle.

The average Russian soldier is of peasant stock. His class was deprived of property rights and made collective farmers. On these collective farms (*kolkhozy*) certain areas of land were allotted for individual use. In spite of this, the peasantry remained dissatisfied. Now in this war, some soldiers see the difference in equipment, in food and in clothing between themselves and the Finnish fighters. They come to the conclusion that they were lied to as to the

ideas they should possess about the "bourgeois" armies. All these facts taken together cannot make out of the Russian soldier a fighter for a fatherland which has not been threatened by an enemy.

Russia's ways of communication, her railways and highways, have demonstrated their inadequacy even now, when she is fighting one small country and in addition is obliged to supply her ally—Nazi Germany—with oil and other products. What will be her fate if in the spring she must face a new front in Rumania or the Caucasus or both simultaneously, is something to provoke speculation. Already we have seen queues reappearing in the most important towns of Russia. True, the population of Russia knows what it means to be discontented with the existing régime; the population became used to the overthrowing of régimes during the period of the Civil War in 1917-20. Disorganization of transport and communication could no doubt bring about active uprising, even without outside intervention or propaganda.

Czarist Russia had Germany for her enemy, which bottled up her ports in the gulfs of Finland and Riga. But the new relations between Russia and Germany have changed the entire Baltic front. They are now co-partners in the condominium over the Baltic Sea. Germany has permitted Russia to take over her historic position in the Baltic, for which they had been fighting for hundreds of years. The establishment of naval bases in Libau, Windau, Riga, Tallinn, Baltiski and on the islands of Oesel and Dago, and the evacuation of the German population from the Baltic States, were the prerequisites for the strengthening of

Russia's position on the Baltic. One can assume that Russia will reward Germany by giving her a share of the spoils on the Baltic and by granting her free access to routes and channels connecting the Baltic with the Arctic Ocean. A victory over Finland will therefore mean a change in the balance of power in international relations, and the position of the Scandinavian countries on the Baltic and consequently on the Atlantic, will become subservient.

Soviet Russia, victorious over Finland, will not only be master of the Baltic Sea, from Memel to Torneo, but will also be the master of ice-free ports on the Arctic Ocean, including Murmansk and Petsamo, even if she has not occupied Narvik or other Norwegian ports situated directly on the Atlantic coast. The weak points of the Soviet Union as a naval power, the deficiencies in her naval personnel, will be filled by Germany. Germany will no doubt put at Russia's disposal her large, well-trained naval personnel, which cannot now find opportunities in the small German fleet, since the Reich primarily needs submarine men. In this manner, Russia's victory over the Baltic and the two oceans will mean an indirect victory for Germany. The Baltic States and Finland are really in the center of world affairs although at first glance they seem removed from the principal sea and land routes.

Contemporary England, the mistress of the seas, cannot afford to permit the creation of a solid Russo-German bloc in the basins of the Baltic, the White Sea and the western part of the Arctic, where it merges with the waters of the Atlantic Ocean. The establishment of such a bloc



would mean the disturbance of the geographic distribution of the three most important Powers—England, Russia and Germany—which existed for about a century. To preserve this balance of power, England must guard her "life-line" with all the means at her command. And as often happened in the history of England, her international interests, thanks to her good fortune, coincide with her interests in protecting the democratic countries and smaller nations.

**T**HE drama which is unfolding before us reveals that the democratic Allies are not limited to the Western Front. The theater of the drama extends to the extreme end of northern Protestantism and clashes in the region of ancient Ingermanland (the southern part of Finland and the district of Leningrad), where the first battles between the Slavic East and the European West took place. The

Northmen were fighting their way through the North to reach the warmer Black and Mediterranean Seas by way of the Dvina and Dnieper rivers.

After the Northmen, Russia's adversaries in this region were, in succession, Denmark, the German Livonic Order, and Sweden—all Germanic nationalities. In the year 1242, almost exactly seven hundred years ago, there took place the famous Liedovoye battle between the Russians and Germans, at the same spot—the river Neva and Lake Ladoga—where today the outcome of the Russo-Finnish struggle is being decided.

Since then, the struggle has become complicated by new developments and for new reasons. The old enemy of national Russia—Germany—becomes the friend of Soviet Russia, and therein lies the vital difference. Notwithstanding this fact, however, the fundamental geopolitical lines remain the same.

## INTERREGNUM

By Louis MacNeice

Twenty years forgetting,  
Twenty years turning the Nelson eye,  
Our wings heavy with the pollen  
Of flowers about to die.

But now the sun has set behind the hangar,  
At least we are alive,"  
We said, "Make merry in the sunshine,  
There is no honey in the hive.

—*New Statesman and Nation*, London

Ready for the new order is a great deal of idle and expensive machinery

# What Is Left of the League

By J. WILLIAM TERRY

**B**EFORE its action on Finland's appeal against Russian aggression, it was not unusual to hear the League of Nations spoken of in the past tense. That tense is still used by some in speaking of the Geneva institution. This is because the League is victim of a popular psychological discrimination and not because it is dead.

The 1930-40 decade stands unique for wholesale, if not all-inclusive, political failures. Russia did not succeed with its communism, the fascist states increased the afflictions of their peoples; the monarchial and social-democratic régimes made records heavy with futility; even the democracies did not hold their own. In the international field, the aggressors, the champions of the status quo and the neutrals all acquired balances on the red side of the ledger. As means of maintaining peace, super-armaments, military alliances, power diplomacy, arbitration treaties, outlawry of war, pacifism and collective security all

proved to be equally impotent. But it is hard for the mind of man to grasp mass failure of this magnitude. Hence, out of the perennial propensity to create scapegoats, came the discrimination against the youngest of the institutions involved in the general political breakdown.

Few will dispute that, if the world is not to go deeper into chaos when the current epoch of warring is ended, peace must have international organization—the League of Nations or something else that is akin to the League. If there is still good League machinery, it would seem monumental folly to scrap it and begin again, with something that is pure experiment. That for which some fifty nations have given upwards of twenty years of intensive building is not lightly to be thrown away.

The League's losses have been great. Three of its former six large-Power members (Japan, Germany and Italy) have withdrawn. Russia has been expelled. The authority of

the League Covenant is gone, in so far at least as it specifies action for restraint of aggression. League finances have been seriously impaired, entailing grievous loss of personnel. What then would a cold-blooded inventory show that the League is and has now that are promising potentialities for world peace organization when such organization becomes possible?

First of all, even in the midst of the wars the League of Nations is a going institution. Moreover, it is going largely on its own momentum.

**I**N substance, the League is machinery which is not self-powered but must be energized by its member nations. Many of these members being involved in wars or the dire threat of wars, which they did not energize the League to prevent, have left Geneva largely to its own devices—and a precarious possibility of getting revenue to cover a penurious five million dollar budget for 1940.

Nevertheless, the League Health Organization has epidemic commissions helping in the battle against typhus fever and bubonic plague in war-scourged China. The League is answering the appeals of countries in Eastern Europe for aid in preparing against invasion of war-created epidemics. The League's Bureau at Singapore still collects reports on epidemic diseases in Far Eastern countries and broadcasts them daily to health services and ships at sea. League work goes on for standardization of various medical preparations, for safeguarding consumers of medical care in many countries. The extensive research in fields of nutrition and housing is being advanced.

There are also the League activities for international control of traffic in narcotics, about two boards of which Secretary of State Hull recently wrote: "It is the opinion of this Government [United States] that it is upon the operation of these two boards, supplementing and co-ordinating the efforts of individual nations, that the entire fabric of drug control ultimately and principally rests."

Launched in direct consequence of the appalling increase of addiction during and after the last World War, these activities have produced what, in some ways, is the most genuine and far-reaching piece of international action yet known. Japan, apparently abetted by a few recalcitrant states, is flouting the control system, in order to use opium as a weapon of aggression against the Chinese. Various lines of control have been cut or weakened by the other wars. The system, however, is being kept intact and in operation; with, for example, 140 countries and territories (31 in excess of last year) submitting estimates for legitimate requirements for 1940, upon which limitation of manufacture is based.

In large-scale achievement, the economic work of the League has a discouraging record, of which the abortive London Economic Conference was not far from typical. There are few, however, who doubt that the world would be in far less a mess if the policies urged by the League's Economic Committee had been put into practice. The thorough research upon which the Committee's urgings were based is being carried on and the Committee continues to function—amazing tenacity for these times.

In no sense is this social and economic activity only a marking time, in desperate hope of a turn for the better. On the contrary, witness the forging-ahead vitality of the fundamental reorganization that is being made, irrespective of the wars, in conformity with the "Bruce Report." Authorized by the same Assembly session that acted on Finland's appeal, this most radical organization change to be made in the League since its founding has as its purpose to increase the effectiveness of the social and economic activities, outside the restricting influences of the strictly political. When the reorganization is complete, all economic, financial, health, transit, housing, narcotic control, child welfare and other humanitarian activities will belong to a semi-autonomous division, under a governing committee on which countries non-members as well as countries members of the League may be represented.

**T**O team with this economic and social division of the League is the autonomous International Labor Organization, of which the United States is a member. Having concern for its 67 multilateral treaties for the protection of workers and raising of labor standards, and their 865 ratifications, by which nations bind themselves to fulfill the conditions of the treaties, the I.L.O. carries on. War, as it always does, is playing havoc with labor standards in many countries. A large part of the I.L.O. program for new conferences and new treaties is necessarily in abeyance. Even so, some advance is being made. For instance, there was the Western Hemisphere Conference at Havana late last fall. Meanwhile, with a di-

minished staff, the I.L.O. holds its lines and does a vast amount of invaluable research against the demands and opportunities of the indefinite tomorrow when the wars end.

Numerically, the international civil service (Secretariats of the League and I.L.O.) has never been large; not much over 1,000 at its peak—at an annual cost to nearly three score nations not exceeding eight million dollars. But it has been unique and highly effective. At the first of this year, the personnel had been reduced by cancellation, suspension or non-renewal of about 300 contracts. It is the men and women who remain in this service, together with League commissions and committees which continue to meet on regular schedule, who are keeping the League functioning non-politically.

Post-1918 conditions afford some suggestion of the epidemics, the multitudes of refugees, the illegitimate demand for narcotics, the economic and financial chaos, and the plight of labor that will follow the present wars. The League's aid to refugees and combating of epidemics in the early 1920s, under Fridtjof Nansen, will stand monument to humanitarian achievement through all time. Then, the work was started from scratch by an infant League. Today, there is functioning basic social and economic organization developed over twenty years and reaching round the earth. Tomorrow, it will be ready for expansion to serve in bringing order out of another post-war chaos. The pity is that the expansion is not being made now—preparation for peace in time of war.

These non-political activities do not, of course, achieve the primary

purposes of the League; do not bring pacific settlement to international disputes, prevent aggression or assure just relations between nations. They do, however, build organically and fundamentally for a world community, through which it should be possible to come to an enduring peace.

While the League is now a going institution chiefly by virtue of its non-political work, the political machinery is ready for operation whenever the nations decide to use it. When it was put into service in the Finnish-Russian affair, a new record was set for speed of operation. Moreover, the impetus and co-ordination being given by the League to practical aid for Finland makes a wholly new development in Geneva technique.

It is yet to be said by anyone competent to speak, that the League's political machinery has ever failed. The failures to date have been those of League members.

There have been twenty regular sessions of the League Assembly and 107 sessions of the Council—the bodies which might be called the two houses of the first permanent parliament of nations. By an open diplomacy, envisaging only the methods of co-operation (so that when there was resort to power politics it had to be outside the League), the Assembly and Council have wrestled with affairs of great magnitude. With most of the lesser of these, the wrestling was successful; with those of supreme import it failed. But there is nothing to say that the machinery which succeeded with the lesser could not succeed as well with the greater, had the member nations the will to succeed. And there is nothing to say that any other machinery could suc-

ceed better, as long as that will is lacking. For all the difference in age, the League's chief political organs have as definite, although not as rigid, an entity as the British Parliament or the United States Congress. Such institutions do not reach innocuous desuetude by way of one tragic epoch's failures.

THE unusual elasticity of the League Covenant and the functioning of League political organs makes the League political machinery peculiarly adaptable to demands that a new post-war order may put upon it.

By striking out the "sanction" articles (16 and 17) from the Covenant, the Geneva institution could be made solely a "league of conferences," should the opinion prevail that a "peace-enforcing" league cannot succeed. On the other extreme, many of us believe that the need will be for a super-state league, to which its members transfer sovereignty on all matters essentially international. Let there be the transfer of sovereignty and the existing League machinery could quickly be expanded into effective super-state structure. Vest the powers in the Assembly and Council and they would make a competent legislative body. The World Court is an established, proven judiciary. There is the nucleus of an admirable civil service. An international police force would have to be created.

The least that the League has to contribute to organized peace in the post-war world are its physical possessions. Nevertheless, the League's eight million dollar Palace in Ariana Park, the cathedral-like I.L.O. building on the shore of Lake Lemman are



not only symbols of stability but can have much practical value.

On the other hand, among the League's greatest assets are the intangibles.

"The League" has become synonymous universally with the ideals of collective security, disarmament, and co-operative diplomacy. Scoffers have, for the most part, been cynics who derided the possibility of achieving such ideals. Today the urgent question, if these things are unattainable, to what can mankind turn for international peace, has hushed all but the most hardened cynics.

Geneva holds the roots of international consultation. Men of state have formed the habit of going to the Swiss city in behalf of peace and an orderly world; and this not only in times of crisis but also ordinarily—annually for the Assembly, quarterly for the Council and frequently for commission and committee sessions. The British always stop at Hotel Richmond and the French at Hotel des Berges. The Germans stopped at Hotel Metropole and the Russians at Hotel Bellevue; and they will in all likelihood return to these hostels when their wayward nations rejoin the League. Everyone forgathers at the unpretentious and often overcrowded Café Bavaria. Certainly, post-war international consultation can flourish best here where, for a score of years, it has been sinking its roots.

"Geneva atmosphere" has had vast

potency for international conciliation. Writing of it ten years ago, the realistic journalist, Sir Philip Gibbs, said: "Something happened to men's minds at Geneva. I saw it happen. Some mental atmosphere there, a contact with former enemies and other types of intelligence, perhaps some spiritual vibrations reaching them from the outside world, broadened their vision and enabled them to see beyond their own boundaries. They learned to think internationally . . ." That atmosphere has been terribly poisoned, since 1930. But the poison is foreign pollution which can be cleared away in a better day. There is convincing evidence that the atmosphere of the years of Briand, Stresemann, Nansen and Cecil at Geneva has not all gone from the halls of the League. What better atmosphere is there in which to build a new peace?

Possibly a federation of democracies, certainly a federation of the world would more effectively insure an enduring peace than any league system. But why ponder utopias when there is intense need for the best that is feasible? In the two paradoxical decades after 1920, the nations created more peace structure than was created in all time before. Then they failed to make adequate use of what they had built. But that which is essential has not been lost. New opportunity to use it lies just beyond the dark valley of wars through which mankind is now staggering.

Von Hindenburg's right hand describes  
the war that Europeans may experience

# Apostle of the 'Total War'

By GENERAL ERICH VON LUDENDORFF

*(Regarded by Reichswehr officers as indispensable for an understanding of "totalitarian war" is a curious volume on the subject by the late General Erich von Ludendorff, who first published his primer, Der Totale Krieg, in 1936; it has not been published in this country. The book is a mixture of military and political doctrine, racist argument, extenuation of Germany's defeat in 1918, attacks on Jews and Catholics, and pre-Nazi mysticism. Nevertheless, the volume is regarded in Germany as compulsory reading for any student of modern warfare, and it contains passages of acute relevance to the hostilities in Europe today. The following excerpts are from the aforementioned book.—The Editors.)*

THE totalitarian war which, far from being the concern of the military forces alone, directly touches the life and soul of every single member of the belligerent nations, arises not solely from a policy

made necessary by the clutching for power of the Jewish people and the Roman Church and their passion for weakening the nations and draining the blood of those who offer any resistance. The totalitarian war is also the result of the introduction of universal conscription, of the increasing population and of the use of new means of warfare, the effects of which have become much more destructive. The days of war by armies alone have passed and, with their passing, totalitarian warfare has gained in intensity; aircraft has been improved, and planes today drop not only bombs but pamphlets and other propaganda material; thanks to the radio, verbal propaganda is carried to the enemy. During the World War, the armies fought in wide zones of action on a front extending over many miles, so that in some degree hostilities affected the civilian population, but it may be said today that the seat of war extends over the whole territory of the belligerent nations. Not only the

armies but home populations are now subjected to the operations of war.

The principle of tit for tat is particularly true of totalitarian warfare, and it gives rise to fearful strains upon the nations who participate in it. The nature of totalitarian war is such that it can be waged only when the existence of the entire nation is threatened and when that nation is really determined to wage such war. The days when wars were declared at the will of prime ministers, and of wars with limited political aims, belong to a bygone age. Such wars were marauding and predatory expeditions, rather than the morally justified combat that totalitarian war connotes. Those limited wars were the most immoral of actions and do not deserve the sublime and solemn definition of warfare. They were provoked by greed, and their aim was not the preservation of the nation but its aggrandizement. . . .

The next conflict will put quite different demands upon the people than did the World War, for it will demand that the nation place all its mental, moral, physical and material forces in the service of war. In future, the dependence of the armed forces upon the mental and moral solidarity of the home front will certainly not diminish, but will be greater than in 1914-18. Just as the hostile Powers then—with excessive consistency—aimed at the destruction of the spiritual solidarity of the German nation, so this goal will be generally pursued by belligerent nations in addition to that of destroying the armies of the enemy. . . .

As nations today regain increasingly their racial consciousness, the more the national soul begins to stir in them and the wider knowledge be-

comes of the world-destroying activities of the Jewish race and the Roman Church, which are striving for universal power over and above all nations, the more inevitable is a policy aimed at the application of totalitarian warfare for the preservation of the people. Such must become the national policy, and the people will willingly devote themselves to the prosecution of that war if it is clear that the preservation of the nation is at stake.

**I**N their lust for power, Judah and Rome, controlling the financial capital of the world, have by a capitalistic organization of the economic life, on the one hand, and by Socialist, Communist and collectivist doctrines on the other, introduced these abuses into the nations of Europe, including Germany. The Reich, unsuspecting and full of joyous hope, was aspiring to the promised state of happiness, and thus unwittingly she served the interests of these super-national Powers and brought about their own enslavement. Once more Judah and Rome set to work to extend their disruption even further afield, and finally and completely to destroy the physical, economic and psychical strength of the nations and to render them defenceless. . . .

The nations which have embraced Christianity do not possess a faith akin to their peoples, which should be based on the unity and solidarity of government, nation and army, and of the entire national life generally. Christianity is an alien creed, diametrically opposed to our German racial inheritance, which it slowly kills. It deprives the nation of its racial psychical unity and renders it defence-

less. Only by constraint do the Jew and the Christian church allow the European nations to retain any of their national values: they are unable to stifle entirely the call of blood. But both the Jew and the Roman Church exploit these national values for the purpose of exciting the nations one against another. That situation, however, does not alter the effect produced by Christianity upon the individual; it always remains pernicious in its results. According to Christianity, the Jewish nation alone has the right to live its own racial and national life.

A totalitarian policy involves momentous national questions in the solution of which the commanders of the army are directly concerned. From the moment that the necessity of both totalitarian policy and totalitarian war has become clear, hesitation or abstention are no longer admissible, for such a course may bring army and nation to ruin.

Both the state, that is to say, totalitarian politics, and the high army command in a totalitarian war must, of course, take special measures—as, for instance, the strictest censorship of the press, more stringent punishment for the disclosure of military secrets, prohibition of communication at the frontiers of neutral States, prohibition of meetings, arrest of leaders among malcontents, careful control of all railway traffic, control of broadcasting and so on. There is always the danger of malevolent saboteurs, be it of their own accord or at the instigation of enemies, or of representatives of the Jew and of Rome, or of direct enemy propaganda seeking to prevent national solidarity or to endanger it. . . .

The separate war of the air forces is directed in the rear of the enemy against his roads and railways, preventing him from bringing up supplies, and also against every kind of industrial plant which is directly or indirectly of importance to the enemy high command. The air campaign is directed against all workers engaged in such plants, and consequently against whole sections of the population of the enemy country. Attacks by air against the civil population of the enemy country may easily fail if the defence is well organized and the instinct of self-preservation is strengthened in the national soul by these attacks. But when air superiority is achieved and the enemy forces are really damaged, then the enemy territory behind the front becomes the target of the air force.

And just as the air force must carry on the fight against the industrial plants and the civil population of the enemy country as its special task so is it the duty of the armies to protect the home country and its inhabitants from the attacks of the enemy aircraft. In doing so the authorities will, of course, confine their measures to what is strictly necessary to protect railway stations, industrial centers or particularly important works, large storehouses and, finally, the great cities, for which purpose anti-aircraft armament and good means of communication must be provided. It is not possible to protect every place nor does every bomb hit its specific mark.

The abolition of totalitarian submarine warfare—that is, the endeavor to sink every vessel met by a U-boat in the blockade zone, even vessels sailing under neutral flags, as

well as rules against the bombardment of civilian populations—will forever remain a pious wish. The demands of totalitarian warfare and the striving of peoples to defend their lives, make impossible consideration of the silly desire to abolish unrestricted U-boat warfare.


Peoples have little understanding of wars of aggression, but they understand very well a fight for their lives. In a declaration of war they easily see the will to attack and, not feeling themselves menaced, the national soul is not awakened. But if they are made to realize that their lives are jeopardized—as was done in Germany in 1914 with dissemination of the warning that the nation was menaced—the effect upon them is even greater than the actual order of mobilization.

If the military solidarity of the belligerents and the psychical unity of the peoples are approximately equal in degree, the domestic situation of the home country will not affect the conduct of the war. But the picture is altered if, in consequence of

defeats at the front or the efforts of malcontents in the country, the unity of the people is impaired. The time then arrives when bombing squadrons must inexorably and without pity be sent against the enemy population.

In all fields of activity the commander in chief must decide, and his will must be obeyed. Whether the man who must direct the totalitarian war is a great general, the war alone will prove. Theorists, or even the military chiefs in peace time, are by no means great captains in war, while for others war is an opportunity which enables them to develop their full capabilities.

The totalitarian war places endless responsibilities on the commander in chief. A capacity for achievement and a capacity for work are demanded of him to an extent which has never been demanded of the war-lords of former days, not even from Frederick the Great. A nation deserves to have a great general only when it places itself at his service, that is, in the service of the totalitarian war which it wages for its existence.





Belgium and The Netherlands are well defended but many weaknesses exist

## Defence of the Left Flank

By CAPTAIN LIDDELL HART

*(Liddell Hart, the British expert, leads a school of military thought in England which holds that Britain should adhere to a strictly defensive role in the war, as opposed to the views of Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty. The writer is known to have had great influence with Leslie Hore-Belisha, the War Secretary whose resignation was requested in January. In the following excerpts from his latest book, Capt. Hart examines the Allies' left flank where many military writers agree that Germany will strike this spring in the initial stage of a grand-scale offensive.—The Editors.)*



B. H. LIDDELL HART

**D**URING a recent tour I had an opportunity of seeing something of the growth of defences along these [Belgian and

Dutch] frontiers. I began at the junction of the French and Belgian defences, studying the Ardennes battlefields whither in August 1914 the offensive of the strongest French Army (the Fourth) was delivered, where it was repulsed on encounter with the advancing Germans, and whence it recoiled back into France. It was revealing to find how immensely strong by nature were the series of positions—the gorge of the Semois, the heights north of Sedan, and the Meuse—upon which the French might have stood, yet which they so swiftly abandoned.

When one passes beyond the Ardennes to the Liège gap, the evidence of new fortification is still more profuse. Anyone who takes the road from Liège toward the German frontier near Aachen, will see the successive

lines of defence across the Plateau de Herve, a projecting tongue of high ground which extends almost to the German frontier. First, on the outskirts of Liège, comes the "line of security" formed by a chain of pill-boxes which cover the roads into the city, and are permanently manned. Beside each of them may be seen movable anti-tank barricades—steel frames on rollers—which can be swiftly pushed into position to block the road. Liège lies in the trough of the Meuse, with high cliffs walling it in on either side, so that the roads leading from Germany descend thither by steep and narrow valleys. The strength of the line of security lies in the fact that an invader is unable to leave the roads and outflank its posts.

Next, about six miles out from the center, comes the line of the old forts, now modernized, which figured in the siege of 1914. A ring of twelve surrounds the city. Of these, the fort of Fléron lies close to the Aachen road. Stretching across the front is a continuous anti-tank obstacle and a deep wire entanglement. Half a dozen miles farther, one comes to the line of the new forts, now the "principal position," which has been placed far enough out to counteract the increased range of modern artillery. The fort of Battice lies beside the Aachen road, with the fort of Pepinster about seven miles south of it dominating the valley of the Vesdre and the road through Verviers, and the fort of Neufchâteau a similar distance to the north. Thence the line bends back northwestward to the fort of Eben Emael, on the Meuse.

Each of the forts is encircled by a deep anti-tank moat. I should esti-

mate that at Battice to be over two miles round, with a perpendicular concrete wall some fifteen feet deep on the outside and a steep glacis about forty feet high on the inside.

Farther out still, on the eastern edge of the plateau only a few miles from the frontier, is to be seen a forward line of posts and defended localities. Many of the pillboxes nestle in the fields, simply painted green to tone with the background. But in the villages and hamlets one frequently notices apparently brick-built cottages or outhouses which have no windows, or else dummy windows, but instead are seen on a closer glance to have painted steel shutters where the windows should be.

More formidable still, as a barrier to sudden invasion, is the deep belt of prepared demolitions. Their existence is well known, and their locations are not difficult to gauge when one sees bridge after bridge—road, rail or canal—and also various other points on the road, with a little hut tucked away beside it that houses a permanent guard and a sentry continuously on the watch.

WHILE these defences constitute a fortified bridge-head east of the Meuse, the maintenance of that river line north of Liège has received similar attention. A few miles north of Visé, the new Albert Canal cuts through the cliffs on the left bank, forms a switch round the projecting bit of Dutch territory opposite Maastricht, and thence runs west toward Antwerp. In itself a tremendous water obstacle, although not quite complete, its resisting power is strengthened by a chain of casemates, about three to the mile, along the near

bank. At the junction of the Albert Canal and the Meuse is the new fort of Eben Emael commanding the passage where the Germans were able to gain a crossing in 1914 and thus outflank Liège from the north. Built in the cliff, its gun-cupolas crown the crest, while it has two casemates from which the cut through which the canal passes can be swept by fire. A water-filled diversion from the canal forms an anti-tank moat round the rear, protecting the tunnel entrance which gives access to the network of underground galleries. Eben Emael is even larger than Battice, and one is again led to wonder whether the value of its armament justifies the cost in comparison with what might be obtained from mobile guns operating from behind an infantry defence based on a less expensively fortified position.

If the Liège gap between the Dutch "Maastricht Appendix" and the Ardennes is the historic gateway into the main plain of Belgium, north of Maastricht there is a potential gateway that offers a defence problem even more difficult. For here the strangely shaped southward projection of Dutch territory narrows to a neck barely five miles wide. As this is too narrow to be defensible by the Dutch, the Belgians have to face the possible danger of a sudden irruption on their own frontier, here formed by the Meuse. Once across the Meuse, an invader would until recently have met with no further obstacle of serious importance. Now, the Belgians have constructed a chain of pillboxes along the Meuse, topped by a cluster of them at Maeseyck, the frontier "cornerstone," while behind this line obliquely runs the more for-

midable barrier of the Albert Canal.

Steps are being taken to remedy the more obvious deficiencies. The Dutch are in process of constructing a chain of pillboxes along the German frontier to cover the main roads of approach and the bridges across the Maas and the Ysel. About forty, it is reported, were completed last spring. They are permanently garrisoned by a frontier-covering force of twenty-five skeleton battalions, totalling some eight thousand men, which could be heavily reinforced within a few hours. The delaying power of this force against a surprise inroad, is multiplied by the arrangements which have been made to flood parts of the country and blow up bridges.

While the number and width of the Dutch waterlines offer a high degree of natural security against the rapid advance of hostile mechanized forces, it would be unwise to overestimate the resisting power of the forces that Holland could assemble to meet an invasion in strength. In the northern part of the country, lying east of the Zuider Zee and the River Ysel, it could hardly be expected that more than a brief check could be imposed. For the south of Holland, that broad river, the Maas, forms a natural shield. But behind it the Dutch have facilitated the advance of hostile mechanized forces by draining marshes which constituted a useful barrier.

Once an invader had crossed the Maas and was driving westward, it is likely that the Dutch forces would be forced to swing back northwestward behind the Waal, to cover the heart of their country. This would entail the separation of the Belgian and Dutch forces.

One of the most pressing of our many modern problems is in the field of genetics

# Race Building in a Democracy

By HENRY PRATT FAIRCHILD

*EDITOR'S NOTE: The new decade of the twentieth century has marked a revival of interest, on the part of Americans in particular and the world in general, in the problems of genetics and race improvement. That interest was manifested at the recent conference of the Birth Control Federation of America, held in New York early this year. That conference has helped crystallize opinion in America to such a degree that we feel the need for a presentation of the outstanding thought on the subject at this time. There follows a symposium on Race Improvement in a Democracy, led by Henry Pratt Fairchild, Ph. D., professor of sociology at New York University.*

**I**N THE current preoccupation of man to destroy himself, he is prone to forget that in his quest for scientific knowledge, the last important object to which he has directed his intelligence has been himself, particularly his numbers and his quality.

As for numbers, it has been generally assumed in the past almost axiomatically, that the rule was "the more the better." Size and rapid growth have been accepted as intrinsically desirable, without the need of evidence. One ground for this assumption, and one argument that has been consistently advanced when argument was called for, has been the chronic state of war, actual

or prospective, in which most human groups have lived ever since the superior habitation areas began to be appropriated. In the days of primitive warfare, military success—and the resulting group security and prestige—was largely dependent on manpower. This has remained measurably true down to the present day, though the experts are in doubt as to the precise extent.

As for quality, each group tacitly assumed that it was the finest lot of men on earth—an attitude which has not yet entirely disappeared from among mankind—and was correspondingly satisfied. If there were certain individuals who were obviously not up to standard, the burden

they imposed was fatalistically accepted or else, as among the Spartans, they were eliminated from the group by drastic methods. Neither the necessity nor the possibility of doing anything to improve the general in-born quality of the population ever occurred to anybody until very recently.

In point of fact, any worry about undue increase in numbers among primitive peoples, from the group or societal point of view, would have been almost as superfluous as it was beyond the range of their mentality. A stern and ruthless Nature looked after that. It took all the ingenuity, industry and knowledge that primitive men possessed to keep their little groups from being decimated or entirely wiped out in the rigorous struggle for existence and relentless competition of life. Hunger, to the margin of starvation, was one of the chronic conditions of existence. We moderns, accustomed as we are to the phenomena of huge and rapidly growing populations, seldom realize how infinitesimally slow was the growth of mankind until very recent times.

The entire population of the globe at the beginning of the nineteenth century was about 900,000,000. Allowing the conservative estimate of one million years for man's existence on earth, this means that the average annual increase of the human species, for the entire globe, was up to that time only about 900 a year. Granting that this is a rather extreme use of simple arithmetical average, it still serves to emphasize the fact that for almost the entire span of man's existence his increase, generation by generation and century by century,

has been so slow as to approach zero. Humanity has never, until recently, succeeded in escaping the law of stationary population that prevails in Nature by nearly as much of a margin as we are inclined to suppose.

Then came a sudden change. From less than one billion in 1800 the population of the globe mounted in the next 140 years to two billion. The exploitation of three new continents, the technological expansion which accompanied the industrial and commercial Revolutions, and the advances in medicine and public health, which in conjunction laid the foundation for this phenomenal growth, did not in the end prove adequate to provide abundantly for the enormous increase in numbers that resulted when the procreative powers of the species were unleashed. What would have happened if improvements in the social and economic system had kept pace with industry and technology, we can only surmise. The hard fact is that poverty, hunger, and misery did not disappear from the face of the earth, and men continued to wage bitter war on each other for the possession of land, or the mastery of the resources and products of land.

**I**N the meantime, the very growth of a material and technical civilization was placing continuously heavier strains on the capacities of the individual members of society. It is pretty generally agreed among ethnologists that there has been no notable improvement in innate human abilities for twenty thousand years or so. Modern men are called upon to grapple with the problems of an intricate, highly refined social system on the basis of a mentality that was good



enough for the cave man, but displays woeful inadequacies today. There has become evident, therefore, a crying need for a drastic improvement in the human material itself with which society has to deal. This is not merely the elimination of the obviously unfit, mentally or emotionally. The whole average of society must be lifted to a higher level.

The result of these simultaneous developments has been a recognition of the imperative necessity of applying to the field of human reproduction the same principles of self-control, reason, foresight and scientific regulation on which we pride ourselves in every other area of social interest. It is realized that if society itself is to advance along the same lines of efficiency and integration as its material structure and implementation, it must permit and encourage its family units to regulate their own increase intelligently, and must provide them with the facilities for doing so. Fortunately, individual interest and societal interest join hands in this case, which is not always so. Parents as a rule are

no more eager to bring into the world children that they cannot properly support and care for than society is to have them. And the natural solicitude of parents for the welfare and success of their offspring leads them to desire the healthiest, most intelligent, and best adjusted children possible. So birth control and eugenics, after some decades of misunderstanding and even friction, today find themselves working in harmony. Each recognizes the indispensability of the other for its own objectives. The slogan of modern society in the task which may be vividly, if perhaps not quite accurately, described as "race building" is not merely a vague and indiscriminate "bigger and better" population, but a population characterized by the particular qualities which are essential to the maintenance of each given society, and intelligently adjusted in size to the most efficient functioning of its material and cultural equipment, with the ultimate goal of the fullest and richest development of the personalities of all its members.

### A SYMPOSIUM ON BIRTH CONTROL

THE role of birth control in happy married life of Americans, which has from the beginning been logically emphasized by its champions, is re-stated and modernized by Mrs. Sidonie Gruenberg, Director of the Child Study Association of America. She speaks of the relationship between the family and democracy in wider social relations, pointing out that the successful operation of democracy depends upon the existence in the body

politic of traits of affection, loyalty, mutual regard and consideration which can only be properly developed through the medium of a happy and efficient family life. The great strains that are placed upon the modern family by the characteristics of contemporary social and economic life have tended to diminish the effectiveness of the family in cultivating these traits. It is therefore particularly important that those parents who, by nature and

training, are best fitted to develop democratically useful traits in their children should be encouraged to have more than the average sized families. The accomplishment of this goal means that we do have to make available our resources for health and sanity to all without discrimination, in proportion to needs.

**T**HIS introduces one of the most conspicuous and significant themes of the whole symposium, the necessity of establishing such economic conditions that no pair of parents whose qualifications for producing and rearing useful offspring are above the average should be deterred from having a fair-sized family by the economic burdens imposed by numerous progeny. To achieve this end, two possible solutions are conceivable. The first is that the level of living of the entire population should be so high that it would make relatively little difference what the denominator is by which the income is divided. Four or five children would not create a serious economic stringence any more than one or two. The other solution would be to have society, out of its general resources, compensate for the costs of adequate families to those who could not well bear them otherwise.

The general tendency is to stress this possibility rather than the former, probably because it seems more practicable and less likely to involve drastic social changes. Thus Frederick Osborn, Research Associate of the American Museum of Natural History, says, "It seems to me that planned parenthood signifies a natural extension of the birth-control movement to include among its objec-

tives those economic and social conditions which will make it possible for thoughtful and responsible parents at any economic level to plan for families of at least three or four children with reasonable assurance that the basic needs of the children with respect to nutrition, housing, recreation, medical and dental care and education will be met. . . . More immediate and more equitable adjustments can be made only by increasing the services rendered to children by the community. This might be done by some system of family allowances . . . or it might be done by an increase of community services."

Mark Starr, education director, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, asserts "there can be little doubt that the community of the future will give greater recognition to the service of child-bearing by way of family allowances, mothers' pensions and similar schemes."

Dr. Roy Norton, of the University of North Carolina School of Medicine, insists that "economic handicaps should be reduced, and wherever possible eliminated." Thus the responsibility of society, at least of a democratic society, to recognize the necessity of emancipated parenthood was clearly recognized.

The importance of liberated parenthood is being emphasized by many authorities from the point of view of social planning in the broadest sense of the word. Thus James G. Hanes, a businessman, points out that "the shortage of skilled labor in the face of tremendous unemployment emphasizes the need for properly planned families." The surest way to relieve unemployment is to produce members of society who are employable.

Dr. Norton insists that "a democracy should encourage and subsidize race-building." Mr. Starr asserts "the planned family is much closer to our democratic ideals than dependence upon the vagaries of uncontrolled and misunderstood natural instincts and the personal misery and suffering which they may produce."

Another note struck is the protest against the subjection of the individual to destitution, suffering and even death, and the deprivation of society of many of its potentially most useful citizens, in the name of religion, and particularly the religion of the loving Christ. Thus Canon Cornelius P. Trowbridge points out that he is "filled, not with information but rather with indignation." Reading the words of Jesus he found them "filled with compassion for those who are heavy laden" and he rejects the legalists who, in the name of religion, would bind heavy burdens upon the backs of the poor and not lift a finger to help them. Canon Trowbridge makes a stirring demand that society establish conditions of health and well-being for all its members, insisting that this is the truest kind of crime prevention.

Dr. Karl Menninger condemns the "hypocritically biased rationalizations with which to denounce the intelligent regulation of reproduction," although he refers particularly to their expression by Hitler and Mussolini rather than representatives of organized religion. He also deflates the traditional notion of the desirability of large and growing populations, asking where they are supposed to be established and how they are to be supported.

Finally, as an indication of the ac-

tual achievement of birth control in America as a practical measure there comes the announcement by Dr. Robert E. Seibels, chairman of the Committee on Maternal Welfare of the South Carolina Medical Society, that "there are no public health clinics in South Carolina which do not include contraception in their clinical facilities," and the assurance that in South Carolina all sanatoria for tuberculosis would presently give contraceptive advice as a matter of routine to all patients at the time of their discharge. This accomplishment, following upon the heels of similar advances in North Carolina, indicates that in this respect at least we can no longer think of the South as a socially backward region, and can console ourselves with the news that the first birth control clinic aided by public authority in New York State was recently opened.

SO RACE improvement moves forward in America to its legitimate place as a recognized and indispensable factor in human progress. It is acclaimed as an essential feature of an intelligently planned society, with respect to its economic, medical, public health, and democratic standards. The establishment of a sound family life and of a constructive population growth, of which birth control is the medium, is recognized as one aspect of the great task of social reconstruction and human rehabilitation, which is possible only upon the basis of a finer type of human being, biologically as well as culturally.

Dr. Roy Norton, to whom I have made reference earlier, covers American aspects of the entire "planned parenthood" movement in the article that follows.

## PLANNED PARENTHOOD

By ROY NORTON, M.D.

**S**PECIAL statistical studies have revealed that from one-third to at least two-thirds of the mortality and morbidity connected with pregnancy, childbirth and early infancy are preventable. With increasing diffusion of dependable health and medical information, more and more of those, who love the thousands of mothers and the scores of thousands of infants dying yearly, have come to ask the question: Why? Doctors, social welfare workers, lawyers and taxpayers are asking the same question—Why? Even the majority of theologians no longer conclude their considerations of a death by a, "Well, it was God's will," and are questioning why preventable disability and death are allowed to occur from ignorance and neglect when proper planning and use of available medical and health facilities could prevent them.

Our Federal Government has promoted studies in maternal health, particularly since the establishment of the Children's Bureau in 1912. Practically all of our state and local health departments are devoting increasing efforts toward the saving of mothers and babies. From a few casual, disconnected bits of work here and there, we now have more effective public health activities and improving legislation aimed at eliminating health hazards at some of the strategic crossroads of life, namely: marriage, conception, childbirth, infancy, pre-school and school. The periods approaching these crossroads are recognized as of particular importance.

Experience has shown that efforts directed against some hazards and among certain groups are relatively fruitless, while those aimed at better health care for mothers and babies offer the best possible returns. There we find the key to improvement of the quality and even the quantity of our population.

From a negative standpoint, marriage may be temporarily or even permanently discouraged, dissolved or prevented among those most likely to transmit physical, mental, or moral disability to offspring. Premarital tests and examinations, divorce laws and state sterilization laws are so designed. From a positive standpoint, marriage can and should be encouraged among normal, healthy young people. Unnecessary postponement should be avoided. Economic handicaps should be reduced and, whenever possible, eliminated. The state should discourage, and perhaps should prevent, its choicest young men and women—those who could and should establish the best homes and become the finest parents—from taking vows of celibacy. Marriage and parenthood should be denied only where medically contra-indicated. The possession of qualities that we find most desirable to encourage, preserve and multiply should not be allowed to even indirectly become a bar to marriage and subsequent parenthood. It should be illegal to limit positions of trust or honor to the unmarried. All marriage handicaps should be removed except among the misfit and the unfit.



A well-planned maternal health program requires that after encouraging marriage among the normal early in adulthood, the bearing of three, four, five or six children should be normally expected and encouraged. The very best contraceptive information should be given to every young married couple. Pregnancy should sometimes be postponed according to requirements for periods of adjustment in marriage, economic conditions and educational training. But physicians should encourage shortening rather than lengthening this adjustment period. Births should be spaced two to four years apart. Indiscriminate pregnancies are dangerous to mother and baby and therefore harmful to the race.

**E**VERY possible aid and service should be made available to marriage, parenthood, babyhood and childhood. Care of the aged should be continued and improved but a far-sighted democracy must promote and subsidize race-building through giving the young a good start. Happy and prosperous homes with healthy and intelligent children are the main asset and the chief strength of a democracy. Those performing democracy's greatest service should have every possible handicap removed. Medical, dental, nursing and hospital care, legal protection, food, clothing, fuel, housing, schools and recreational facilities should be brought within their financial reach. These things should be made available, as Dr. Rosenau has so well said, "As a matter of justice and not of charity."

The possession of qualities that are most desirable to preserve, encourage and multiply should not be allowed

to become a bar to marriage. Unfortunately a conscientious desire to devote a life to unselfish humanitarian service may cause some of our finest young men and women to be misled into taking vows of celibacy so long as key positions of opportunity are open only to those taking these vows. Contemplate the broad effects of arbitrarily requiring that our president, members of national and state congresses, governors and mayors promise never to marry.

All normal men and women have a physical as well as mental and spiritual responsibility in race-building. Specialization has its advantages in many lines and perhaps in a partial separation between physical and spiritual race-building responsibilities, but is there any way to make up for the loss to the race when spiritual and mental leaders fail to reproduce physically the bodies that would very likely house those qualities which are most essential to progress in future generations? Admitting the great spiritual and other race-building services of many who give up attempting protoplasmic immortality, and that the number of individual celibates is relatively small, who can tell the loss to individuals and to the race—the stigmatizing effect—of spreading the warped and distorted attitude that normal homebuilding is incompatible with the highest type of life pattern. The arbitrary insistence by a celibate-controlled group upon an ineffective "natural methods" of birth control is made even more tragic by an unnatural demand for birth prevention among the cream of the young men and women under their influence. There is no adequate substitute for normal natural marriage and any at-



tempt to cheat healthy young men and women with substitutes is selfish and sinful. Encouragement of race-suicide among the choicest stock is the antithesis of race-building.

Perhaps in our zeal to overcome selfish opposition to universally planned parenthood, one of the requisites of which is making contraceptive information available to those most in need of it but now the only ones left without it, some may have reasonably misunderstood references made to the hazards of large families among the diseased poor. Poverty, in itself, however, should be no bar to either marriage or childbearing. Large families among the ablest couples are desirable and should be vigorously stimulated. Bachelorhood and spinsterhood (whether premeditated or not), childless marriages, and even the one- or two-child marriages of normal people have received too much praise as a sign of superior intelligence. No service rendered in a democracy is higher or more sacred than that of intelligent homebuilding and parenthood. The unnatural and premeditated childlessness of certain couples, and of ascetic dogmatists, are to be condemned alike. The no-child or one-child habit of couples possessing the best personal and hereditary qualities should change to a several-children habit.

Recent trends toward planned parenthood have been rapid and many leaders have had a part. Progressive medical practitioners are everywhere directing the lines of progress.

American race-building received a greatly needed stimulus three years ago through the pioneering and courageous leadership of two of our health statesmen — Doctors George

M. Cooper and Carl V. Reynolds of North Carolina—when they inaugurated the first state health department birth control program as an essential part of the medical and health care needed by mothers. In attempting to build a balanced state maternal health program, there had been patient health education, sterilization laws, premarital hygiene and then the traditional disregard of conception hygiene in the jump over to prenatal, delivery and infant care. The weakest link in the golden chain of public health care supporting safe motherhood is being strengthened as mothers of the diseased poor are following the lead of their well-to-do sisters in acquiring freedom from the slavery of undesired and undesirable pregnancies. North Carolina is poor and much is yet to be done, but the North Carolina State Board of Health has "pointed to higher things and led the way" in showing that to serve democracy best, planned parenthood must be democratized.

In striving toward planned parenthood, there should be equal joy because of both increasing parenthood among normal couples, and because of wider use of medically indicated spacing or limitation of childbearing. A desirable population policy will be promoted (to quote Mrs. Alva Myrdal) "not by keeping people in ignorance of birth control, and not by letting the poorer classes bear the main burden of regeneration, but by educational and democratic measures aimed at stimulating voluntary parenthood." Planned parenthood is essential to maternal well-being, to an adequate and balanced general health program and to race-building in a democracy.

Britain cannot sell 'democracy' to its workers, says the Schwarze Korps

## A Nazi View of Allied Aims

Translated from the *Schwarze Korps*, Berlin Weekly Organ of the Elite Guards

**T**HE INTENTIONS of our enemies in the year 1940 are plain enough. In the next twelve months they propose to destroy the German nation and people and to partition the country. It cannot be said that their exploits in 1939 entitle them to high optimism; on the contrary, their setbacks should give them pause and permit them only the blackest pessimism with regard to the future. But the official New Year's commemorators in the enemy countries are not paid for pessimism, but to launch the era with an energetic propagandist push.

We have still to read the editorials of the other side, but we are so familiar with what they will write that, in fact, we are glad to come to the assistance of these "colleagues" before they go to work themselves. For once, they will write the truth. It will not be the truth of what exists, but the truth about what they want. Moreover, they will express these

demands and hopes of their employers as palatably as possible.

Only a short time ago, they were ringing peace chimes in print and presenting themselves as benevolent saints in long beards, because at that time they still affected a love for peace; at that time, moreover, they still loved the good and kindly German people whose plight they pitied. They wanted only the best for Germany. In fact, their only aim was to free Germany of Hitlerism, described by them as a loathsome disease, and they still believed they might win the war with leaflets, with radio propaganda or, if necessary, by murder.

But this year finds them in a sobered mood. They have recognized that it is necessary to fight Germany from outside the Reich, if the attempt is to be made to defeat her, and they realize at last that their slogan of a "crusade for democracy" makes no impression even upon their own people.

The fact is that democracy is not something for which anyone will consent to be shot. Indeed, it is not even something for which one will suffer hardships. The great masses of the British and the French people have not waxed enthusiastic over the prospect of freeing the German worker from national socialism because—while they have only heard the worst things of nazism—they know for a certainty that the lot of the German workers cannot be worse than their own.

No, you cannot win so much as a flowerpot, and still less a war, by means of utterances full of references to pacifism, humanitarianism and the League of Nations. Accordingly with this realization the enemy propaganda designed to create enthusiasm for the war, has taken an opposite tack. Now it proclaims the most extreme chauvinism heard since the days of Clemenceau. It is concocted of a hoary recipe successful particularly with the "peace-loving democracies."

**T**HE "bloodthirsty German Huns" would not relish a fight to partition France or to move the German frontier up to the Marne. But every pot-bellied French Babbitt becomes exercised if he is promised a frontier on the Rhine and the destruction of a mythical country known to him as "Prussia"; although the name of that region has long since disappeared from the map, it continues to be a nightmare to him. The English, who know a trick or two, have succeeded in jockeying France into a position where it alone is making increasingly exorbitant demands on the enemy. Britain wants no one to say that

France is fighting in the interests of Britain.

Britain keeps in the background. The worker in England cannot be excited by these endless chauvinistic demands, but nevertheless he is made to hear a thousand times the promise that eventually he will become as prosperous as he deserves to be in a society of overlords and masters—once Germany is destroyed and once German markets become British markets and all German business is British business.

British chauvinism, incidentally, must express itself in the language of stock-exchange reports. In those terms it has always proved much more effective than in the guise of appeals for crusaders.

According to the latest reports dealing with the demands of our enemies, France's frontier is to be on the Rhine. Schleswig-Holstein goes to Denmark. Eastern Germany as far west as the Oder will be handed to a resuscitated Poland, while the Sudetenland goes to Dr. Benes as well as all of Saxony—the last as an extra dividend. All of Germany south of the Main will be awarded to Otto of Hapsburg, and the remainder of the Reich is to be occupied militarily and its people taught democratic virtues under the direction of a British High Commissioner, after the methods successfully adopted by the British in India and Palestine.

We doubt whether the enthusiasm of the democratic writers of editorials will go much further than we have indicated. The foregoing dream would probably exhaust their powers of fantasy. But possibly there will be space remaining for the customary expressions of their humanitarian dis-

position. For example, before Christmas a British "society lady" demanded that all German males should be exterminated and that German females should be presented to British males for purposes of reproducing a peace-loving cross-breed. That being so, it is altogether possible that someone in England will demand that German women after the war be transported to the Congo, while the Negroes of the Congo should be brought to Germany. If, in the British view, Germany should be populated henceforth by a race acceptable to them, why not take one which is already accustomed to the whip?

There, in general outline, are the hopes and resolutions of the enemy. No one in Germany, of course, has anything but a smile for such daydreams, and no one is afraid of the big bad wolf. But while we smile, we also know that these are the aims of our enemies. And droll as their behavior seems to us, we know they really propose to break up Germany and annihilate us physically. They really want to starve our women and children to death, and now—for once—they are telling the truth, not for the sake of the truth, but because now the truth happens to suit them.

"We must," says Lord Trenchard in the House of Lords, "reconcile ourselves to the fact that Britain has the explicit aim of destroying the German people and not merely eliminating national socialism." The speaker demanded the truth, and so he told it.

Our enemies, however, will look in vain for revelation of any such sensational war aims in New Year's editorials in the Reich. Neither does any German expect that we will be forced to announce any specific "pro-

gram" in the year 1940. There is no necessity in Germany for using any artificial means of creating enthusiasm and optimism. And, indeed, we have much more than optimism. We are armed with knowledge. Probably never before did any people engage in war with a better knowledge of the objectives of the struggle. From the first instant of war, we knew that everything was at stake in the struggle. Thus no war-objective "revelations" are necessary.

This war is not a struggle comparable to past wars: it is the decisive battle in Europe's revolution. It is the struggle of labor against capital, of the peoples against the rule of plutocracy, of the peasants, workers and soldiers against the shopkeepers. Precipitated by the victory of the popularly led and popularly governed socialist State, the struggle now enters in the decisive stage. The British lords, together with their Jewish jobbers on the stock exchange, the French money-bags and their shyster, ward-heeler lawyers, declared a war of annihilation upon the German people not because they dislike our looks or our language, but because our qualities of character enable Germans to be the apostles, the champions and the protagonists of a new era.

What the enemy wish to destroy is not the German people but the socialist German people, the people who finally recognized the moral dignity of labor, which proclaimed the right of the workers to enjoy and own the fruits of their labor.

That handful of British and French plutocrats who determine the value of the products of the workers, who manufacture world crises, control world business conditions, and con-

descendingly distribute the necessities of life to the peoples, are fully aware that their hour has struck in their own countries now that they are confronted with the example of a socialist Germany which has freed itself from the power of gold and usury. It is not so much that these plutocrats want to destroy the German Reich: they want to destroy an example which, in their eyes, is a bad and wicked example. And since we know their aims and their motives, our one war objective can be only the destruction of their power.

We are not interested in the territory of the British or the French. Neither are we disturbed by the existence of those peoples. But so long as they permit themselves to be exploited by their tormentors, to serve as the Praetorian guards and the tools of a few hundred criminal usurers and blood suckers, we will regard them pitilessly as our enemies.

In the long run, every people has the rulers it deserves. We know that it is the destiny of our generation to fight the battle which will decide the history of the next thousand years, and the magnitude of our duty makes it impossible for us to be misled by sentimental considerations.

Whoever is in the line of our fire will be destroyed.

Our consciousness of the greatness of our aims relieves us of the petty compulsion to measure the probable length of the war by weeks or months. Whoever wants to lift the world from its hinges does not consider the time involved, but looks

to the firmness of his will and the extent of his breath.

Any consideration of the probabilities must fill the German people with unflinching optimism, because that attitude is inherent in the people. It is not some army leader, not merely a professional army, which is gambling on victory. It is not our role to await our fate with curiosity, for every one of us will engage in forging our destiny armed with our strongest weapon—the knowledge that it is not our insignificant well-being that is at stake, but the decisive year of German history. The year 1940 is the year of trial.

What we National Socialists demanded and fought for in past years, what we received with exalted happiness at the hands of the Führer—the fruits of his confidence—we now place on the scale of our valor. "The year 1940," our Führer states, in congratulations to his men, "is a year of struggle, and it will be a year of victory because of our courage, our willingness for sacrifice, our fidelity and our blind obedience."

The measure of our valor will determine the extent of our victory.

When the national socialist movement was in its infancy, the aim of our struggle was expressed in the simple slogan, "Freedom and Bread." To-day this has become the war aim of the Reich. We will win our struggle for bread, which is life and future, if we are ready to give everything for freedom, which must be placed before bread, just as we must be placed before I.



There's much less romance in the job  
than the novelists ask you to believe

# Inside Britain's Secret Service

By FREDERIC SONDERN, JR.

**T**HE DEFENCE of the British Empire against enemies, foreign and domestic, is an intricate problem even in peacetime. In wartime it becomes a titanic task. Every government that looks longingly at England's rich possessions is now intriguing to disrupt the commonwealth. Northern India, Iran and Afghanistan are crawling with Soviet agitators. Tokyo is pressing at Singapore and the eastern crown colonies. Mussolini's agents quietly sow discord through the Mediterranean littoral and the Near East. England is not only fighting Germany; it is battling for the existence of the Empire.

And in both struggles a most important part is being played by a small group of men, little known and seldom understood, the agents of the British Government's intelligence services. Strangely enough, this largest and finest detective system in the world has been abused and disregarded. Many of the mistakes of Prime Ministers MacDonald, Bald-

win and Chamberlain can be traced to their dislike and distrust of one of the Empire's most powerful weapons.

To most people the British secret-service man is a creature of bizarre fiction. E. Phillips Oppenheim and a host of other mystifiers have endowed him with superhuman powers. And sensational, pseudo-political writers, who like to show the diabolical cunning of the "British Intelligence" behind every major world event, have given the legend its finishing touches.

Actually, the British Government's intelligence services have few such officers and seldom such Machiavelian ideas. True, they have produced extraordinary men like Colonel Lawrence of Arabia, Admiral Sir Reginald Hall—the naval intelligence genius of the last war—and others who never tell why they wear the King's highest decorations and never break into print. But most of them are just plain, unimaginative Britons who work without glory or romance to keep the Empire's fingers on the

nerve centers of its vast territories and the world.

From Wilhelmshaven, the German naval base, a letter reaches London. A British agent in Germany has sent it via an apparently harmless Amsterdam address—a "letter-box" in intelligence jargon. Between lines of innocent writing, invisible ink tells of a German submarine campaign about to be launched. Across the Himalayas, a filthy cartman brings a message to the Indian Intelligence Officer at Peshawar: the Russians are concentrating on the Indian border. From the four corners of the earth these reports pour in—by mail, radio and diplomatic pouch. On their accuracy may hang the fate of the Empire.

There is no British "secret service" as such. There are seven of them. The Foreign Office, the War Office, the Admiralty, the Air Ministry, the Board of Trade, the Colonial Office, and the Home Office each has an intelligence department of its own. Unlike the centralized German *Geheimdienst*—covering all branches of espionage and counter-espionage under one head—the British services are not well co-ordinated. And they sometimes have Gilbertian conflicts. Several years ago an inquisitive reporter discovered by accident that the War Office and Foreign Office intelligence services were fighting a little war against each other. Each was arming and paying a rival Arab chieftain, thinking that a foreign power was behind the other.

To men of the Chamberlain school this spying business is still very shady and definitely not cricket. As a result, much valuable information from agents in the field never gets to the right place.

Sir John Simon and Anthony Eden were completely bowled over when Adolf Hitler, in March 1935, told them in Berlin the strength of the German air force. The writer will never forget their dazed expressions at the press conference afterward. London had been kept well-informed by the War Office's espionage of the growth of the Nazi air armada, but both the Air and War Ministers had pigeonholed the alarming reports, feeling that "Intelligence" was exaggerating again.

The Foreign Office Intelligence Department is probably the most efficient of the seven secret services. Its men are sent out where and when the regular accredited British diplomats can no longer function. They intrigue for or against a treaty or a change in government—in which London must not be involved officially in any way. The F.O.I.D. chief is generally the Permanent Under-Secretary of State, at present Sir Alexander Cadogan. This spare, keen-eyed, soft-spoken, cultivated aristocrat runs a machine of great power. In his hands is the secret fund of the Foreign Office. Just how much flows through his agents to foreign government officials in bribes and support is known to only two or three men, but the sum is known to run into many millions of pounds a year. If Prime Minister Chamberlain had trusted Cadogan more and his own brain-trust of dilettantes less, the events of the last few years, particularly the debacle at Munich, might have shaped differently.

THE Foreign Office intelligence corps is small and select. Most of its men are chosen from the foreign

service itself, for skill in ferreting out information and handling difficult situations. But some of the most valued are private persons, specialists called on when needed. Generally they are wealthy men, in important positions. Intelligence chiefs discover them in their clubs and among their business friends, and appeal to their patriotism and love of adventure. Few refuse to serve.

The writer has known several of these part-time agents. One is a retired insurance-broker who has done much business in Central Europe and knows well the bewilderingly intricate intrigues among Balkan countries. Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia are open books to him. Whenever any crisis loomed in that part of the world he was off to "see about his investments." A roly-poly, cherub-faced *bon viveur*, with plenty of money, an irresistible manner and a glad hand, he made friends everywhere and spoke their language—be it German, Croatian, or Greek dialect—well or badly at will. And from wherever he was, the Foreign Office had amazingly accurate information.

There is another, an executive of a large British corporation, one of the few men in London who really understand the political workings of Washington. Whenever any serious trouble in Anglo-American relations threatens, he takes a hurried vacation to the United States. His connections among banking, business and newspaper leaders on the one hand, and the most radical of New Dealers on the other, are extraordinary. He has a knack of extracting information—this bird-like, professorial elderly man with pince-nez on a black ribbon—and when he returns to London, the

Foreign Office receives a report which no ambassador could write.

Intelligence departments employ women only when absolutely necessary. Miss X, who uncovered the Russian spy ring in England in February 1938, has been unique. The trim, 30-year-old blonde did a remarkable job at the request of a friend in the War Office counter-espionage section. She joined the suspect Friends of the Soviet Union, gained the confidence of the spy ringleader, and led him along until she knew the whole organization. To clinch the proof, she even hired the apartment where the plans supplied by traitors in Woolwich Arsenal were copied. At the right moment all the conspirators were arrested and the secret of a new 14-inch naval gun was saved for Britain.

REGULAR, full-time agents of the intelligence services are of all types. In Naval Intelligence they are ordnance, supply and operations officers. In the Board of Trade I. D. they are statisticians and experienced traders. They vary from athletic youngsters to old gentlemen in wheel chairs. Unlike the German and French agents, they receive no formal training in the spy business. The



somewhat sinister pair who command Hitler's *Geheimdienst*—Admiral Canaris and assistant Gestapo chief Reinhardt Heydrich—have started a school in Berlin where the agent, under rigid discipline, learns everything a spy should know, from recognizing ship silhouettes to picking locks. But British intelligence men learn as they go from simple jobs to more exacting assignments. Appointments to the services are not widely sought. The pay is not attractive—no more than the regular civil service scale—and the life of an agent is not enjoyable. He must live a lonely life—without real friends—his mind alert every moment. Not until a long period of apprenticeship is passed is the agent given jobs such as espionage inside Germany.

The War Office Intelligence Department is the largest. A whole wing of the rambling War Office building is its headquarters—where no stranger may enter without a special pass and a brass-buttoned guard. It directs not only the regular intelligence officers in the British Army all over the Empire, but also has an immense Special Intelligence Section which controls British military espionage throughout the world and counter-espionage in all British possessions. Somewhere on the top floor of this rabbit warren lives the Chief of Special Intelligence, known only to his immediate assistants, to the top men in the War Office, and to the Prime Minister. The private stairway is guarded by officials who let no one pass who is not on the high staff, and even these watchdogs could not pick out the Chief himself. From his office go the crack men of the service—equipped with forged passports—into Germany and Russia,

via the elaborate underground-railway system which he maintains. From here go the orders via embassy, "letter-box" and field agent—moving, say, Number 34 from his job at Aden to a small shop in Bombay, or shifting Number 574 from a saloon in Cape Town to a tugboat at Lisbon.

These experts must watch continuously for false rumors, and for plans purposely played into their hands by foreign secret services. The German *Geheimdienst* let it leak out, for example, that a certain sector of the West Wall was not yet completely equipped with artillery, hoping that the Allies would attack at that point. But another British agent reported that Krupp had sent a large number of powerful guns to that very sector. It was up to Special Intelligence to find out which story was correct and inform Lord Gort, commander in chief of Britain's forces in France. Thousands of lives depended on the accuracy of that report.

British War Office espionage in Germany during the last few years has been extremely competent, despite the vigilance of the *Geheimdienst* and the Gestapo. The development, morale and disposition of Hitler's new army were charted in London, step by step. Unfortunately, the Government refused to draw logical conclusions from the information at hand. During peace time, the various intelligence services at London are greatly helped by the Englishman's habit of letter-writing. He does not go spying for the fun of it, like the Japanese, but if while traveling he sees anything interesting—an apparently new fort or military concentration—he writes about it to Whitehall or to his newspaper. It was a



casual traveler who stumbled across Italian "missionaries" surveying strategic points in Ethiopia long before there was any other intimation that the Duce was interested. With Britons globe-trotting as much as they do, this letter-writing habit gives Whitehall thousands of unpaid agents all over the world.

The counter-espionage division of Special Intelligence has a brilliant reputation. These men—some 400 of them—protect the British Isles against foreign agents and the sabotage of munitions plants, railroads, and other vulnerable points of Britain's industry. They work closely with Scotland Yard detectives—in peace time the Intelligence Department of the Home Office. A "Special Branch" of Scotland Yard is trained to deal with foreigners and to know intimately the foreign colonies of London and the other manufacturing centers, always hotbeds of intrigue and espionage.

A NEW problem in this war is the refugee. Thousands have streamed in from Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia, with credentials that are hard to check. One German munitions expert, posing as a refugee, was able to worm his way into the confidence of the War Office. He had proof that he had been in the Dachau concentration camp, had suffered beatings and other hardships and finally had escaped. It was by sheer accident that he was discovered—an ex-journalist meeting him at the War Office remembered seeing him years before behind a desk at Gestapo headquarters in Berlin. His whole career, concentration camp and all, had been planned by the *Geheimdienst*. In-

stances have been revealed where bona fide refugees were forced to join in espionage work by threats of reprisal on relatives and friends left in Germany. For these reasons the Special Branch has set up a network of informers among the refugees themselves.

A lot of information on British troop movements, preparations and plans has leaked to Berlin, but the big German espionage organization was knocked into a cocked hat last September, just as its predecessor was in August 1914. The Germans are incorrigible creatures of habit and system. Where the British send one or two highly intelligent, experienced spies, with instructions to use their own imagination and initiative, Berlin dispatches a dozen rigidly disciplined agents under a chief—thorough workers, but generally clumsy and without imagination.

In 1914, the War Office nipped off the two leaders of the Imperial German *Geheimdienst* in England, who had been suspected and watched for years without their knowledge, and the whole German espionage in England was paralyzed for the duration of the war. Much the same happened last autumn. By finding a "letter-box"—a central office through which reports went to and from Berlin—Special Intelligence was able to nail a dozen of Admiral Canaris' best men. They had been watched for some time before war began and scared off whenever they got too close to a vital secret. On September 2 they suddenly were arrested, much to Berlin's surprise.

Naval Intelligence has been having a rough passage. In 1914, it had the extraordinary luck of obtaining a



German naval code book—found in the pocket of a drowned signal officer on the cruiser *Magdeburg*, which ran aground on the Aland Islands. For almost two years the Germans used that same code. They also had their submarines radio reports from time to time, while the British were perfecting and using wireless direction finders with marked success. Admiral Raeder is more circumspect than his predecessors, however, and the officers who work in front of the big charts in the War Room of the British Admiralty are not so well supplied with clues. The long marauding career of the *Graf Spee*, the escape of the *Bremen* and the undiscovered location of other ships like the *Admiral Scheer*, embarrass Winston Churchill considerably. So tight is the German counter-espionage net around Kiel, Wilhelmshaven and other naval war bases, that even the Admiralty's agents have found it difficult to do any effective work there. And profiting from experience the German command changes codes frequently.

The Admiralty's decoding section is famous for its speed and accuracy in cryptography. At the beginning of the last war, Admiral Sir Reginald Hall found that there were not enough cryptographers to do the job which suddenly swamped the Admiralty. Descending on the British Museum, this son of the creator of Britain's Naval Intelligence dragged frightened savants out from dusty

nooks and crannies. If they could decipher hieroglyphics, they could break codes. They did so well that it seemed like sorcery. These obscure talents have again been drafted into service.

It was mainly Board of Trade agents who made it possible for the Ministry of Economic Warfare to lay such a strangling net around Germany. For two years they had been tracing the channels of German trade with neutrals and preparing plans that were to strangle it.

THE Colonial Office's Intelligence Service saved Britain from serious trouble in Africa. Through the League for Colonial Development in Berlin, the Nazis had been conducting a tremendous drive throughout the former German colonies. Arms and ammunition were smuggled in and distributed among pro-German sympathizers, in preparation for a rising at the outbreak of war. German officers were sent down to train secret formations. But an agent of the Colonial Office's Intelligence had made unceasing rounds through jungle and veldt until he had the whole Nazi set-up in hand. Arrests followed, and when September came South Africa was safe for England.

And so they go on, those lonely men, fighting single-handed against tremendous odds—always just a step from the assassin's bullet or the firing squad, unknown and unsung, holding together the world's greatest empire.

# Persons and Personages

## STALIN'S 'CATSPA'W'

By ANDRÉ MARTEN

Translated from *Socialisticheski Vestnik*, Paris Organ of the Russian Social Democratic Party in Exile



I N 1930-31, I had an opportunity in Moscow to meet Otto Wilhelm Kuusinen, who is today the head of the so-called People's

Democratic Government of Finland, appointed from the Kremlin and regarded by many as Stalin's catspaw.

Now fifty-nine, a small, insignificant fellow with protruding cheek-bones, but carefully dressed, Kuusinen usually appeared as a stranger in Moscow Communist circles. His cultured manners and appearance did not fit the boisterous and unceremonial attitude of this circle. He also was handicapped by faulty speech, since he stammered slightly, and his speeches and writings were without color or distinction. He made the usual impression of a little fellow, at best a provincial pastor. At that time, Kuusinen was one of the secretaries of the Third (Communist) International, and this job took all his energies and left him very little time for social life of the Finnish Communist party.

He was at the head of two important offices of the Communist International, the Anglo-American and the

Far Eastern divisions, but he was *not* at the head of the Polish-Baltic division, which also included the Finnish department. There were very important reasons for this. The activities of Kuusinen in Finland were, from the Communist point of view, by no means brilliant.

Kuusinen made his debut in the Finnish Social Democratic movement in 1905, at the age of twenty-four. At that time he was an instructor at Helsingfors University and lectured on esthetics. In 1907 he became the editor of *Tiuomis* (*The Worker*), the central organ of the Finnish Social Democratic party. Elected in 1905 to the Finnish Diet, he remained there until 1918. He belonged to the most moderate wing of the Finnish Social Democratic party.

In 1918 the revolutionary movement seethed over in Finland. At the head of this movement was the Council of National Representatives consisting of Socialists. Kuusinen took part in this Council in the capacity of the delegate in charge of national education, but did not play any important role. Later he declared that the Finns ruined their revolution because they were Social Democrats and not Bolsheviks and consequently "did not know how to fight."

In August 1918, after the defeat of the Finnish revolution, Kuusinen,

together with several other Finnish emigrants, formed in Russia a Finnish Communist party, and he has remained since then the permanent member of its Central Committee.

In 1930-31 the Finnish Communist party underwent fundamental changes. A movement of fascist character, the so-called Lapua, forced Parliament to outlaw the Communist party. Unable to organize even the slightest resistance, the party collapsed. Several of its leaders escaped to Russia, and others became victims of repression. The "progress" described in reports to the Central Committee of the Finnish Communist party was pure bluff. The Communist International demoted members of the Finnish Central Committee from their posts, declaring them incompetent.

Kuusinen remained diplomatically silent. This is his usual method. Whenever it is necessary to adopt an attitude on a difficult situation, Kuusinen comes out with the learned opinion that the problem has not been studied sufficiently, that it is necessary to postpone the analysis. "It must be postponed." This expression became his nickname in Communist circles. This postponement may last for weeks, months or even for years. What of it? Kuusinen has to go deeply into the problem. But as soon as Stalin expresses an opinion on the subject, everything appears quite clear to Kuusinen, and thereupon he submits the result of his long contemplation which, by fortunate coincidence, always agrees perfectly with the opinions expressed by the Leader. This is not a method practiced exclusively by him; it is used by all the members of the Communist International, but Kuusinen seems to have

reached special mastery of this technique.

This completely subservient mentality explains Kuusinen's continuance in the Communist hierarchy and his present post at the head of the dummy régime set up by Stalin. He never belonged to any opposition or to any of the circles in which Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin and others moved. This is the great secret and also the usefulness of Kuusinen, who will explain everything — after repeated postponement of an "analysis."

*Editor's Note:* The American press has neglected Kuusinen, apparently partly because the régime he heads at Terioki, near the Soviet frontier, is dismissed by many editors as not representative of the Finnish people. This is unquestionably true, but the fact remains that if the Red Army is eventually successful, which certainly is in the realm of possibilities, Kuusinen's post as Premier of the puppet government will be much more powerful than is the case at present.

The foregoing translation does not disclose all the salient facts of Kuusinen's life. For example, less than two years ago he circulated a manifesto throughout Finland calling for the nomination to the Finnish presidency of Väinö Tanner, a leader of the Social Democratic party, who has since been violently attacked by the Communist press throughout the world. M. Tanner was Prime Minister of Finland, and lately Minister of Finance and Minister of Foreign Affairs. Now leading in the attacks upon him is Kuusinen, who a few months ago regarded Tanner as the one man who should head the country.

Somewhat vehement on the subject of Kuusinen, in this country, is the weekly *New Leader*, official organ of the Social Democratic Federation. It writes that Kuusinen alone survived the Comintern purges although, as a paid Communist agent in Finland, he had consistently failed to organize a party or to organize underground activities of any consequence in the country, where the Communist party today is officially outlawed. An upshot of these failures, according to the above article, was the murder in 1920 of all the members of the Central Committee of the Finnish Communist party who could be found in Moscow. Kuusinen, out of town, escaped execution and it is some sort of tribute to his political dexterity that he escaped the punishment extended to his colleagues. In the words of Boris Souvarine, former secretary of the Comintern, writing in the *New Leader* last month, Kuusinen is merely a political "courtier and house porter," a "contemptible and mediocre fellow," "a nonentity," to which he adds the description, "a common drunkard and a complete idiot. Let us hope Otto Kuusinen will never enter Helsinki."

Benjamin Gitlow, whose book, *I Confess*, has created considerable stir in Communist circles the world over, tells us that he knew Kuusinen well in Moscow, where he was one of Stalin's "most docile illiterates." Per-

haps more interesting than the considerable quantity of vituperation directed at Kuusinen is the prediction in an article, *Comrade Kuusinen*, appearing last month in the *National-Zeitung* of Basel, that the puppet-premier's day is over because of the setbacks suffered by the Red Army.

"This information," the newspaper asserts, "does not seem improbable because it seems strange that nothing has been heard of Kuusinen since his proclamation [in early December]. Neither Moscow's *Pravda* nor the Basel Communist *Freiheit* write a word of what Kuusinen is doing with his 'government.' . . . He is a strange mixture of theoretician, bureaucrat and conspirator, the opposite of a man of action, an insignificant, reticent man who speaks very little. . . . Kuusinen was also active in the purges of the Communist parties of Western Europe . . . followed faithfully all turn-about in the party line, and helped Stalin in the extermination of his former friends, old Bolshevik comrades of Lenin's. This time he seems to have undertaken a task far beyond his capabilities, and he may break his neck. The treacherous role which Kuusinen now plays in relation to the country of his birth is perfectly in keeping with the character of the man who aided in the liquidation of Zinoviev, Bukharin and many other old friends."—S. N.

#### FOUR COMMANDERS

From *The Times*, London Independent Conservative Daily

**T**ODAY, with the whole nation under arms, the French people have a justified confidence in their fighting leaders. Gamelin and Georges for the Army, Darlan for the Fleet, Vuillemin for the Air Force,



are names to conjure with in France.

Maurice Gamelin, who was born in Paris on September 20, 1872, is of mixed Northern and Lorraine stock, and comes of a family rich in military tradition. In his youth he aspired to be a painter, but breeding and inclination finally turned him towards a military career. He entered the Military College of St. Cyr, the French equivalent of Sandhurst, at the age of nineteen. Two years later he passed out at the top of the list, and was gazetted to the Third Regiment of Tirailleurs Algériens. He was promoted to lieutenant in 1895 and soon afterwards was seconded to the Army cartographical service. In 1899 he entered the Ecole de Guerre, or Staff College, where Foch was instructor at the time, and passed out with the note "very good" in 1901, being posted to the staff of Corps XV with the rank of captain. Then, in 1904, he was given a company of Chasseurs, but two years later Joffre, who had been impressed by young Gamelin's ability, took him on his staff, thereby beginning an association which was to endure for many years and to deepen into a reciprocal understanding and respect which nothing could weaken.

Gamelin remained with Joffre until 1911, when, in accordance with regulations, he returned to regimental duty for two years, taking over the command of a battalion of Chasseurs Alpains. After that, with a brief interval of other staff work, he was back again with Joffre, and the outbreak of war found him on the operations staff of Joffre, now Commander in Chief of the French Armies.

Of his work during the difficult early days of the War no more can be said here than that by his cool

judgment and technical skill he proved a tower of strength to Joffre himself, and was largely responsible for the operation orders for the memorable Battle of the Marne. Then, with the Battle of the Marne and the race to the sea over, Gamelin, now promoted to lieutenant colonel, began to chafe at the inactivity of staff work in conditions of stationary warfare, and began to press for a command in the field. At first Joffre refused to let him go, but finally he yielded, and Gamelin went off to command a brigade with the rank of colonel. Promoted to brigadier general in December 1916, he was recalled by Joffre to serve on his staff, but Joffre's supersession followed, and Gamelin was shifted to the post of Chief of the Staff to General Micheler, commanding the Group of Armies of Reserve, the instrument with which Nivelle carried out his ill-fated offensive.

In May 1917, he took over command of the Ninth Division—a post he was destined to hold until the end of the War. Under his leadership the division gave a splendid account of itself, putting up a particularly fine fight before Noyon in March and April 1918, when the German armies made their most dangerous and effective offensive of the whole War. His division was magnificently commanded; holding its ground doggedly but always doing what the enemy least expected, it established a record of skill in defence which has since been constantly studied. It again did splendid work later, notably during the counter-attack by the French Fifth Army on July 18, 1918, and the passage of the Vesle on September 20.

In 1925 Gamelin was sent out to



Syria as Assistant High Commissioner, with the difficult and disagreeable job awaiting him of putting down the Jebel Druze revolt. Acting with energy and speed, he reoccupied Sueida, besieged Damascus, and finally broke down the resistance of the tribesmen.

In 1928, leaving all quiet in Syria behind him, he returned to France, and was given command of Corps XX (Foch's command in 1914) at Nancy. From now on his progress was even more rapid, until on January 23 last year he occupied the newly created post of Chief of the General Staff of the National Defence. On the outbreak of war, in accordance with a previous Anglo-French agreement, he became Generalissimo of the Allied Armies.

This record speaks for the man and the soldier who today bears the supreme responsibility for the conduct of operations by land in the present war. But the testimony of those who know him best gives additional reason for confidence. Retiring in manner and habit, modest to a degree, he nevertheless possesses powers of rapid and energetic decision which leave no room for hesitation around him when they come into play. Yet almost in defiance of French military tradition, he has been able to do that most difficult of all things—to wait. Not a single life has been thrown away in the present war, and as long as Gamelin is at the helm economy, wise economy, of blood and suffering will continue.

**G**ENERAL Alphonse Joseph Georges, commanding the French Armies of the Northeast, is the son of a schoolmaster at Montlu-

çon. He was born in 1875 and entered St. Cyr at the age of twenty, where he revealed himself as a brilliant student. On passing out, anxious to see service if possible, he managed to get posted to an Algerian infantry regiment, and took part in various actions in the Sahara, notably with the Touat column. Next he went to the Ecole de Guerre, and, after passing out with great distinction, was posted to the Cabinet of the Minister of War. After three years there he returned to an infantry battalion, and saw more fighting on the Algerian and Moroccan borders, being mentioned in dispatches.

Shortly after the outbreak of the Great War he was badly wounded at Gerbéviller. As soon as he had recovered he was posted to the Paris Command and, after various other appointments, including missions to Macedonia and Greece, found himself on the staff of Foch (then in command of the Allied Armies).

After the War he was Chief of the Staff to General Pétain in Morocco, after which he went back to France and followed the senior staff officers' course before taking command of a division in Algeria but was soon recalled to serve as *chef de cabinet* to André Maginot, then Minister of War. In this capacity he took part in drawing up the plans for the now famous defensive line on which the French armies stand today. On June 6, 1939, he was appointed Général d'Armée, a new rank reserved for those designated for the highest command. He had been gravely wounded in November 1934 by the assassin of King Alexander of Yugoslavia and Louis Barthou, while in their company at Marseilles.

ADMIRAL DARLAN, the Commander in Chief of the French Navy, shares with General Gamelin a family tradition of service in the arm to which he belongs. He was born at Nérac on August 7, 1881, entered the Ecole Navale at the age of twenty-one, and from the start showed unusual aptitude and initiative. In 1914 he went to the Western Front in command of a battery of naval guns and, indeed, fought for the greater part of the War on land, at such widely separated points as the heights of the Meuse, Alsace, Noyon, Belgium and Salonika. On July 11, 1918, he was promoted to lieutenant commander.

After the War, Darlan served on the staff in Chinese waters, where he earned the highest praise from his superiors. Then he returned home to take over the School of Pilots. The command of two sloops followed, after which he went to the School of Advanced Naval Studies, passing out first with a special mention. A period on the staff preceded his appointment as *chef de cabinet* to the Minister of Marine, Georges Leygues and his Minister gratefully recorded his "exceptional services" at the London Conference of 1930. From this post he went to the command of a cruiser squadron. Then in October 1934, a vice admiral at the age of 51, he took over the command of the Atlantic Squadron, and greatly distinguished himself in the maneuvers of 1935. On December 31, 1936, he was appointed Chief of the Naval Staff, and has held the post ever since. On June 6, 1939, he was appointed Commander in Chief of the French Naval Forces.

One day we saw an aeroplane flying low in spite of the white shell-bursts around it; it was making figures of eight with the greatest precision and perseverance. 'That,' said Mailfert to me, pointing upward, 'can only be Vuillemin. He's amazing.' This passage, taken from the memoirs of a former French airman, refers to September 1914, at the beginning of what was to be an outstanding career for General Vuillemin, today the Commander in Chief of the French Air Force.

With 105 air fights, forty-one enemy machines destroyed and twenty-five driven down, to the credit of his squadron, and a record of untiring personal devotion and courage in a long series of bombing and reconnaissance flights, Vuillemin holds a high place in the ranks of the French aces of the last War.

Vuillemin was born on March 14, 1883, and at the age of twenty-seven took a commission in the artillery. Almost immediately, however, he transferred to the embryonic air service of the day, and immediately on the outbreak of war went into action with his squadron. From the very first his courage and energy attracted attention, surrounded though he was by the very cream of pioneer airmanship, and as time went on his reputation became legendary.

Under Vuillemin's direction the personnel of the Air Force have more than justified the traditions inherited from their forebears of the Four Years' War. With Vuillemin at their head, it would be surprising if the pilots of today did not throw every ounce of energy, skill and courage into their dangerous task.

The first physician of the nation  
refutes tales of physical disrepair

# How Healthy Are the German People?

By LEONARDO CONTI, M.D.

Reich Commissioner of Health\*

*(Wide circulation was recently given, in this country, to a magazine article reflecting unfavorably on the state of public health in Germany. The German Government was prompt in stating, to newspaper correspondents at Berlin, that the article was based on a misreading of official statistics. In rebuttal, Dr. Leonardo Conti, Reich Health Commissioner, made the statement that follows, in part, to representatives of the foreign press. —The Editors.)*

**T**HOSE charged with the responsibility of preserving the health of the German people have been harassed by many anxieties in the last few years. The tremendous upheaval which shook the Reich after the World War was necessarily fraught with certain dangers which to some extent affected the public health also. Certain aspects of our population policy and public hygiene are in-

terrelated. I need not call your attention to the increase in our birth rate. In spite of the excess of births over deaths in the last few years, aged persons still predominate in the population. This fact necessarily influences all statistics for ailments associated with age.

In the process of abolishing unemployment we almost completely eliminated women from industry, until shortage of labor compelled us to reopen the factory gates to the female sex. The same condition compelled us to rely, in a larger degree than heretofore, upon elderly workers. The tendency to reintroduce women into industry and to employ aged workers received an additional impetus through the exigencies of the war. Aged workers as a group are more susceptible to illness than their younger compeers. Every war, it must also be pointed out, brings with it the danger of epidemics and nutritional difficulties.

The rate of births in Germany has


\* From *Facts in Review*, published by the German Library of Information, New York City.

risen from 14.8 per thousand head of population in 1932 to 19.7 per thousand in 1938. This is a very considerable advance. It becomes even plainer if we consider the actual figures. In 1933 we had less than one million, to be exact 993,000 children, while in 1938 the number of children born reached a total of 1,346,900—an increase of 40 per cent for every year as compared with 1933. It is claimed in some quarters that in the years of economic depression, prior to 1933, there were fewer marriages and that the increase in the number of children is the natural result of economic recovery. This may be true, but it is not the whole truth. Careful calculations reveal that it holds true in one-third of the cases. The remaining two-thirds represent an absolute increase. This fact has been established by statistical tabulations.

It was formerly held that an increase in births necessarily implies a corresponding rise in the rate of infant and child mortality. Our own experience in the past confirmed this conclusion. Infectious diseases of children and the death rate of infants and children invariably increased with the birth rate. We were afraid that this would happen in the present instance. Fortunately our fears were unjustified. On the contrary, our experience disproved what had been accepted as an axiom of

science. In spite of the rapid rise in the number of births, infant mortality in Germany has declined considerably. Our infant mortality does not exceed 6 per cent today. With this figure Germany takes its place among the ranks of the more fortunate nations, although a few nations, especially among the Nordic States, are even more favored. It is important to note that most nations whose birth-rate is relatively more favorable than ours cannot boast of a more favorable infant mortality rate.

The rapid increase in our birth rate was accompanied by certain drawbacks, because it was not immediately possible to provide for a commensurate increase in the number of institutions devoted to the care of sick children. May I be permitted to cite a case from my personal experience: When I was Health Commis-



sioner of the City of Berlin in 1932, the number of children born was 36,000; by 1938 the number reached a total of 68,000, an increase of nearly 100 per cent. It is obvious that our welfare agencies, day nurseries and children's hospitals did not have a sufficient number of beds to meet this demand. It has taken us several years—and we have not yet been completely successful—to adapt the capacity of these institutions to our increasing birth rate. We were forced to resort to various makeshifts, such as the construction of shelters, to accommodate the increase in our population. Usually it takes two years to build a hospital. We failed to keep pace with the stork.

Fortunately there was practically no increase in the rate of infectious infantile diseases; where it did occur, the increase was slight. Foreign observers point to the substantial increase in the number of diphtheria cases in Germany. It is true that diphtheria has claimed more victims since 1933 than in the previous decade. In the years 1923, 1924 and 1925, the figures for diphtheria were considerably lower than in the corresponding years since 1933.

However, if we examine the curve of incidence closely, we discover that the increase began in the year 1925 and reached its peak in 1932. This peak is now passed. We were, in other words, confronted with an increase in the incidence of this disease which occurs at regular intervals. Diphtheria, like the grippe, descends upon nations periodically. In the case of diphtheria this interval is longer than in the case of grippe. The figures for measles and scarlet fever have remained constant, while other

children's diseases have actually diminished. We have already noted the diminution in the mortality rates of infants and small children. The mortality rate for older children also declined in the last few years, after slight temporary increases.

The re-entry of women into our industrial life necessitated an intensive development of kindergartens, day-nurseries and similar aids to mothers. Ordinarily the vocational occupation of women is incompatible with a high birth rate. We regard it as a particular triumph that in spite of the re-absorption of women in industry the number of births has not fallen and there has been no increase in infant mortality. We look upon this phenomenon as a convincing demonstration of the basic health of our people.

The enormous efforts thrust upon us by our work program and the exigencies of our position, undoubtedly increase the menace of tuberculosis. Nevertheless health statistics show no such increase.

The increase of cancer in Germany, which is unfortunately indisputable, has been widely discussed. But a similar increase affects all civilized countries. It is due in part to the relative increase in the number of older people. Both the origin and the cure of cancer are still unsolved mysteries. It seems to take the place of the epidemics of the past and seems to threaten particularly nations with a high standard of culture. We regretfully acknowledge the fact that this insidious disease seems to attack young women. Formerly it was primarily a disease of old age. It is to be hoped that the nations of the world will unite in a common defense against cancer by supplying their scientists



with the best possible equipment for research and that sooner or later somewhere an inspired investigator will be able to free mankind from this scourge by discovering its source.

The vigorous pulsation of life in Germany has induced great fluctuations in the population. In the city of Berlin alone, nearly 200,000 persons migrate in and out annually. Such movements favor the spread of infectious diseases. It has been claimed in this connection that social diseases have been unusually prevalent in Germany in recent years. The reverse of this is true. The accomplishments of German scientists, particularly the discovery of the syphilis germ and the invention of Neo-Salvarsan, have checked this disease considerably. In fact, new syphilitic infections are so rare in Germany that our university clinics must hunt far and wide for such cases in order to demonstrate the disease to their students. There are, it is true, some districts where social diseases are more prevalent than in others, but even there syphilis is almost extinct.

Complete up-to-date national statistics on the subject of social diseases are not available, but I can give you exact figures from my own former sphere of action, the city of Berlin. In 1927, 1,281 new infections of social diseases were recorded in a single test week. A report for the same week in 1933 revealed only 436 cases.

The acquisition of the territories of the former Polish State, where hygiene has always been sorely neglected, presents a number of new problems and dangers. According to the statistics of the Reich Department of Health, 4 per cent of the popula-

tion of Poland were annually infected with social diseases. This is a very high percentage. In Germany new infections are estimated at .5 to .8 per cent—that is to say, 5 to 8 cases per thousand. But we have done everything possible to take up the battle against social diseases in the Polish territories and to prevent their spread through the Reich. Under a number of new ordinances we trace every infection to its source. A special welfare service provides the necessary treatment for the persons affected. War always brings certain diseases of this type which must be checked.

The prevalence of other diseases in these former Polish territories is by no means inconsiderable. In the war of 1914 to 1918, spotted fever was a great source of anxiety to us. That will not happen again. Spotted fever is transmitted solely by lice. The technique of delousing has been perfected to such an extent that, so far, not a single case of spotted fever has been carried across the borders of the Reich. And the disease has been kept within narrow confines, even in German-occupied Poland. Some cases have occurred on the other side of the demarcation line, but there, too, the situation is under control. There is no danger that the disease will become epidemic in Germany. We have absolutely checked the danger of an invasion of lice which we faced after the World War.

**I**N wartime, problems of nutrition require special attention. The German people are not the only ones confronted with this problem. A great many other nations suffer from the burdens and privations of war. The food control which the German people

have accepted, supplies all the elements necessary to sustain life and vigor over a long period. We are proceeding under the assumption that we are facing a long war. Our nutrition policy adapts itself to that contingency. Although it would be entirely possible to grant generous increases in many items out of available supplies, we deliberately refrain from this policy, in view of the uncertainty of the political outlook. To make the food situation of the German people secure, we provide for the specific needs of all age groups and working classes.

Men engaged in hard physical labor, children, nursing and expectant mothers receive our particular attention. The division of our population into consumer groups, the distribution of food with special reference to the necessity of individual classes, vouchsafe a national utilization of our food supply. It is obvious that the heavy laborer needs more calories than the average working-man or the clerk. When fruit and vegetables become more scarce, as they probably will in the course of the winter, it will be possible to supply

other nutritional equivalents. For the time being the rations prescribed are sufficient.

The hope of our enemies that the German people will, in the course of time, be subjected to severe nutritional strain, will be frustrated. Past experience has enabled us to forestall this danger. Moreover, Germany is not an isolated island as it was during the World War. On many borders sources of supply are open to us today. I cannot conceal from you that, as a health official, I deprecate the effects of war on national well-being. Every war brings with it a menace and an impairment to the health of the people. Certainly every medical man must wish that the care of the national health may proceed once more under peaceful conditions. The words of the Führer when he prophesied that in war there are neither victors nor vanquished, but only victims, assume particular significance in this sphere. We all wish that we could approach our task with new vigor and new ideas under peaceful conditions. But if this wish is denied us, we are prepared to meet any test of endurance.

# Notes and Comments

## The New Art

Now is the time when artists should busy themselves devising new and original forms of gravestones. A wide field is opening for their talents. The dreary stereotyped forms are already giving way to novel designs, but now it has become specially necessary to accelerate the reform before new vistas of monuments, regular and monotonous as the keys on a piano, suddenly inflict themselves upon the landscape.

—*Muenchener Neueste Nachrichten*

## Censorship Note

A new paragraph in the story of espionage is added by French censors who have obliterated the cross-word puzzles carried by some French newspapers. It is explained that spies have used this method of communicating with persons outside the country. So far the prize boner is by a British censor who held up a long article on military tactics on the ground that it betrayed national secrets. The article had been lifted bodily from the *Encyclopædia Britannica*.

—*Japan Chronicle*, Kobe

## Anti-Assassination Note

When Hitler travels overland, he does so in a special armored railroad car, the windows of which are equipped with bullet-proof glass. The armament of this travelling fortress includes twelve machine guns and four anti-aircraft pieces. Above the train is a convoy of fifteen Messerschmidt pursuit ships, four Heinkel bombers and, flying low, Hitler's personal Junker plane, equipped with four machine guns and piloted by the German ace Ernst Udet.

—*Paris Soir*

## Definition

What is a totalitarian State?

—A totalitarian State is one wherein everything is compulsory that is not forbidden.

—*Pourquoi-Pas*, Paris

## The Coarsening War

As there has been a tendency toward the less sophisticated type of program since the outbreak of war, the British Broadcasting Corporation are finding it necessary to keep a closer watch than ever on "indelnicacy."

The wartime programs have contained more of the broad variety of jokes than peace programs, but it was learned there has not been an increase in the number of listeners' letters complaining about this development.

—*Sunday Express*

## English Humor: This War and Last

Most of us have noticed the difference in the humor of this war and the past one and wondered why it exists. We haven't had time as yet to get used to the new conditions of life, and you can't see where the joke lies in any subject until you know something fairly definite about it. When food rationing was last in force, comedians seized on it with relish. Perhaps you remember the story of the stockbroker who came to the city with traces of egg on his moustache. "Swank," was the comment. (There's nothing in that story now, by the way, because eggs aren't scarce and "swank" is a word that's become obsolete except in German propaganda.) The point I'm making is that all such cheerfulness about life's little temporary worries depended for its effect on conditions of life that were well known and taken for granted. Now, when rules and regulations are still taking shape, comedians don't know quite where they are and neither do the rest of us. Topics of conversation are out-of-date before we've had a chance to try out our sense of humor on them.

Anyhow, you can't make humor to order. The worst mistake of all is to disregard twenty-one years and imagine that this war begins, if I may parody Ada Cerito's famous song, where the other old war left off. The disillusioned humor of 1918 grates on our ears. When a detachment was marching through London streets recently, a fat,

middle-aged woman with sleeves rolled up, pushed her way forward to take charge of the onlookers. Her opportunity came when a private received orders to turn back on some errand or other. "E's 'ad enough already," was her comment. There wasn't a smile. She tried another and put all our teeth on edge. Twenty-odd years ago, I imagine, she must have been the life and soul of every party at that street corner.

—Editor of *The Listener*, organ of the British Broadcasting Company

### England's Destiny

Official—from the German radio announcer: "England, terrified by the German U-boat campaign, has now abandoned her former position in the Channel, and is being towed by the British Fleet, under Sir Lord Churchill, to a destination unknown. Our Navy is in pursuit."

—*London Opinion*

### Terrific Currents

"We have in Europe not only the duel between Germany and Britain, but the fact that the longer the war lasts the more our part of the world and its surroundings will be influenced by those terrific currents which are far more important than the battle between the two great duellists."

—Rudolf Kircher in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*

### Useful Information

Some misconception has arisen regarding the Commercial Inquiries Section set up by the Ministry of Economic Warfare. It has had no lack of applications for information, but some have been of an odd kind. For example, its advice has been asked on how to smuggle jewelry out of Belgium into the United Kingdom.

—*Times*, London

### Normalcy in Spain

In Madrid, too, life is nearly normal again. General Franco has done a wonderful job of reconstruction in the battered capital. The Ritz and three floors of the Palace are open and newly decorated.

—*Tatler*, London

### Light and Leftish

Light reading for relaxation and stimulating fare for thinkers both found a place in a list of 1,300 book titles compiled for the Services by the National Book Council, at the request of the War Office. The catalogue was provided for the use of people wishing to send books to service friends or to the Red Cross Hospital Library. Confident of the mental stability of British Tommies, the Book Council recommended arch-enemy Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, leftish Allan Hutt's *Post-War History of the British Working Class*, and revolutionary Karl Marx's classic *Das Kapital*.

—*News Review*, London

### Quiz

Who is the great statesman who, in a moment of rare sincerity, said recently to a French diplomat in his country: "In politics, there is no honesty but more or less hypocritical dishonesty." It is, by the way, the same person who last year said, "In politics there is only one principle: namely, no principle."

—*Marianne*, Paris

### On General Principles

Mimeographed inflammatory handbills were scattered in front of the Hongkew Market during a busy market hour on Tuesday, on the occasion of the Double Ten celebration.

The anti-Japanese handbills were issued by the Shanghai Group for the Extermination on General Principles of Chinese Traitors.

—*North-China Herald*

### Royal Welcome

An Italian paper quotes from a French source the story that when King George was recently in the British lines in France, he was greeted with the tune of *God Save the King* from the German trenches.

—*New Statesman and Nation*, London

### War Crisis Solved

One of the most important rules to be observed during the present war crisis is to keep the nails soft. Bathe them daily in a mixture of oil, vinegar and lemon juice to which some boric acid has been added.

—Advertisement in *Paris Soir*

Fear, discretion and alliances now  
motivate the non-belligerent press

## The 'Neutrals' View the War

By STEPHEN NAFT

THE HISTORIAN of the future who sets out to determine the opinion of various neutrals toward the belligerents in the World War, Second Installment, and the secondary conflicts of these times will soon discover that conventional labels have no meaning. For a neutral—in the dictionary sense—is almost non-existent. The historian will be first beset by the fact that, while Britain and France are belligerents vis-à-vis Germany, they are ostensibly neutrals with respect to the war in Finland. The Soviet Union is ostensibly a neutral in so far as the war in western Europe is concerned, but presumably the Kremlin has only an academic concern in the war among Germany, France and Britain. To some degree, indeed, Soviet Russia purports to be neutral even toward Finland, for in the view of *Izvestia* and *Pravda* there can be no "war" against Finland since the "Democratic Peoples Republic" of Otto Kuusinen

already exists at Terioki, and the current hostilities are merely to support the régime they "recognize" as legitimate. Contradictorily, the press of the totalitarian states of Italy, Spain and Japan have words of encouragement for democratic Finland, whose Government is compounded today of more Marxists and leftists than was the republican Government at Madrid, which was destroyed largely by means of Italy's intervention. Italian newspapers continue to snarl forth their undying support of Germany, but their Government sends volunteers and planes to Finland in the hope of stopping the Soviet Union, which is an ally of the Reich.

This state of transcendent confusion reaches a kind of insane disorder when the third war, that in China, is considered in the neutrality puzzle. Japan has not hesitated to show her hostility toward Britain and France, whose interests in eastern Asia conflict with hers, but her press



often suggests that her fear of Soviet Russia is greater than her dislike of the Allies.

In fact, fear is obviously a compelling factor in shaping published neutral opinion in nations adjacent to or near Germany and the Soviet Union: Germany, for example, has not hesitated to warn Switzerland of immediate and disagreeable consequences if anti-Nazi opinion continues to be published, and the Scandinavian governments (including Denmark) have also been warned by the Reich not to publish attacks upon Germany nor, in fact, to give allegedly partial news-accounts of the war at sea. It is interesting and perhaps indicative that, since about the first of the year, the so-called "neutral press" in Europe has been less hesitant to speak its real mind, and that that mind is often distinctly hostile to the Nazis.

Generally speaking, the controlled press of the totalitarian states is pro-German, and is anti-Nazi in the neutral states that are constitutionally governed. An exception, incidentally, is the official and the disguised communist press abroad, which is vociferously "neutral" in demanding stoppage of war materials to all belligerents; this does not square with the demands of the communist press, before the Russo-German treaties, that all non-fascist states (including this country) join with the Soviet Union in a united front against the fascist aggressor states, or with its demands of active aid for republican Spain, or its apologies for the sale by Moscow of oil to Italy during the Ethiopian invasion, or with its present supply of oil and other war materials to Germany.

Probably the most disinterested opinion, in the excerpts that follow, is that appearing in the press of Latin America, where the likelihood of involvement in the European war is the most remote. (In this survey, editorial opinion in the United States has been omitted as in no need of citation or clarification.)

#### MEXICO

*El Universal*, most influential pro-Government organ:

France will never have another or better opportunity to guarantee the peace of the peoples of Europe than that which appears at this historic moment. Efficiently aided by Britain, and seconded by the majority of the nations of the world, accompanied by the universal condemnation of the unprecedented attacks by Germany, France will guarantee the tranquillity of Europe . . . by firm, legitimate and honorable means. The recognition by many nations of the Government of Poland, now established in France, is a public condemnation of the outrages committed by Soviet Russia and Germany.

But the opposite view is adopted by the *Mexican Labor News*, published weekly in Spanish and English by the Workers University of Mexico, and the official organ of the Mexican Confederation of Labor, which is controlled by avowed friends of the Soviet Union. Its views may be said to be characteristic of the attitude of official and unofficial communist publications and organizations, the chief concern of which, whether in Mexico, Paraguay, Sweden or the Balkans, is the welfare of the Soviet Union. Thus:

England and France, as they did in the Pact of Munich, which sacrificed Czechoslovakia, have permitted Poland to fall into the hands of Hitler. . . . If the war should present itself, at last, as not between a group of theoretically democratic countries against the fascist coun-

tries, but between two great groups of capitalist countries, in each of which there would be nations governed by the fascist régime [a reference to the possibility of Italy joining the Allies], it is obvious that the workers of Mexico and of all countries would have nothing to defend in that struggle unleashed to bring about a new adjustment between the imperialist countries of the declining capitalist world. It is also possible that in the end an alliance will be formed . . . to fight with the aid of the United States against the Soviet Union. . . . The only possible attitude is one of strict neutrality. . . . Mexican labor rejects the British and French thesis of a war against Hitlerism, and sees the conflict merely as a new "imperialist war" . . . implying the refusal to join some of the other members of the International Federation of Trade Unions, to which the Mexican Federation belongs, in a condemnation of the action of the Soviet Union.

#### BELGIUM

The conservative *Libre Belgique*, elaborately avoiding mention of Germany, has this to say:

It would be dangerous for foreigners to believe that the invasion of Belgium would leave The Netherlands indifferent, and vice versa. A manifestation of solidarity of the two peoples could, on the contrary, eliminate grave dangers from their soil. . . . This solidarity, which is directed against no other State, would have no other objective than to defend more securely the double neutrality which all the belligerents have promised to respect.

*La Nation Belge*, conservative and nationalist (and tactful):

In Parliament, as well as in the press, talk about the reported aims of a possible attack on our neutrality should be halted while our responsible officials, prepared for any eventuality, should be left to worry over the situation.

#### THE NETHERLANDS

The Netherlands, its leaders and its press, have been in no position to give offense to either side, and diplomatic representatives of the Reich have been quick to protest the least

room for inference, in editorials, that The Netherlands have any fear of or hostility toward the rulers of Germany. Thus most editorials deal in generalities with the forthcoming peace, with the shape of Europe in the post-War era and kindred, inoffensive subjects.

Only by inference, then, does *De Groene Amsterdamer*, usually regarded as an independent weekly, reflect its sympathies in a discussion of the shape post-War Europe must assume:

Europe's unity must be based on democratic equality, in social as well as in national respects. The elimination of the present social inequalities will demand much intelligence and energy—but not more than Europe's nations are applying at this moment in their mutual destruction.

A tone of "a plague on both your houses" is adopted by *Gids*, a monthly of Amsterdam, in this vein:

Was Russia's attitude really a "betrayal" [of Britain and France]? . . . It is impossible to believe that Stalin and his co-workers suddenly became convinced that Germany no longer constituted a danger to the Soviet Union, or that the two countries are destined to work hand-in-hand. . . . The "ideals" of the German General Staff are explicit in the Brest-Litovsk treaty.

#### SWITZERLAND

The Swiss press, in both German and French, is today outspoken in its criticism of the totalitarian régimes, with the exception of the pro-German *Neue Basler-Zeitung* (which is very guardedly pro-Nazi). The leading liberal organ, the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, remarks:

We wish that we were like Finland—free, simple, competent, in her days of peace; courageous, willing to sacrifice, brave and strong, when attacked. But we are far away from Finland, not only in faith but in our characteristics. Do you

think it is easy to say that we are soft, spoiled, pretentious, disorganized, aimless and without faith? Who is compelled to say it, must do so with pain. We are at the turning point in our history. Are we to have an awakening and a rebirth? God grant it. We need it.

The same influential newspaper, in a subsequent issue:

The belligerents are continually making presumptuous demands which the neutrals cannot satisfy, partly because of the very fact of their neutrality and partly because of their economic well-being. Whenever they obviously have not the power to protect violation of their rights by one of the belligerent Powers, they are subjected to threats and accusations by the opposite party. . . . In the future, let us not speak too much of neutrality: to maintain the independence of Switzerland, and to defend it, if necessary, with all means, should be our solemn vow in this hour. . . . There is hardly a country which does not feel and does not know that Finland is fighting against Bolshevik imperialism, against the *Sozialismus Asiaticus* of Stalin. And it is the ardent desire of the Swiss people to help Finland with active assistance, which she deserves.

#### SCANDINAVIA

Generally speaking, the Scandinavian press has, until quite recently, been on the fence regarding the war in western Europe, although the pro-Ally sympathies of Norway and Sweden have been made plain enough by other means. With respect to the war in Finland, however, the press is severely anti-Soviet and is anti-Nazi only by inference. But to judge from some sections of Scandinavia's press, it is a question whether Sweden and Norway are not more in fear of Germany than of Russia.

The monthly *Svensk Tidskrift* of Stockholm, however, is an exception to the rule in that it does not equivocate with respect to the war among Germany, France and Britain. Thus:

The Allied Powers have the advantage of fighting for the same principles which gave the Entente a powerful, quasi-religious weapon of propaganda. Today, after the Polish campaign, the Germans cannot profess the ethical aims they did before, when they agitated against the Versailles Treaty. It should be clear now even to the most loyal soldier that this is a war for the sake of war and power. . . . Any weakening in Britain's power must also impair Britain's traditional role of protector of the small countries of Europe.

The Norwegian monthly *Samtiden*, of Oslo:

The old fear of Russia is again on the increase in Britain. Many Englishmen look with misgivings at the Soviet Union's appetite for new lands to conquer. They ask themselves what Russia will do after Britain and France have subdued Ger-



many. Powerful and aggressive today, Russia will scarcely be less powerful and aggressive if and when the Allies have conquered Germany. Already one reads in the Russian press, articles devoted to the future redistribution of British colonies.

The Danish press treads cautiously. The leading monthly publication, *Gads Danske*, adopts this academic tone:

... Nobody can predict how much of [National Socialist Germany's] program will be dropped during a war which was organized for imperialist purposes. There will remain elements which will bring National Socialism nearer to bolshevism—such factors as a planned economy geared to the nation's militarization, the co-ordination of intellectual life, the alienation of youth from the family, and atheism.

#### SPAIN

The Spain of Generalissimo Franco is, of course, under his strict control and its views are his. Accordingly, the best example of the general tone might be said to be an address by the generalissimo, reprinted by the *Arriba* of Madrid and all the other official organs, in which he gave his view of the conflict in Europe. In part he said:

If we look for the deeper causes of the struggle in Europe, we must point to the responsibility that falls upon the international speculators and the leaders of the liberal régimes of injustice existing in the world. Such régimes today are undergoing a period of severe strain, even in those countries which created and propagated liberalism. . . . The longer the conflict lasts the less its prolongation is justified. The fate of an already vanquished nation [Poland] should not constitute a motive for continuance of a struggle which threatens to destroy other States. The fate of a conquered nation cannot justify the prolongation of war.

The Generalissimo, who defends Finland against the Soviet Union, agrees with Stalin over the supposed futility of continued war over Poland.

#### ITALY

Italian editors prefer the phrase "non-belligerent" to neutral in discussing Italy's role, present or potential, in the European war. Hostility is expressed consistently against the Allies, against all the democracies, but the tone of the press is scarcely more vituperative against Britain and France (and, occasionally, the United States) than it is against Soviet Russia, particularly in recent weeks.

In its customary breast-beating manner, the *Regime Fascista* of Cremona refers in bold type to the "anti-democratic, anti-Bolshevik and anti-bourgeois intransigence along the whole line of the Fascist Revolution, which has now attained its twentieth year and has been consecrated with the blood of the *squadristi* and the legionnaires. . . ."

And in a subsequent issue:

We cannot relax peacefully under the illusion that the present attitude of Italy will remain unchanged in today's war. Fascist Italy may at any moment find it necessary as a matter of duty to take up arms. The country, therefore, must be ready in arms and prepared in spirit.

With respect to Finland, a racist tone now begins to appear in the Fascist press. The same party journal headlines front-page news from Finland in this fashion: STALIN'S MONGOLIC HORDES AGAIN DEFEATED IN SALLA SECTOR.

The personal organ of Count Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister, has established a sort of daily department given over to deprecation of the Red Army. Thus *Il Telegrafo* of Leghorn:

The Red planes, the parachute-jumpers and the tanks have not performed as expected. The motorized Soviet Army, about whose power the stupidest legends



have been disseminated, has proved of no use other than to send tens of thousands of poor devils to their death—adorned with the Red Star. . . . The fate of Russian battalions has always been to be commanded and led without plan, and to be sacrificed without rhyme or reason.

#### FRANCE

On the surface and in international law, France is a neutral so far as the Russo-Finnish war is concerned. The semi-official *Le Temps*, however, has been calling for severance of diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia, and has even discussed the strategic advantages of actual war with that country. The Socialist organ *Le Populaire*, headed by ex-Premier Leon Blum, who for years demanded Franco-Russian collaboration, changed its policy overnight when the Russo-German treaties were signed, and became extremely bitter on the subject of Russia once the invasion into Finland began. In comment on that invasion and subsequent developments, *Le Populaire* stated:

When the Red Army violated the Finnish frontier, Finland had a Government unanimously supported by its people, as the last vote in the parliament demonstrated. In order to establish a communist Government, its head [Otto Kuusinen] and other members had to be imported, ready-made, from Soviet Russia. . . . No external or internal policy of the Helsinki Government could have given Stalin the slightest pretext. . .

All this adds up to make the Finnish crime the most atrocious and the most intolerable in these terrible times. It is the same savage greed, the same bloodthirsty instincts, that have been unleashed elsewhere. Up until the last few months a veil of ignorance could be spread over Stalin's despotism, and there seemed even grounds for illusion and hope. Now the terror has reached its zenith. Everything is finished, everything is broken.

#### U.S.S.R.

An ostensible neutral in the war in

western Europe, the Soviet Union nevertheless has made it plain, since the outset of hostilities, that she bears no love for the Allies, despite the pre-war exhortations of Communists against the Nazis (and vice versa). The official position of the Kremlin may be said to have been well summarized in an editorial in *Izvestia*, the official Moscow Government organ, soon after the start of the war. Thus:

The war of Britain and France against Germany is waged under the slogan of the restoration of Poland. Therefore, continuation of the war cannot be justified by anything, and its protraction constitutes senseless slaughter. Termination of the war would meet the real interests of peoples and nations.

British and French politicians declare, as their principal war aim, the destruction of Hitlerism. Can one accept this argument? Everyone is entitled to express his attitude toward one or another ideology to defend it or to reject it. But extermination of a people merely for the reason that one doesn't like their views and ideology, is senseless and absurd cruelty. It would make us revert to the dark medieval epoch of devastating religious wars for the extermination of heretics and dissidents. . . . One may respect or hate Hitlerism, just as one may react toward any other system of political views. That is a matter of taste, but to undertake war for the annihilation of Hitlerism means to commit criminal folly in politics.

Alex Tolstoy, distantly related to the novelist, is the author of an article on neutrality in another issue of *Izvestia*, published after the invasion of Finland.

We are neutral in the Soviet fashion, not in the fashion of the bourgeois neutrals, who stuff their pockets with bloodstained money. We repudiate wars of conquest from which gold flows into the pockets of the financiers, while whole divisions are slaughtered. . . . Our brothers beyond the frontier, slaves yesterday, will find in the future that they are to live prosperously and happily.



# Washington Letter

By RAY TUCKER

**T**WO INTERNATIONAL assemblages recently staged in Holland depict vividly the practical philosophy and politics underlying Cordell Hull's reciprocal-trade-treaty program—now an embattled subject on Capitol Hill and destined to become a heady issue in the 1940 Presidential campaign.

The first parley consisted of diplomats representing the belligerent nations. They met to discuss means by which merchandise aboard German ships bottled up in neutral ports could be shipped without interference or seizure, to the innocent, pre-war purchasers. Despite a common desire for an answer, the respective delegations did not meet together. They huddled in separate suites and on separate floors; they were forbidden to exchange the time of day or to mention the horrible weather, like the soldiers on the Western Front. A distracted Dutchman, sprinting from one suite to another and climbing from floor to floor, acted as interpreter and intermediary among these acidulous emissaries. The diplomats' powwow was, in actuality, a Babelian brawl.

Meanwhile, members of the Council of the International Chamber of Commerce assembled to talk over business problems arising from the war. Although their agenda referred to questions which are the internal stuff of diplomacy—of war—they met in an atmosphere of cordiality and co-operation. Heiling Hitlerites talk-

ed and gorged and highballed with the parents of poilus. With them it was "business as usual." The dim, misty barriers which diplomats delight to build vanished because they realized that it is business, by whatever name you choose to call it, which makes the world go 'round—which makes a man and a nation work (and sometimes fight) for himself and a swishing skirt forever and forever, amen! Even the imperialistic Kipling caught a glimpse of that economic verity.

Mr. Hull regards his reciprocal trade arrangements as business contracts. There is more than superficial significance—and a dodge to escape Senate ratification—in the fact that under their legal definition they are "agreements" rather than "treaties." Scientifically negotiated and conscientiously performed, they will tend, in Mr. Hull's opinion, to supplant the existing system of force and pressure and rivalry in world relationships with one of fair and honest dealing. As Secretary of State, he has exceptional means of knowing that business men owing allegiance to various belligerent powers are executing their contracts faithfully and decently even while their home governments treat their most solemn diplomatic promises as "scraps of paper." Therefore he may be pardoned if he believes that his "agreements," his contracts, will eventually eliminate the spirit of fierce nationalism and com-

mercial quarrels which have brought the world to its present dance of death.

His theme is, perhaps, too familiar to require repetition here. But from a bread-and-butter, dollars-and-cents standpoint, the Secretary of State argues that the United States cannot sell abroad unless it provides purchasing power by opening our own markets to other nations' products—non-competitive, so far as possible. Lastly, as an old inhabitant of Capitol Hill—from 1906 to 1933—he considers his scheme vastly superior to the backscratching, log-rolling procedure which produced such inanities as the Payne-Aldrich and Hawley-Smoot Tariff Acts.

Win or lose in the battle for renewal of his authority to negotiate these agreements—and quite apart from their intrinsic merits—the drawling, silvery-headed Tennessean makes a gallant figure in this scrap. He knows that he may be tossing away his chance to become the Democrats' Presidential nominee, and mayhap the next Chief Magistrate of the United States. His theories have alienated powerful economic and political interests in the farming, cattle and mining states.

The "big shots" from these areas—chiefly the Rocky Mountain and Pacific Coast sections—swear that they will never vote for him either at the convention or at the polls unless he mends his manners and amends his agreements; they have flung that ultimatum into his ghostly white face. Friendly Democratic strategists—such an old Congressional crony as Pat Harrison—have begged him to "forget it, Cordell." They have suggested a slick scheme under which he

would ask for no new basic law to replace the statute which expires on June 12 of this year. The existing agreements, they point out, will live on anyway, and then, next year, after both the convention and the election, he can revive his demand for extension of the underlying legislation. Indeed, there has been a suspicion that the White House was amenable to this "political out."

But Mr. Hull, like an American Cato, insists that tariff barriers must be destroyed. Agree with him or not, his enemies cannot but admire and respect this stubborn old feudist from the mountains of Tennessee. There are not many men in present-day American politics who would pass up a shot at free rent in the White House for an unpopular and a still unproved ideal.

**I**RONICALLY, only a handful of fellows in Congress disagree with Mr. Hull's fundamental theory; they concede that it is logical, practical, sensible. They concede likewise that it has been a major factor (though only one of many) in improving the national economy, in increasing foreign trade, in boosting purchasing power here and abroad. Only a few legislators who still profess to believe that Mark Hanna and William McKinley were the nation's foremost statesmen, cavil at these general conclusions.

With respect to these trade agreements, however, it is impossible to argue from the general to the particular. Mr. Hull's principal difficulty in ensuing encounters in Congress will be that what may be good economics may not be good politics. Tariff policies which benefit the nation

in a broad and universal way may mean political bankruptcy to the individual member of Congress. And what profits it a Congressman if he should save the nation but lose his own district!

Here cometh a Congressman from Massachusetts, let us say, and his district houses numerous shoe factories. Now he may concede the virtues of the Hull policies as aforementioned; he may have served in the House with the Secretary and liked, as everybody does, "the old man"; he may want to support extension for party reasons. But he suspects that concessions granted to Czechoslovakia may permit importation of fancy, feminine shoes that will compete with the homemade product. The imports might, in his opinion, result in the discharge of workers—voters, to him—or even in the closing of the factory. Therefore, regretfully, he must vote against Mr. Hull.

**O**RGANIZED labor has also registered its resistance. With 9,000,000 people unemployed, and always a high-tariff element in the electorate, both the C. I. O. and the A. F. of L. maintain that the reciprocal-trade agreements discriminate against them. So they have ridden into the fray with the slogan of "America for the Americans." They refuse to accept Mr. Hull's and Dr. Isidor Lubin's figures demonstrating that production and wages and prices have increased or remained stable during the period when these agreements have been in force.

Where the opposition does not proclaim its selfish, local interest and fears, it raises the argument that delegation of so much power over tariff

rates to the Executive arm is unconstitutional. It insists—and the opponents may succeed in forcing through this amendment—that these agreements are actually treaties, and must be ratified by the Senate. As an old Senate cowhand, Mr. Hull realizes that no agreement, no matter what its provisions, would emerge in its pure and virginal form under such a revision. Therefore, he rebuffs his old colleagues on this score.

The substance and identity of the opposition presents a curious paradox. It derives its greatest strength from such erstwhile free or low-tariff areas as Mr. Hull's own South and the West. Plantation and agricultural spokesmen who once howled that the Republican tariff philosophy was driving them to the poor house, now bewail that this Tennessee Democrat's policies will be their destruction. Conversely, his support hails from great Republican manufacturing centers—New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Michigan—which have enjoyed a more profitable foreign market for their industrial products. Consumer groups, especially the women, have also rallied behind the Secretary of State. Thus the battle has assumed the old, old aspect of agriculture versus industry, the country against the city.

Now let us consider the agreements themselves and their operation. At the moment we have these arrangements with nineteen great and small countries. The nations still outside the reciprocal orbit are Japan, Germany, Italy, Russia (the dictator powers), the Balkans, Persia, India, Norway, Denmark, Portugal, Argentina and Uruguay. The war has temporarily forced the British and French

agreements into a state of suspended animation.

The United States has granted, roughly, concessions on such major products as lumber, boots and shoes, wool, crude petroleum, cattle, glass, cement, clocks and watches, cottonseed oil, zinc. Although this makes an imposing list, it should be kept in mind—though few try to—that a determining factor in lowering duties is the quality and price of any particular product given special treatment. The American negotiators aim to favor articles which furnish no direct competition with home-made goods. And in every instance quotas are imposed so as to restrict the amount of imports.

The United States has received concessions on such key items as automobiles and parts, machine tools, agricultural implements, tires and tubes, hardware, stoves, radios and phonographs, wire, rubber goods, textile machinery, cash registers and typewriters, rubber boots and shoes, cutlery and edge tools—also on numerous fruit, fish and vegetable produce.

Mr. Hull claims that he has won beneficial treatment for some 3,000 items or rates. These take the form of actual rate reductions, liberalization of quotas, agreements not to increase existing duties. These concessions, he reports, affect 75 per cent of our total agricultural exports and almost half of our total non-agricultural exports. To deny that this general lowering of trade barriers means money in the American pocketbook and pay envelope does not make common sense to him.

Dispute him, and he will cite statistics from the Department of Com-

merce and the United States Tariff Commission. One set, for instance, shows that, during the first eleven months of 1939, exports to trade-agreement countries increased over the same 1938 period by 4.9 per cent, whereas shipments to non-agreement nations declined by 7.9 per cent. Or, comparing January-November, 1938-1939, with the same 1934-1935 months (pre-agreement years), he finds the increased trade to Hull customers to have been 60.5 per cent, and only 29.6 per cent to the less cooperative fellows.

Take the single but important item of automobiles alone. Foreign sales to all countries jumped from \$190,216,000 in 1934 B.H. (Before Hull) to \$270,427,000 in 1938—an upping of 42.4 per cent. But the trade-agreement nations accounted for a 50.2 per cent gain, while all others were responsible for only a 37.7 per cent boost. And here is the Secretary's most crushing load of statistics. It tabulates pre-agreement and post-agreement export totals to various countries:

	<i>Before Hull</i>	<i>After Hull</i>
Cuba . . . .	\$30,600,000	\$73,500,000
Belgium . .	47,300,000	72,400,000
Sweden . .	27,800,000	62,700,000
Canada . .	312,800,000	459,000,000
Brazil . . .	42,000,000	62,300,000
France . .	115,200,000	151,400,000
Finland . .	6,500,000	12,700,000

If you ask the Secretary how the wage-earner has fared under his system, he will refer you to Dr. Lubin's testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee. The United States Commissioner of Labor informed the inquiring legislators that the agreements had provided direct



work for 300,000 Americans, and indirectly had furnished jobs to 1,000,000 more. Or Mr. Hull will trot out more statistics revealing that there has been a greater gain of employment in trade-agreement industries—automobile, machine tools, rubber, manufactured iron and steel—than in others.

Next, let us examine some of the "sore spots." Nobody yelled more violently than did the wool growers over a lowering of the duty on their finished product in the agreement with the United Kingdom. The reductions ranged from 13 per cent on low-value goods to 30 per cent on stuffs sold on Bond Street, where former King Edward used to buy his pin-striped suits and topcoats.

Well, for the first ten months of the agreement's operation, the number of wool-textile employees increased over the previous year by 35,000, although their hourly earnings dropped about 2 cents. Machinery activity in the industry rose from an index of 69.1 to 102.6, taking the 1923-25 period as 100. And on the basis of either quantity or value, imports under the Hull setup were only 2 per cent of domestic production.

The newest batch of crêpe-hangers have been the oil men. They complain that the agreement which lowers the excise tax on Venezuelan petroleum by 50 per cent—from 21 to 10.5 cents a barrel—will ruin them body and soul. It will, according to them, permit numerous foreign countries, which will also benefit from the reduction under the most-favored-nation clause, to flood the United States with oil produced by cheap or peon labor.

The hard fact is that the import quota has been fixed at only 5 per cent

of all the crude petroleum refined domestically for the year prior to the date when the agreement became effective, which was in December 1939. And actual taxable oil imported during that period amounted to only 55 per cent of what the quota would have been in those years. It is questionable whether foreign oil interests will ever fill up the domestic quota tank. Moreover, it is doubtful if this concession will affect the domestic oil situation. The three principal producers in the Venezuelan fields are American companies, and it would not be to their interest to undermine the price or production structure for the 95 per cent of the domestic output in which they have a rich interest. Their major benefit will be a cheaper freight rate on the Venezuelan supply, which will be refined at their plants along the Atlantic seaboard.

It would require too much space to examine all the "sore spots"—to weigh the complaints against the facts—but these are typical. The record seems to reveal that, with the local exceptions already noted, the agreements have been so framed that they safeguard the industrial and agricultural producer and wage-earner.

It would be silly to attribute the generally improved domestic and foreign trade to the policy of reciprocity. Nor does Mr. Hull make such a contention, in view of the many other factors affecting world commerce. But he does believe that if he can persuade the nations to think about cash instead of conquest, to think and act in terms of business rather than along old-fashioned, cut-throat, diplomatic lines, to foster commerce as against armaments, it will be a better world to live in—and much more democratic!



Militarily considered, the Finnish War  
has had little effect on the Allies

# Strategic Aspects of Finnish War

By STRATEGICUS

From the *Spectator*, London Conservative Weekly

IN a conversation with Moreau, Napoleon once insisted that the big army must always overcome the small, and he met an obvious objection by pointing out that, faced by a bigger army, he took it piecemeal, and so in the end confronted the remnant with superior forces. This conversation indicates the position and chances of the gallant little army with which General Mannerheim is attempting to defend Finland against Russia. The disparity between her war potential and that of Russia is tremendous. But there can be little doubt that Stalin, embarked, possibly, on historic Russian policies, has chosen Finland deliberately, in much the same way that an untried boxer is pitted against some decrepit old bruiser so that by certain and easy success he may gain confidence. For it must be remembered that in the past Russia has suffered checks at the hands of Finland as well as Poland. If the new armies are to gain experience and confidence Finland was

predestined to provide the diploma piece.

Something, therefore, very much greater than the conquest of Finland is at stake. It is the question of the strategic and tactical efficiency of an army of almost illimitable size, equipped with the latest weapons of today, but weakened by constant purges in its responsible direction. At best Finland should be able to raise some three-quarters of a million troops; but it is doubtful if there are arms for two-thirds of the number. It seems almost irrelevant to number the air force and the navy. Russia's air force runs into incredible figures. Its tanks are numerous, and, in Spain, they were found to be formidable. It would seem that Russia has chosen well if she wants military prestige at a bargain price. There are, however, two factors in favor of Finland. The country is not over-favorable to an invader, and particularly in the neighborhood of the most important area—the coast fringing the Gulf of

Finland and the southern part of the Gulf of Bothnia. The string of lakes, and especially Lake Ladoga, have been worked into the Finnish de-

is north of Lake Ladoga. An advance here would at a certain point turn the defences which cover Helsinki, south of the lake.

### DAY



fence. The second factor in favor of Finland is the morale of the population. A highly intelligent, educated, free and virile people will fight well for their independence.

At the moment all the successes and surprises have gone to Finland. Petsamo lost has been retaken; but with the assistance of a landing from the sea Russia should soon recover what is left of it, though it may be some time before she can use it. At the extreme south of the country the advance has been checked before it reached the main defensive line. Lake Ladoga leaves a gap of about thirty-six miles between it and the coast. Here the Karelian Isthmus is the seat of the Moscow puppet-government. But it rests, at present on a no-man's-land, from which the Russians are trying to remove mines. The critical area

THE campaign is, of course, merely at its first page. The air attack on Helsinki caused great damage and some loss of life. But the Russians have had a number of planes brought down and lost even

### THAT NIGHT



more tanks. In fine, in a sense which was certainly not intended, the Russian claim that they are "not at war" might be taken for the truth. But the heavier potential must tell. There is no chance for the Finns to imitate Napoleon and defeat their enemy piecemeal. The conditions forbid it; and, even if they did not, Russia can bring up too many columns for Finland to remain in possession of the larger army ultimately. What skill and courage can do in attacking Russian details with superior force, has been done, and done well. The factor of real importance is the *time* it will


take Russia to occupy the area fringing the Gulf of Finland and the southern part of the Gulf of Bothnia, including the Aaland islands, and Petsamo.

That seems to be the most important aspect of the Finnish campaign. Much ink has been wasted in discovering other objectives (and effects). It has been stated, for instance, that somehow Germany has lost by it. Germany may lose in *prestige* by Russia's success. But that emerged dimmed from Russia's intervention in Poland. In the Baltic, too, even if Finland be the only objective and even if it be conquered much more slowly than was Poland, German prestige will suffer. But it is sheer nonsense to suggest that somehow her necessary freedom of action in the Baltic will be impaired. If Russia is Germany's ally, the German fleet can still move into the Gulf of

sense that she cannot move where there is no obvious necessity she should move.


The shock of the Russian invasion has caused much more confusion than it should have done. Successful, it harms Germany and the Allies not at all, in the military sense. For Russia and Germany it is downright bad policy; but so would be the invasion of any other neutral, though some might provide a better chance for Germany to attack the Allies. But from the point of view of the blockade, Germany should be praying them to remain neutral. To bring them into the German system is to assist the blockade. Only in one sense, apart from the question of prestige and the moral revolt of the world, is a Russian conquest of Finland a disadvantage to Germany. If Hitler wishes to attack Russia, his chance is to that extent weakened. But it is unusual to make an alliance with a State which one regards as a possible object of attack. In any

### NEXT MORNING



Finland if it desires to do so. If Russia is a little detached, Germany's *Lebensraum* is narrowed only in the

### LATER THAT DAY



case, we have to remember that Russia entered the Great War with Finland completely in her power, in command of the Baltic States and with a strong navy. Germany did not then deafen the world with cries of loss of *Lebensraum*. Liberty of movement in the Baltic, in fact, depends upon the possession of a great navy; and, as compared with Russia, Germany's navy is of immense strength.

All the secret hopes that Russia is somehow hurting Germany, and the fears that the Allies are losing by the Russian treachery, will not bear analysis. If Russia halts at Finland the Allies have at least gained in the world's indignation at the action of Germany's ally. Germany's main *possible* loss is the restriction in the supplies of Finnish nickel. That may not eventuate. She may not have realized but she must have recognized the loss of prestige. Apart from that, the question of greatest importance is how far Russia intends to go. It is certain that she will take all she can get at bargain prices. Thus, she would certainly like a port on the Atlantic coast of Norway. No doubt she would like to control the exit from the Baltic. As to this, we have once more to bear in mind that Germany is her ally, and the German Government would never agree to any Power which she could not cajole or

browbeat, controlling the Baltic exit. The Kiel Canal is not meant to provide merely a funkhole!

But if Russia wishes to go further there is no military, though every moral, reason why she should not. Sweden and Norway can resist and make trouble for her; but Napoleon's conclusion will still hold. If the Russian army is really big, that is to say, if it is really a *big army*, it can take what it desires in Scandinavia. But it is very doubtful if it will advance far enough to threaten the Allied blockade. At this point, in fine, we enter the region of speculation which has clouded the war from the beginning. We do not know in what precise military sense Russia is the ally of Germany. So far, everything she has done might be explained as the recovery of former Russian territory, though it seems to provide at the same time a reinsurance against Germany. The position is that we are playing, as it were, a new kind of chess with the pieces not yet all on the board, and with others enjoying a role that seems to be improvised from moment to moment.

For the present Finland holds the eyes and ears and sympathy of the world. Militarily, it hardly affects the Allies. Morally, it may prove the catalyst that will set in action forces on which we hardly dare speculate.

The moment approaches when action  
will be demanded of us in the East

# Withdraw or Conquer?

By C. J. LAVAL

*From the Far Eastern Review Shanghai, English-Language Economic Monthly*

**I**N MUCH that is written about China, the position of Americans there seems to be confused with such things as the principle of the Open Door and the maintenance of the integrity of the Government of China, which may or may not be factors in American Far Eastern policy. The destiny and the safety of Americans living in China are necessarily bound up closely with anything Washington may do in shaping a policy in East Asia, and if there were no Americans in China the situation would be changed—maybe for the better, certainly simplified.

The protection of American lives and properties abroad is traditionally a fundamental obligation of our Government. It follows, therefore, that the situation of Americans in China must be a primary consideration of the Washington Government in anything it does there. But since the numerical strength of American armed forces in the Far East through the past decade has been such that

for long periods every American in China has had an individual armed guard at the expense of taxpayers back home, it may not be charged that these Americans have been forgotten by their government.

Americans laugh at Japanese asseverations that they have maintained the Open Door in China. They point to losses of crippled commercial enterprises and the uprooting of American business concerns when Manchuria became Manchukuo. The Japanese in turn point out that the value of exports to Manchukuo from the United States has more than quadrupled.

The Open Door in China is a much more serious matter for Great Britain than it is for the United States. The British stake in China in dollars and cents dwarfs that of the United States in a ratio of about ten to one. Besides this, unlike the American position, the large British investment in China is linked closely with all the vast British possessions in the Far East and with



far-flung policies that involve the destiny of the British Empire elsewhere.

Recent credits granted to the Chinese Government by Great Britain and the United States have irked Tokyo, but for various reasons the Japanese anger has been directed mainly at Great Britain. Sir Robert Leslie Craigie, British Ambassador, is reported to have explained that it became necessary to give financial support to the foreign-exchange position of China's national currency to safeguard British investments in China. The American credit of some odd millions was granted probably in some measure to placate American public sympathy with China and Britain. Some observers in the Far East inclined to the Japanese viewpoint that these credits from Anglo-Saxon Powers would prolong the war without affecting the ultimate results.

From the turn of the century, consistently, we have marched our soldiers up the hill, then marched them down again, arriving at length today nowhere in particular. Before events can compel a particular course of action, leaving no choice, it seems Washington should decide exactly what it wants in the Far East, then go after it. Lofty sentiments, however boldly enunciated, wishful protesting or letter-writing cannot be of much help. A Donald Duck routine on foreign affairs may be satisfying to the electorate at home; abroad the effects are often the opposite of the apparent aims, and engender bitterness and resentment or—worse—ridicule. Such talk, to command respect abroad, must be followed promptly by bayonets and warcraft.

If Japan succeeds in subduing China, or if China and Japan decide

to call quits to the fighting, events may be expected to follow the pattern of Korea and Manchuria, with a vigorous housecleaning and renovation done efficiently according to Japanese formula. Direct American trade with Asia might thrive by this, though the American marooned there would not be served advantageously.

If the internal collapse of Japan that China dreams of should take place, it is unlikely that China's position would be bettered. Such an event would not mean that the well-equipped Japanese armies would get out and go home. If external influences are excluded, the Japanese in China now are almost in a position to hold all their gains, live on the country and repel all attacks of guerilla warfare indefinitely.

The only other contingency, intervention by a third Power or Powers, cannot be expected to benefit the United States in any way.

The United States is in a position to take a positive line of policy in the Far East, from which, once begun, there could be no turning back. This would not be in consonance with national thought trends of recent years, but extraordinary changes in national viewpoint sometimes take place overnight.

After we had come into control of the Philippines and John Hay had become Secretary of State, an event singularly fortunate for the United States took place. Great Britain cleared out of the Panama Canal region and withdrew from the Caribbean where British political influence long had been paramount. The Open Door notes, which had been dispatched by Secretary of State Hay sometime earlier, furnish the reason.

It was a good trade for the American Government, for our interests in the Far East, where Great Britain was solidly entrenched, were small.

America has always virtuously refused to accept anything in the nature of land grants from China. We have been content to establish ourselves in the areas of other less punctilious Powers, accepting their hospitality and protection but ever vigilant to insist that our individual rights under treaties equal the rights of other aliens in the land. It would be inconsistent, therefore—and it would be a tactical error, too—to permit China at this late day to give us any territory. We could go in for Chinese real estate in a big way, however, and probably without getting snarled up in any most-favored-nation clauses. It would be hard to imagine what China would not be willing to give just now to humble her Nipponese adversary and get an American policeman in her front yard. But we couldn't let China give us the premises outright. While keeping clear of British and French spheres in the south, we might buy for nominal considerations a large portion of the country, and China would be glad to give us a conveyance of ownership to Manchukuo. This would serve as well as anything else as a cause to start the gun play.

In our initial moves in the Pacific we would, of course, completely reverse our policy in the Philippines and take a new firm grip on the Islands. Congress recently rejected that portion of the naval appropriation measures which provided a beggarly five millions to fortify the Island of Guam. This amount can be multiplied by twenty to make a beginning

on the work needed. Steps also would have to be taken to provide for fortifications and bases in the Aleutian Islands and to enlarge all defences in the Philippines where a minimum requirement would be a base attaining or surpassing parity with the Singapore Naval Base on which Britain has thus far expended about forty million pounds.

**I**N the drive toward new destiny, the United States must squander man power in a manner never before known in the Nation's history, and such an adventure would mean the outlay of an unthinkable amount of money, and material losses beyond calculation. We would be obliged at a stroke to destroy our trade in the Pacific. The nation would have to anticipate an outpouring of treasure on a scale that would make the billions of the most fantastic New Deal program look like small change.

Deep-rooted traditional beliefs, that are inbred in the spirit of the American people and are based on the inspired foresight of great leaders of the past, stand as a forbidding red light in the path leading to foreign entanglements. New prophets say these are old-fashioned concepts, unworkable in the modern world; they are deaf to those who cling to old ways and believe that if the ancient standards are put aside the nation must lose some part of its identity and undergo a basic change of character. Kind Providence has made us one of the "have" nations of the world, that is to say, one of the "peace-loving nations," but with one tremendous difference from other favored peoples. Britain and France and other dominant Powers are so

placed and conditioned that they must follow particular courses. The unique advantage that we possess is our unhampered freedom of choice of what we wish to do. Many clear-thinking Americans believe that this priceless option is ours just so long as with unwavering fixity of purpose, we attend strictly to our own business.

The obligation of the American Government to its citizens abroad may not be denied, but it seems absurd to imagine that the best interests of these people, or the interests of the nation, dictate that they should be thrust into leading roles in a vast tragic drama. Other, simpler means, more surely calculated to insure their well-being and prosperity, should be found.

Shortly after planes and big guns went into action at Shanghai in August 1937, elaborate plans were brought into play by the American authorities at Shanghai to remove to places of safety all Americans in China. Washington made available \$50,000 for consular authorities to send them home. Every American's credit was good for transportation home. Though it was held that no authority existed to compel individuals to accept this aid, American officials in China did all in their power to induce Americans to leave. Many did, but many others remained behind. Most of those who left at that time, either had only slight bonds to hold them or possessed resources that enabled them to shift into new environments confidently. The reason so many stayed behind simply was because they had nothing to go to in the United States—no jobs there and no funds with which to begin a new existence. Rather than abandon con-

nections and enterprises, which in many cases they had been building toilsomely through the years, to face bleak uncertainties at home, they chose to stay on in China.

Thus, if precedent be needed, the precedent of giving substantial assistance to American citizens in times of emergency is well established. The emergency of the present day is less apparent, but perhaps no less sinister.

After the war with Spain when we got the Philippines, we failed to follow through with our swing toward colonial expansion. We did acquire the Island of Guam, but we neglected to take over the thousand-odd other islands of the Marianas surrounding it, which we might have done with full world approval. Germany then seized the opportunity presented and bought all these islands at a bargain price from a humbled Spain. Then Germany lost them to Japan in the World War, so Japan holds the whole group except the largest, Guam, which has become an international pain in the neck.

THROUGH recent years, the indicator of our course in the Far East has been pointing toward Exit. We have chosen to quit the Philippines. Without them, the importance to us of Guam shrinks into insignificance. Even if the American mantle of protection should remain over the Philippines, the question of the strategic importance of Guam in the eyes of the naval experts generally is extremely uncertain, although none deny that costs of adequate fortifications there would be stupendous and, even if fortified, the doubt would remain whether these 200 square miles of sand in the Pacific could be defended

or would be worth defending. To the north, to the south, to east and to west, Guam is surrounded by other islands all under the Rising Sun Flag, a number almost within gunshot.

The United States has a possession that, though of dubious value, carries a germ that may or may not become malignant in the national system. This possession, useless to us, is coveted by a neighbor. It's as simple as that. The United States could sell Guam to Japan and use the proceeds to liquidate the American position in China.

The Government would have to acquire the bulk of American commercial enterprises in China and make to every bona fide American citizen of long residence in China a cash allotment sufficient to enable him to move homeward or elsewhere. Though the allotment would have to be substantial, the total would be less than the cost to the United States of a week of active warfare in the Pacific. The bulk of the American commercial enterprises are of such a nature that they could be disposed of without any ultimate cost, perhaps at a profit. American missionaries and mission property fall into a special category. Like the others, the missionaries would have the option of accepting the Government's proposals, but there seems to be no valid reason why their efforts in China should slacken even if every ordinary American citizen did leave the country; in fact, their position might be bettered by such a change. Many of them in the past have asked the Government to withdraw armed protection from China and have sought to throw off their extraterritorial rights as American citizens.

The whole thing could probably be worked out so that the funds acquired from the sale of Guam would be equal to or exceed the total necessary outlay. Japan would not quibble over the price, for Japan wants to get the cinder out of her eye and the American element in China out of her hair. And in any such sale, the United States would retain all her now existing values on the island. The air base for American transpacific planes and the cable and radio relay stations could remain under American control, under some such perpetual-lease arrangement as was made in the case of the Island of Yap.

By selling Guam to Japan, Washington would be giving unmistakable new emphasis to the American opposition to war and everything that may lead to war. It would furnish concrete evidence that the United States intends to hold aloof from Asiatic entanglements, and so the need for huge expenditures for naval armament in the Pacific—a large part of Navy cost in recent years—would be relaxed measurably.

Withdrawal from East Asia assuredly would loose a barrage of scornful criticism against America, for it would be charged that we were deserting our sister democracies and abandoning China to a dire fate in her hour of need. We should remember, however, that these Powers have managed their affairs through the centuries with conspicuous success and much profit and have come to control about a half of the earth's surface. China, too, has been flourishing in her own peculiar way without external aid for some seven-thousand-odd years.

The opposition to withdrawal of



the United States from Asia will be concentrated in the charge that it would mean complete extinction of American trade in the Pacific. But, from the record of the past, it is likely that American trade would be better served by Japanese dominance in the Far East than from that of France or Britain or, certainly, of Russia. The myth of the "great China market" of 450,000,000 persists, but with an annual per capita expenditure of \$10, the only way China can buy from the United States or anybody else, is to borrow the money. China is willing to borrow, but when it comes to payment that is a different matter. There is a long list of disillusioned Americans who have pranced blithely through the Open Door only to discover too late that they had no possible exit for their commitments. It is to be noted in this connection that American financial interests for some time have been holding aloof from Chinese securities.

We can move into China on our own and impose a trade control of our making; otherwise, every factor of the situation points to the conclusion that we shall have to depend upon Japan for Far Eastern trade. But even Japan's bitterest enemies will not contend that she has not been a fairly good customer of ours, her trade relationship to the United States being approximately that of Canada to the United Kingdom. In 1936 Japan bought more from us than China and South America combined—our best customer after Canada and the United Kingdom.

Among the Powers with investments in China, Japan has climbed

into the first place so long held by Great Britain, and its commercial stake there is now nearly a billion American dollars, invested in enterprises which annually consume an average of 10 per cent of their valuation in repairs, supplies, etc. This market of about \$50,000,000 a year is, of course, first open to Japan itself, but, since Japan's resources are limited, to a large extent orders are placed in the United States, about 25% of our Chinese trade. Roughly a half of American trade in China—in oil, tobacco and cotton—is quasi-monopolistic, depending upon other factors than the Open Door. So it is for only 25% of our Chinese trade, or about \$25,000,000, that we keep a huge Pacific naval establishment geared to high tension and ready to fight.

**I**F IT is accepted that a time has come when the United States must shape a definite policy in the Far East, then it seems to follow that specific action should be definitely positive or completely negative. At considerable cost in lives and treasure, we could completely smash Japan, "save" China and conserve all the vast holdings of European Powers in the Far East. If it should appear wiser to the leaders of the American Government to keep clear of conflict, we may, honorably and without damage to national dignity, withdraw behind our safe ramparts, retaining in our hands all power to shape new courses of action whenever we may see fit. Between the two alternatives lies no profitable or even safe middle course.



## Twenty-Five Years Ago

(Twenty-five years is a conventional span for then-and-now comparisons, and, coincidentally, the First World War and the present one began just twenty-five years apart. Since in March 1915, as in March 1940, the editorial aim of *The Living Age* was to collect the most informative periodical literature the world over, together with interpretive articles by American experts, the following summary may have particular interest as a cross-section of the subjects about which men and women in many countries were concerned twenty-five years ago when the war in Europe was entering its seventh month.—*The Editors.*)

AN ANONYMOUS writer in *The Nation* (London) develops at some length the argument that, "America, be the correctness of her attitude what it may, cannot be morally impartial. This is no light quarrel: two rival ideas struggle for the mastery of civilization. Which does America choose? Military force or civilized law?" The identical arguments are appearing in letters-to-the-editor columns of London newspapers in March 1940. The author concludes that, "The time is approaching when [the United States] must either surrender herself to be the Thoreau of nations, fixed in her seclusion on the Atlantic, or come into the world of older nations, and seek with them and for them relief from a fatal malady of civilization." The Allied inter-

ventionist arguments today are identical, although expressed with less bluntness. . . . Writing of protests by President Wilson to the British Government over the seizure of ships and detention of American cargoes, A. Maurice Low in *The National Review* (London) complains that, "It is unfortunate that the American people have not been made to understand that this injury has been brought about by Germany and not because England has been required to search ships and confiscate contraband. Americans seem to be forgetting on whom the responsibility for the war rests. . . . Sentiment in the United States is still heavily in favor of the Allies, but it is not so one-sided as it was, I believe." A satire in *Punch* reports the demand of Scotchmen that the Censor forbid publishing news of advances in food prices lest their wives demand increases in house-keeping allowances. . . . A long essay by James Moffat in *The Hibbert Journal* describes with enthusiasm the number of "fighting men" in the novels of George Meredith, but observes that his preoccupation was with officers and not with the rank-and-file and deplores the novelist's aversion to describing battles. . . . An editorial from *The Times* of London declares that Germany is not enforcing a blockade against England, as that word is understood in international law, but "is running amuck in the North Sea," a charge that both *The Times* and Winston Churchill are repeating today with regularity.

... An article by A. Keene from *The Nineteenth Century and After* quotes the words of Prime Minister Asquith that, "We shall never sheathe the sword until Belgium recovers in full measure all and more than all that she has sacrificed; until France is adequately secured against the menace of aggression; until the rights of smaller nationalities of Europe are placed upon an unassailable foundation; until the military domination of Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed"—pledges, by the way, that sound much like Messrs. Chamberlain, Halifax and Churchill. ... In an article *Etiquette*, reprinted from *The New Statesman*, the problem is discussed of a woman who wonders whether she is correct in asking to dinner a nephew who is a captain and another guest "who is only in the ranks." The problem, according to the author, "is oppressively real [because] etiquette is the grammar of behavior, and men aspire after correct grammar more than after truth

or wisdom." Evidently this was a serious problem so recently as March 1915, when one might have supposed Britain was more concerned with winning the war than in Tommy Atkins' antecedents. Nevertheless, according to the author, "Burns may insist with democratic heartiness that 'a man's a man for a' that,' but, as everybody knows, being a man is a very different thing from being a gentleman. A man's a man, even if he eats peas off a knife, or tucks his napkin in among the buttons of his waistcoat. But, in most houses in the comfortable parts of London, if he did any of these things he would cause more excitement than an escaped puma. He would become, by virtue of them, not a man but a foreigner." Such profundities escape discussion in the British press today, though Hore-Belisha is said to have irritated some of the army people by doing away with the regulation that officers might require enlisted men to leave restaurants where they themselves wished to dine.

## QUIZ

By Lao Tzu

Between your name and your body, which is the dearer?  
Between your body and your wealth, which is the more to be prized?  
Between gain and loss, which is the more painful?

An excessive love for anything will cost you dear in the end.  
The storing up of too much goods will entail a heavy loss.

To know when you have enough is to be immune from disgrace.  
To know when to stop is to be preserved from perils.  
Only thus can you endure long.

—T'ien Hsia, Shanghai

# Political Philosophy

By Y. L. CHIN

From *T'ien Hsia*, Shanghai Literary Monthly

(Concluding installment)

**T**O BEGIN WITH, among human beings the craving for sympathy and understanding results inevitably in the desire for justification. Justification is not merely giving an account of one's activities, but also involves the invoking of principles, articulate or otherwise, in terms of which, sympathy and understanding and even approval may be procured. That there is such a desire for justification we need not doubt for a moment, though theoretical accounts of it may differ in different studies by different persons. Some may account for it by the notion of a consciousness of kind, others may attribute it to what is called instinct, while still others may claim it to be due to conditioned reflexes. Whatever the explanation may be, the fact remains that human beings desire and need justification. Since justification is needed in so many human activities, it is all the more needed in activities which are political. Political thought is a justification of political activities and is itself indirectly a political activity in disguise.

Besides this craving for justifica-

tion, political thought is also needed for other reasons. Take the most obvious reason first. Political activity is collective among people who have heterogeneous interests in their other spheres of life, and whose support can be gained only through some kind of common program. What is meant to be achieved by the activity must be communicated and partly, if not entirely, understood by all concerned, if the activity is to gather momentum. But communication to those who are to accept a certain program requires articulate thought on the part of those who are proposing it, and communication to the intellectually élite requires especially an exhibition in impersonal terms of the urgent desirability as well as the reasonableness and the cogency of the program proposed. This could not be done without first principles, or a structure of political ideas. Hence, political thought.

A more subtle reason is that political activity must be based on certain group interests to start with and yet must not be identified with them. Perhaps the term group interests is mis-

leading. One is perhaps liable nowadays to think of group interests as being essentially the economic interests of the capitalists, or the proletariat, or industrial or trade unions. This may or may not be so. What is important is that people may combine to form groups and develop their own interests without having any interests to start with other than the strictly political. In other words, political groups may gather strange bed-fellows for purely political reasons. A political activity would be mere abstract yearning, if it were not based on the interests of political groups; but it cannot be identified with any given group, for it may cease to be political. The point involved is that political activities should not be limited to group interests in theory, though always so in practice, merely because political activities are, supposedly at any rate, indulged in for the whole body politic. If they are in theory limited to any given group, they probably won't find support outside the group; but if they are not based on the interests of any group at all, they are merely the merry-go-rounds of people stigmatized by the *real politikers* as idealistic dreamers. Political thought, whatever else it may be, is the theory behind political activities.

**P**OLITICAL thought is needed for another reason. Political activity is never purely cognitive, if indeed it has to be so at all; it is at any rate conative. If it is to be at all extensive, it involves the imposition of a will either to shape or to reshape certain aspect or aspects of the political environment. In order that that will may be shared by all to any appreci-

able degree, not to say its full realization, mass emotion has to be aroused. But as such emotion cannot be aroused by specific measures of one kind or another, general principles will have to be invoked so that people can be made emotionally attached to them and prepared to accept them as what we are in the habit of calling "causes." Causes differ from other principles in having with them emotive values which make it difficult for those who are attached to them to accept or even to contemplate any alternative. They are fundamental in this special sense. At present, the principles of dialectic materialism, though far removed perhaps from practical measures, stir the blood of millions of adherents, whereas the principle of relativity or the principle of induction important for other reasons leave people in a normal state of mind. Extensive or far-reaching political activity cannot leave people in a normal state of mind, in spite of the fact that within the system of thought that is a justification of the said activity, there may be constant and untiring appeals to reason. We must not forget that the eighteenth century rationalism is eminently emotive. It is perhaps the fate of human beings that they are on the whole more susceptible to emotional appeals to reason than to reasonable arguments in favor of it. Since the emotive element could not be absent, political activity has to be accompanied by political thought, the principles of which are generally also "causes."

Political thought must be timely, despite the idea of eternal concepts or principles. Timeliness here refers to the facility with which certain concepts or principles or systems are

accepted at certain times, not their validity nor their mere subsistence. From the point of view of subsistence, ideas are eternal in the sense that they are out of time; but such a sense of eternity is irrelevant to our present topic, since in this sense all ideas are equally timeless. From the point of view of validity, some principles may be said to be eternally valid.

Political thought has a practical side in addition to the theoretical. The practical side to a given political thought leads us to the history both of facts and of ideas. An examination of contemporary facts accounts for certain problems taken up, certain measures advocated, and an examination of contemporary ideas accounts for certain phrases used and certain principles emphasized in a given political thought. Without this historical background, no political thought is quite understandable. This is plain, but what is not quite so plain is the relation between political thought and the *Zeitgeist*. As has been pointed out in the previous section, the main spring of human action that emerges from a congeries of hopes, fears, beliefs, and doubts and what not, is charted out by the ideology and valuation of a given time. In terms of ideology, what is known as the *Zeitgeist* of a given period is simply its predominant oversimplification of the complex issues so that with it the lazy or the stupid are absolved from any active thinking. One who adheres to a prevailing "ism" of any kind is as though wearing colored glasses; he may see as many things as other people, but in seeing them always in a certain light, he allows whatever thinking that is needed to be, in practice, done for him. In terms of valua-

tion, the *Zeitgeist* of a given period is reflected in the manners in which the people of that period would conduct themselves in all the complexities of life; so that with it the lazy or the insensitive are excused from having to have any active and real feeling beyond its external forms. One who conducts himself in terms of contemporary valuation is essentially a conventional man, though he may be fashionable, since for him how he should and does feel is socially prescribed. The *Zeitgeist* is therefore something which unifies thought and behavior, it is a whipping rod by which the masses are herded for action. Since political action does involve the masses, political thought must be in consonance with the *Zeitgeist* in order that it may be stirring. It is more specifically in this sense that political thought has to be timely.

SINCE times differ, the ideology and valuation of different times are sometimes also different. Take the simpler case of ideology. The cry of "reason" was stirring in the eighteenth century, the idea of evolution moving in the latter part of the nineteenth, while at the present the idea of economic determinism or dialectic materialism is like music in the air to millions of young political enthusiasts. These ideas may be either valid or invalid, but during their prevalence they are all of them dogmas of simplification, in terms of which thinking could be minimized, and political thought in consonance with them is also timely at different times. This obviously does not mean that thought not in consonance with the *Zeitgeist* necessarily fails; the very fact that there is a succession of predominant ideas at dif-



ferent times indicates that what was once unpopular may emerge to be timely. But unpopular political thought has an uphill fight to gain predominance and before some degree of timeliness is gained, it has no political efficacy, and while it may be some kind of pattern of political ideas, it is not yet political thought in the sense here emphasized. Though abstract and fundamental principles of politics may have long periods of timeliness, the kind of political thought here emphasized generally varies with the passage of time.

**T**HE timeliness of political thought is just as much the timeliness of the structure as that of its ideas. The latter is easily seen. Take, for instance, the historical school of political thought. It could have struggled along without the notion of evolution, but with the notion it captured for a time the imagination of the literate public. Guild socialism prevailed for a short period some twenty years ago when people in the west were somewhat tired of the modern mechanical age; as a system, it adds very little to the already current forms of socialistic thought, but it had at the time a romantic appeal by being linked up with the notion of mediaeval guilds. While the cogency of Thomas Hobbes appeals to the intellectually fastidious, especially among those who have a tendency towards abstraction, it was never timely and never stirred the heart of the masses. Perhaps the idea of social contract offers an example both for the timeliness of the idea as well as that of structure; it must have had enormous appeal during the time it flourished, but in the cogent but untimely system of Hobbes,

its power of appeal was much smaller than in the timely system of Rousseau.

Timeliness is a convenient term to cover complexities which are bafflingly difficult to analyze. Perhaps we could say that the facility with which certain political thought is accepted at certain times indicates something in or about its structure or ideas or both, which is meant to appeal, and since political thought is not just any current ideas strung together, the thinker behind it must be an artist as well. This of course is true of other systems. Euclid is an artist as well as a thinker. So also are Rousseau and Marx, only they are so in a different sphere. As a work of art, political thought is on the one hand distinguished from other systems of thought in that it is meant to appeal to a large number of persons and to evoke in them a multifarious set of sometimes even conflicting emotions, and on the other, it is distinguished from what is usually called works of art in that it is at the same time a system of thought, and as such subject also to the rigors of logic. It is a pattern of ideas created out of the materials that are historically and contemporaneously given, but so delicately adjusted as to appeal to the intellect of a few, to satisfy the interest of some, and to arouse the emotion of large numbers. It is purely political thought, and nothing else; it is neither pure thought, nor pure history, nor pure science, nor pure art, but all of these combined into a whole and woven into a pattern, the appreciation of which is not ecstasy in a gallery, but political activity toward the exercise of political powers more or less in accordance with the pattern created. Though difficult to analyse, political

thought must yet have a technique of its own. If Abbé Sieyès could develop the art of writing constitutions, some talented person might in future develop the art of generating political thought to suit different conditions at different times.

**B**UT who needs political thought? If it is supplied, it must be supplied to somebody. We must bear in mind that the fundamental thing in politics is the control of political power and the pattern in which this power is to be exercised. If the pattern becomes unsatisfactory from the point of view of the objective conditions obtaining at any period, so that political rackets would be started with profit, the control will have to be transferred. If the transference can be achieved without revolution, well and good; if it must be achieved through revolution, then revolution will come. In any case, different groups of capable, active and ruthless men will be pitted against each other. These are the star actors of the political stage; without them there can be no stirring political drama.

Ruthlessness must be of supreme importance. The meek may inherit the world in other ways, but not politically. Those who have no wish to impose their will upon others will never become politicians, and those who can be prevented from doing so through any form of tender-mindedness could not be successful political leaders. Unswerving devotion to causes is admirable and as often as not a genuine phenomenon, but the psychological reality behind it is always an unflinching determination to impose one's will upon one's fellow men. For these leaders of men, politi-

cal thought is a sort of Junoesque facade, a dignified exposure on the one hand, so that followers can be attracted toward them, and an effective cover on the other, so that their energy may be spent, their ambition realized, and their will at last imposed upon their fellow men.

It is to these men that political thought is supplied as a facade for their activities. In order to remove a possible and likely misunderstanding, it should be said that this paper is not an argument in favor of the Great Man theory. The notion of greatness involves valuation of various kinds. One may be valued for what he is, or for what he does, or both; what is valued in one may be quite different from what is valued in another. At any rate, greatness in men refers to prescriptive values, not to descriptive qualities. Great men may exist, but whether the Great Man theory is valid or not is quite another question. We are not concerned with it or them in this article. The kind of men described here as capable, active and ruthless, are so described as to indicate their function in the body politic, not the values prescribed for them and heaped upon them by society. They may be scoundrels, ignoramuses, rascals, bores, or great men; Chinese history alone abounds in evidences of scoundrels, and great men becoming powerful political leaders, even founders of dynasties. How they are judged according to the different criteria of valuation is immaterial to the purpose of this article, it is their function that counts.

Perhaps if we proceed from another angle, the point involved may be brought out into even more striking relief. The kind of Great Man

theory that is at all significant does not merely assert the existence of great men, but also that they achieve what they desire irrespective of the objective conditions. In other words, leaders lead, and they are in no sense led. Now, while this article does affirm that capable, active and ruthless men are political leaders, it does not assert that they are never led. Only theorists insist on leaders leading, the leaders themselves are sufficiently realistic as not to be concerned with whether they actually lead or are sometimes led; the important thing with them is to seize the occasion when things are ripe, or else to bid for time as Fabius did of old. They may or may not be opportunists; they either achieve opportunity or wait for it, but they cannot ignore it. The ideas they stand for may originate from themselves, or are appropriated from thinkers who are not practical men, or else are mere items of mental currency that could be picked up here and there; but once they champion these ideas, they become also the vehicles for their realization, it does not make the least difference whether they are the masters or the disciples, it matters still less whether they are the originators or merely the instruments of the will that is imposed upon their fellow men. The question whether circumstances make men or men circumstances need not be discussed here, for one way or the other, it is only some men who are of any consequence, and in politics it is men of the capable, active, and ruthless type who count, whether they are saints or devils, or else disciples or masters.

As a rule, however, leaders in practical politics are rarely at the same time political theorists. One who is versed in theory is generally not capable of practical work, and vice versa. Marx is undoubtedly the high priest of communistic thought, but he is not its statesman; if he were given the role of Stalin, he might not have the latter's success, and yet in all probability he would have suffered as philosopher. Mussolini and Hitler might have been tragic, and therefore in some sense grand, if they had been satisfied with being the instrument of the blind impulses, but when they attempt to theorize at the same time, they only succeed in being farcical and ridiculous. To combine the two rôles would be on the whole disparaging to either the one or the other. There were exceptions in earlier ages, but in modern times when division of labor has taken place in almost every line of human endeavour, to be a ruler is hardly compatible with being a theorist at the same time. Political theorizing will more than ever go into the hands of intellectuals who beat about the bush for stirring political ideals and attempt to inherit the world through the capable, active and ruthless men in politics.

To treat political thought descriptively as a facade is not meant to be derogatory to the theorist or to the statesman; each has his function and *raison d'être* in the body politic. To point out their difference is partly the purpose of this article. It may also be mentioned incidentally that being merely thought on political thought, this article is not its own subject matter.

# Letters and the Arts

By CHARLES ANGOFF

ONE OF THE phenomena in the current philosophical world is the almost sudden burst upon the scene of the ideas of Søren Kierkegaard, the solitary Dane who searched his soul between the years 1813 and 1855 and then died, hardly causing a ripple even in his own neighborhood. Like Spinoza, he wrote furiously, tucking his manuscripts, when completed, into his drawer, and immediately starting new ones, apparently caring little whether they were published or not. And like Spinoza, too, when he eventually did achieve recognition, about twenty years ago, long after his death, a mysterious love affair of his took precedence in interest. The lady in this case was Regine Olsen. Kierkegaard was engaged to her, and suddenly broke off all relations with her. She married another man. That is all. The absurdity of the claim that this personal tragedy shaped the philosopher's thought is too obvious to need proof.

V. A. Demant, in the *Nineteenth Century*, offers an excellent summary of Kierkegaard's ideas, relying mostly upon the key book, *Fear and Trembling*. While Kierkegaard was both poet and moralist, he found the fullest meaning of existence, not in the individual, but in the society of God. He belongs to the line of thinkers, extending from St. Augustine through Luther and Pascal, for whom "knowledge and love of God is over and against all other knowledge and love." By God, of course, he did not mean the specific divinity of any

creed, but the basic emotion behind all creeds, in other words, something akin to the pantheism of Spinoza. Perhaps the chief difference between the two philosophers is that the Dutch Jew reached his metaphysical conclusion by way of ethics, while the Dane reached it by way of poetry.

The latter's whole body of thought, as has been said, is an amalgam of poetry and morals, always insisting upon the spiritual, which coincides with the temper of our day. That is why, in Mr. Demant's words, Kierkegaard "has such a real piquancy in the religious thought of our time. He represents a recall to religion in terms of dogma and faith, addressed to an age bored with a rancid moralism cut off from its religious roots." On the lower levels this spiritual turmoil has brought forth such bizarre movements as Divine Science, while on the higher levels it has resurrected the teachings of Kierkegaard.

For about the same reason there has of late been a revival of interest in Corneille in France, as has been the case in every period of national crisis since his death. Caring little for the passions between men and women, he wrote mainly about the sublime and heroic. His characters, to quote M. Joubert, writing in the *Contemporary Review*, "are often the outcome, not the creators, of the dramatic situation, ready-made moral abstractions, suffering from a hierarchic hardness and rigidity, obsessed by an all-absorbing ethical *idée fixe*, looking in one direction only



with the metallic stare of a Russian icon." Racine, the three-hundredth anniversary of whose birth came on December 21, 1939, was hampered by the religious background of his time and by his strict moral upbringing at Port-Royal. Nevertheless, he wrote chiefly of men and women loving and hating, letting his ethical conclusions "arise out of the swaying, passion-ridden souls of his dramatis personae." He explored the soul of woman as no other Frenchman did before him or has done since. With Racine woman came "into her own in French drama."

In China the hostilities with Japan have had a remarkable effect on poetry. The composition of sentimental lyrics seems to have suffered, giving way to the composition of sturdier verses. Says Ling Tai, in the *T'ien Hsia Monthly*: "Love and hate of a personal nature still exist, of course, but people have come to realize that they are really nothing compared with the love and hate of a nation." Thus war poetry of every description has descended upon the Chinese people. Some of it is of such a propaganda nature, indeed, that critics have denounced it as no poetry at all. Nevertheless, it flourishes.

Two major forms of such poetry have developed: *Ch'iang T' ou Shih*, or Wall Poetry, and *Chieh T' ou Shih*, or Street Poetry. "This movement has been started partly because of the lack of printing facilities in the interior and in the war areas, and partly as a response to the call for the popularization of literature." Sometimes these wall and street poems are mere slogans, but they are all expressed in rhymes which the masses can easily commit to memory. A singular effect has been the emergence of worker poets. Consider the case of Wang Ta Tzu. Before the war she was only

a factory worker. She enlisted and served on various fronts, and recently a long poem of hers appeared in the *Wen I Chen Ti*, a national literary monthly.

In Hungary, despite the nation's ties with Germany, now at war with England, Shakespeare is as popular as ever, says T. A. Marle in the *Hungarian Quarterly*. Shakespeare is almost as much a Hungarian classic as an English classic. Only recently *A Midsummer Night's Dream* and *The Tempest* enjoyed very good runs at the Margaret Island Open Air Theatre in Budapest.

The first performance of *Hamlet* in Hungary was in 1773, since when Shakespeare plays have been performed all over the country regularly. This year the National Theatre is producing several of them. The translations apparently have all been done by highly competent people, including such great native poets as Vörösmarty and Arany. The latter's translation of *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, made in 1864, is still being used at the National Theatre.

George Bernard Shaw's latest play, *Geneva*, said to be his fiftieth, had a disastrous run of only fifteen performances in New York. It is hardly





a play at all. One actor, using masks to represent Hitler, Stalin and Mussolini, could have played it all by himself. The dialogue is very stodgy, dated, and far from brilliant. Besides, the entire script doesn't seem to have a point of view. It is for Stalin and against Stalin. It is for Mussolini and against Mussolini. And the lines attributed to Hitler are so absurd as to defeat their own purpose.

**I**N THE musical world of New York, the Durieux Chamber Music Ensemble, Willem Durieux, conductor delivered very graciously a suite by Corelli, the Liebeslieder waltzes by Brahms, and a concerto for violin, piano, and strings by Ernest Chausson. The ensemble consists of ten members, all women, except the bass player. It is an able organization, led by an able director. The two-piano recital by Arthur Loesser and Beryl Rubinstein at Town Hall, unfortunately, left something to be desired. Mr. Loesser ran away with the show, so to speak. Mr. Rubinstein seemed merely to assist him, which is not what a two-piano recital should be. They should play as one. Finally, Mr. Rubinstein's own composition, a suite for two pianos—prelude, canzonetta, jig, and masks—was hollow when it was not reminiscent of almost every classical composer in the repertory.

**T**HE matter of leisure has occupied more and more American sociologists. The depression—there

are still about 10,000,000 unemployed—undoubtedly accelerated this concern, but a more persistent cause has been the common foreign jibe that Americans don't know what to do with their time, and that the machine age has dulled their faculties for "loafing." In a book soon to be published, *Leisure for Living*, Mr. Sydney Greenbie tackles the entire problem with considerable learning. He defines leisure as "not mere release from toil; leisure is not recuperation or recreation. Leisure is itself the time for creation, for work that is play and play that is work." Which harmonizes nicely with the late Havell Ellis' idea. Work was his play, and play was his work.

Mr. Greenbie suggests that American industry might well consider the thought of spending more time in improving the cultural level of this country, and spending less effort in seeking foreign markets. "They would then sell their own products about as much as they do now. In spite of advertising, people buy up to the level of their taste and appreciation only; raise this level, and the ideal is attained." In other words, a higher level of culture means a greater demand for consumer goods, which means more business at home, which, finally, means less need for foreign markets for basic goods. Mr. Greenbie probably oversimplifies the problems involved, but his suggestion has enough validity to merit serious discussion.

# Speaking of Books

By LEON BRYCE BLOCH

SINCE the dawn of recorded history the development of the human race has been marked by the struggle between the small segment of superior mental and spiritual creatures and the dead weight of the mass-man. That struggle has been heightened by the increasing mechanization of modern man, until today the world is faced by a terrifying destructive force against which we may well be powerless. To help in our understanding of the current problem comes *Beyond the Clinical Frontiers*, by Edward A. Strecker, who is professor of psychiatry at the University of Pennsylvania.

However, if you think this is going to be a discussion of another book dealing with clinical psychiatric problems, read no further. The title, however, should suggest something far beyond a scientific interest in man. The book, though it stems from a series of lectures, is cohesive and conclusive in its analysis of "what's wrong" and "what to do about it."

Professor Strecker explodes some of the older notions concerning mass psychology with neat strokes, in his insistence that the crowd is merely an extension of the individual; it is subject to the same psychoses and psycho-neuroses. He says that the mass of humanity—like individuals—today is engaged in a huge conspiracy of escape. This escapism is a psychotic manifestation become a Gargantuan

narcissism that is about to devour us and our culture.

Like the individual manic depressive, the crowd made up of mass-men resorts eventually to violence. In our modern states the facts of reality become too hard to bear; super-competition drives men to fantasy in search of ego satisfactions no longer attainable in a hopeless economic struggle; the mass-men destroy the thinkers who try to return them to reality and choose leaders who consent to play the game of make-believe-we-are-kings. Then dictatorship.

The totalitarian movements are filled with these mass-men, who together accept segments of unreality as reality. By banding together they achieve a certain social acceptance and thus avoid the consequences of their escapism. Other men who devise individual escape fantasies land in insane asylums or outside the social pale of their erstwhile friends. "He's extremely odd," "he's queer" or "he's nuts," constitutes the crescendo of appellations we apply to the reformer, religious fanatic, world savior or the artist who wears a sixteenth century costume. But they are using the same technique as the vituperative revolutionary. However, in the former cases the disease is probably schizophrenia while in the last case it is probably manic depression.

In the case of the schizophrenic, the patient merely hides in a corner and

plays at being Napoleon, but the manic depressive shouts, struts and manifests an "active" condition that lands him a job as a Nazi Führer or an inheritor of the robes of Father Lenin.

All this is disheartening to those who want to conceive a better world for our children. But the mass-man does not think in terms of past or future. He has absolutely no historic sense, no roots in any culture and sees himself as part of a small segment of reality that, because of its isolation, becomes intolerable.

Professor Strecker has this to say of the mass-man:

"He has prodigious confidence in himself, and without even a semblance of techniques, he acts as if no accomplishments were impossible. No authority or limitations are recognized. Momentous questions are decided by mere weight of numbers, by poundage, without reference to the intelligence of the action as viewed in the perspectives of the past. There is no estimate of the practicability of the desired solution, nor is there any reckoning of the character of the inevitable aftermaths of the mass action.

"It is true that the mob threatens and moves by force of hate, and seemingly loves only itself. Therefore it is scarcely capable of idealistic altruism. It demands flattery, even if it be only blatant self-flattery.

"No finesse is required; there is needed merely shopworn platitudes, slogans, symbols, and the flimsiest generalizations."

This crowd-man and crowd mind, writes Professor Strecker, is not limited to low degrees of society, it is present in all classes and manifests itself at the pseudo-intellectual

"group meetings" as viciously as in the mob gathered for a lynching.

In this book the analogy between the mass-man and the mental patient becomes too obvious to miss. Both have little or no awareness of the motivations of their actions, and both eventually resort to violence as a natural outlet to their emotions when the natural avenues of egress become blocked, either by a nurse or an unjust peace treaty or economic deficiencies. To quote again:

"Violence as a common practice is the bar sinister across the shields of the ideologies of communism, totalitarianism, fascism. Attempts to escape from social injustices and abuses of the past by the route of methods socially reprehensible, and more archaic than the abuses themselves, are paradoxical and anachronistic."

A mark of the mass-mind is its penchant for rationalization, Professor Strecker points out. The "communal good," "progress of the state" or "racial purity" become fronts for the noble purposes of tyranny, oppression and violence.

What's to be done about all this? Professor Strecker says apply mental hygiene. But it seems that it's a bit late in the day to cauterize a wound that has already become gangrenous. But can we amputate the body politic? All would seem lost. I can yet repose an abiding faith in the healing power of mental and chemical sunshine, fresh air and water. The mass-man has swept away other cultures and must eventually destroy the heritage of Western Europe as the world has known it. I have faith, too, in those rare individuals who are the protagonists in this human drama; that they are already beginning a molecular

synthesis of social forces which portends a new culture—-independent of physical science to a far greater degree than the old—fashioned with a strong coloration of spiritual balance in its intricate pattern.

FOR a complete picture of how the mass-man appears in action I recommend a reading of Michael Power's eye-witness report of totalitarianism rampant, called *Religion in the Reich*. This book describes the Nazi persecution of the Catholic and Protestant churches in both Germany and Austria, with a special chapter on the latter country. In this chapter Mr. Power reveals the intense attack in Austria with authority and definiteness of detail, picturing a savageness that in the *Alt Reich* was reserved for Jews only.

FURTHER light on what is happening in Germany, but less revealing to the clinical observer is Oswald Garrison Villard's *Inside Germany*. Mr. Villard speaks from first-hand observation, since he managed to get into the Reich after the onset of hostilities. He talked to the well-known "man in the street" in Berlin and other cities, and received amazingly frank information. This book is a little more hope-inspiring than many, since it leaves one with the feeling that not all Germans have succumbed to the Hitlerian megalomania, by a long shot.

**MIND EXPLORERS.** By John K. Winkler and Walter Bromberg. New York: Reynal & Hitchcock. 1940. 378 pages. Index. \$3.00.

THIS is a readable series of biographies of men who have devoted their lives to the study of the mind, and it extends from Francis

Gall and the phrenologists up to Freud, Jung and even John B. Watson.

The volume serves a useful purpose. For one thing, it attempts to reduce discussion of mental processes to terms understandable to the layman, an assignment that, with few exceptions, scientists in all fields find impossible to fulfill. In addition, the "scientific attitude" evidently precludes any citation of the experiences of the scientist himself, and it is natural that the public has a good deal of curiosity over the lives such men lead.

There seems to have been a good deal of conflict between the collaborators. Mr. Winkler is a former Hearst reporter and editor, who has a healthy respect for those details of "human interest" that bring an individual alive in print. Dr. Bromberg has a widening reputation as a psychiatrist and, although he has himself written books in his field aimed at the lay public, it would appear that he has sought to flatten out Mr. Winkler's style when that ex-star reporter got into his best reportorial vein. On the other hand, apparently Mr. Winkler has yanked his scientific collaborator out of the morass of technical jargon when Dr. Bromberg lapsed into the style of abracadabra beloved by all men of science. Such a tug-of-war would explain the sometimes abrupt and nervous style of the volume.

Of the seventeen chapters perhaps the most rewarding are those on Freud and Watson. In the concluding chapter, "Mental Science and the Future," the authors conclude that enormous strides in the clarification of mental processes will be made in this country because of the generosity of American millionaires. "Due to these princely outpourings, no other country in the world at the present time enjoys such magnificent scientific equipment and facilities as does the United States."

*Mind Explorers* is well worth a reading if you want a dose of psychologists and their schools in painless form. —L. M.

**THE INSIDE STORY.** By members of the Overseas Press Club of America: Edited by Robert Spier Benjamin. New York: Prentice-Hall. 1940. 263 pages. \$2.75.

With as curious an assortment of stories as is imaginable, this book takes the reader into the sanctum of the Overseas Press Club



for an intimate session with as glamorous and motley a crew as the layman will ever find. Some twenty members of the Club who have travelled in every part of the world and experienced some of the weirdest adventures that have ever befallen the inheritors of the Richard Harding Davis tradition, tell frankly and intimately what they consider was "tops" in their careers.

Every one of the contributors has had his by-line on stories of wars, diplomatic intrigues and interviews with the biggest statesmen of modern times. The book itself covers the world. From the Texas border, Peggy Hull reveals the amazing story of the raid in 1915 of Villa's band against the town of Columbus, which was blissfully unaware of its peril, although newspaper correspondents had tried in vain to warn not only General Pershing but the other Army commanders along the border that Villa was going to seek revenge against the United States for what he considered was the State Department's help to Alvaro Obregon, Villa's most deadly enemy. The information was received from a discarded mistress of the Mexican bandit, but the Army refused to give credence to the adage of the fury of a woman scorned. The result: twenty died.

William Parker relates his adventures in attempting to take secret Japanese peace terms to Chiang Kai-shek at the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, when hostilities got under way in the Yangtze Valley-Shanghai region. Parker, believing that perhaps the slaughter in China might be stopped before it had seriously begun, was acting in a purely humanitarian role, and barely escaped with his life for his pains.

Perhaps one of the most amazing chapters is that of George Sylvester Viereck, who reveals the story behind the break between Colonel House and Woodrow Wilson in a chapter that places the War President's widow in the virtual role of the "woman president of the United States." Upon the second Mrs. Wilson's jealousy, the connivance of a physician and the ambition of a daring Wall Street operator, Viereck places the whole blame for the wrecking of Wilson's loftiest venture and the change in the course of human history.

Other writers take the reader into Ethiopia; the little bistros of Paris, where the international plotters, so dear to the Oppenheim

school of detective thriller, are usually found; into Russia; down into South America where the Sickle and Hammer is perhaps being dangerously planted; out across the Atlantic on Henry Ford's famous Peace Ship; into Morocco, Egypt—everywhere.

Because every newspaper man or woman usually "has a story on his chest," this volume seems to have all that anyone could ask for in the way of pleasant reading. We hope it becomes an annual affair.

—WGM

## POETS AND POETRY

### *"Peasants and Intellectuals"*

By ALFRED KREYMBORG

MURIEL RUKEYSER'S new book, *A Turning Wind*, has been received with fanfares in many quarters. There is no denying her talents as a poet, but it seems to one reader that she rides them too hard and is frequently caught in highly self-conscious obscurities. In view of her ardent faith in a new social order her arrogant indifference to communication is difficult to fathom as a principle, especially by those most involved in eating the dust of a decaying society. Her revolutionary drive and speech, far removed from the underdog even in the Loyalist Spain she visited and championed, gives an impression of snobbery where snobbery is least desired. One need only turn to the work of F. Garcia Lorca, the great Spanish poet shot down by fascist Spain, to see how poems and plays are composed by a man involved in common life and



death. In the recently translated *Blood Wedding*, a magnificently simple and subtle three-act tragedy, we live in the blood and bone of a group of peasants universal to any time or place. There is no special pleading, no propaganda, no address on the part of the author to his own or any other particular group. And Lorca is to Spain what John Synge was to Ireland and the younger Gerhardt Hauptmann to an earlier Germany.

In *Modern Poetry and the Tradition*, Cleanthe Brooks, one of the editors of the *Southern Review*, has produced a remarkably stimulating volume—even for those readers who will come to the hearty defense of poets attacked or belittled. By the tradition the critic means the metaphysical, beginning with doughty John Donne, and, with the aid of other critics who receive due credit and quotation, this hard-headed Southerner traces the tale of the metaphysicals to Eliot and Yeats, and to his three fellow Southerners, Ransom, Warren and Tate. Their place in the book may sound like special pleading, and it is, legitimately. Brooks maintains that these three poets were instigators, with Eliot, of the third poetic revolution since the seventeenth century. The pre-war poets, such as Lindsay, Masters, Sandburg, and the Imagists, are treated with scant respect and as men who revolted against the Victorian tradition without returning to the great roots of English poetry as a whole and especially the metaphysical. Whitman comes off very badly (metaphysical though he was), and a poor case is made against the new social poets by quoting them at their worst. There seems to be no American tradition whatever. Nonetheless, readers

who can blind themselves to the blind spots in the volume are in for a superb adventure. Brooks has a brilliant mind, a profound and witty style, and is a metaphysician who happens to be delightfully clear!

Meanwhile, I'd rather not say anything about T. S. Eliot's *Old Possum's Book of Practical Cats* except to say that these private poems, written for intimate friends, should not have reached publication. In their place, Eliot should have unveiled the wonderfully lusty series, *King Bolo and His Great Black Queen*, which hearsay states he wrote as a Harvard student. Am I telling tales out of school?

A TURNING WIND. By Muriel Rukeyser. New York: The Viking Press. 1939. 120 pages. \$2.00.

BLOOD WEDDING. By F. Garcia Lorca. Norfolk, Connecticut: New Directions. 1939. 61 pages. \$.50.

MODERN POETRY AND THE TRADITION. By Cleanthe Brooks. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. 1939. 253 pages. \$3.00.



## BOOKS ABROAD

### THE FRENCH YELLOW BOOK

DIPLOMATIQUES, DOCUMENTS 1938-1939

Paris: *Ministère des Affaires Étrangères*.  
1939.

(Vernon Bartlett in *The Listener*, London)

THERE are people with a passion for official documents—Blue Books, White Papers, and so on. I am not one of them. I have had thrust into my hands a large volume of over 350 pages of official documents, and my normal instinct was to put it aside to be read in those remote days when I find time hanging heavy on my hands. Then someone asked me to broadcast about it, and I began to read it.

If it comes your way, don't just put it aside on a shelf. Even if you aren't interested in politics you are certainly interested in Hitler, and there is a fascinating account by M. François Poncet, the former Ambassador, of a visit to him in his new eagle's nest near his mountain chalet home at Berchtesgaden. First, there's a very steep winding road cut out of the rock by men of the German Labor Corps. That leads up to two heavy bronze doors such as you expect to find at the entrance of the wicked giant's castle in a fairy tale. The doors open, and you are in a long tunnel, at the end of which an elevator takes you straight up a shaft hewn in the solid rock for some 350 feet. And there you are in a huge round room with windows from which you look on a wonderful panorama of mountains and a terrifying series of precipices. How much this super dugout cost and what the German people think about it, one doesn't know. Nor does one know what Hitler himself thinks about it. As François Poncet asks himself in his despatch, one wonders whether it is the work of a man filled with a passion for greatness or tormented by fear, and he points out that all the possible approaches to this fantastic and beautiful spot are guarded by machine-gun nests.

M. Coulondre, the Ambassador who succeeded M. François Poncet, shows himself a good prophet. On May 7 of last year, when most of us were talking about an Anglo-

Russian agreement as a certainty, he was warning his government that Hitler and Molotov would probably reach some agreement on the quiet. Even he, however, wondered whether this agreement could go very far since the whole National Socialist foreign policy had been built up on an anti-Bolshevik ideology, and German public opinion, misled and suppressed though it is, might revolt.

To my mind the most interesting revelation about the *French Yellow Book* is the way in which Hitler was assuring the French that the British were the only enemy, while he was assuring the British that they were or should be the only friend. On August 25 of last year the British Ambassador, Sir Neville Henderson, was assured by Herr Hitler that he had always wanted an understanding with England, that would leave England more or less free to act as she chose in the rest of the world, provided England left him free to do as he pleased in Europe. But all the way through the *French Yellow Book* there are attempts to win over the French against the British.

On February 7 of last year, by the way, Herr von Ribbentrop stated to the French Ambassador that the two great aims of German foreign policy were: one, to fight bolshevism, and, two, to regain the colonies. "On this first point, believe me, the struggle will be without mercy," he said. "Toward the Soviets we shall remain firm as bronze. We shall never reach an agreement with Bolshevik Russia."

M. Coulondre does not seem to have taken such assurances very seriously. On May 22 when the Germans had returned to the same subject, he wrote: "Hitler's objective appears to be to make use for his own ends of the material and human resources of the Soviet as an instrument for the destruction of the British Empire."

The last part of the book opens in August when German armies were concentrating on the Polish frontier. Herr von Ribbentrop, the man who in my humble opinion bears a greater responsibility than anybody else for the war, since he always told his chief that the British Empire would not fight, informed the French Government that if they wanted war they would find Germany quite ready at any moment. "The French Government," he said, "would then have to assume before the people of the world the responsibility for

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such a war." I, as an Englishman, am obviously prejudiced, but I would urge those of you who have the chance to do so, to read the last few despatches in the French *Yellow Book* and then to decide where the responsibility lies. All the momentous statements in the British *Blue Book* are confirmed—for example, that the German demands on Poland were only given to the British and French Governments after the German radio had announced quite wrongly that Poland had rejected them; and that the Polish Ambassador waited for seven hours to have the opportunity to tell Herr von Ribbentrop that Poland would agree to the opening of negotiations, and was then given no opportunity for any discussion. Next morning at dawn German aeroplanes were bombing Polish cities.

It is not out of place that the first section of the French *Yellow Book* gives the texts of Hitler's pledges and the despatches announcing his breaches of them. Although it may not help us much for the moment, it is rather satisfactory to close this *Yellow Book* with the thought that, however many mistakes we may have made in the past, there cannot be much doubt where lies the blame for the outbreak of the present war.

Also the book leaves one with the very definite impression—entirely confirmed as far as I am concerned by a visit last week to France—that all the efforts of the German propagandists will completely fail to drive a wedge between the French and British peoples.

## —AND THE GERMAN VIEW

(From *Facts in Review*, German Library of Information, New York City.)

In its own "review" of the French *Yellow Book*, the German Government denied its claims one by one, in a statement issued at Berlin January 25, of which the following is a summary:

French diplomacy stands convicted of duplicity by its own testimony, Germany demonstrated in her fourth official reply of January 25 to the French *Yellow Book*.

Robert Coulondre, French Ambassador to Berlin from November 1938 to the outbreak of the war, publicly supported a permanent Franco-German understanding with great

vigor, but behind the scenes he actually did everything in his power to smash all hopes of such a rapprochement. Coulondre's reports, set forth in the French *Yellow Book*, which purports to describe the events leading up to the war, clearly indicate the dual role he played.

These documents published by the French also show that Coulondre did everything possible to prevent a peaceful solution of German-Polish problems.

"It will surprise no one who knew M. Coulondre personally," the German pronouncement said, "that he was a typical representative of the Quai d'Orsay, and he remained true to the traditional French policies. It will surprise no one that M. Coulondre did not possess the breadth of mind to appreciate the creative ideas of new European policy.

"Coulondre's reports, nevertheless, deserve particular attention since they seek in quite a degree to hide that lack of political far-sightedness behind a constant repetition of attacks on Germany."

The German statement finds it astonishing that the French Government should have allowed those reports, which testify against its own policy, to form one of the chief parts of its *Yellow Book*. Germany comes to the conclusion that Coulondre must have been the chief editor of the *Yellow Book*, or have written it himself.

"These reports in the *Yellow Book*," said the German statement, "prove that Coulondre supported the anti-German policy of encirclement. On March 19 last, he advised setting up a barrier in Eastern Europe. In this connection, advantage could be taken of the uneasiness prevailing in Warsaw and other capitals. At the same time, France could increase her armaments as rapidly as possible."

"On April 29, the day following the Führer's conciliatory speech, Coulondre reported that it would be possible to hold Germany in check by further rearmament and by strengthening the Allies' anti-German system of alliances. Coulondre did everything he could to prevent Poland from coming to an understanding with Germany. He considered that Polish acceptance of Germany's generous offer would be fraught with danger for France.

# THE LIVING AGE

## NEXT MONTH

TUG OF WAR IN ITALY:

*Betty Wason*

Enroute to Sweden, the *LIVING AGE* correspondent-at-large tells from Italy of the despairing struggle of the peasants to keep out of the conflict.

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"Coulondre warned his Government on July 11 against any attempt to induce Poland to make concessions. Again on August 27, Coulondre told his Government not to leave the impression that the Western Powers were 'impatiently awaiting some possible adjustment of the German-Polish problems.'

"During the night of August 29-30, Coulondre telephoned his Government that he agreed with the British Ambassador (Sir Nevile Henderson) that Poland should appoint a negotiator to travel to Berlin in order to 'prove her good will in the eyes of the world.' Coulondre added, however, that a journey of Beck (Polish Foreign Minister Joseph Beck) to Berlin would entail serious disadvantages since it could be interpreted as a moral success for Germany, and as a sign that Poland was inclined to yield.

"Thus, Coulondre gives clear proof of the fact that the Western Powers never desired serious German-Polish negotiations on Germany's just demands. *Ambassador Coulondre, who assured every German in Berlin that he would do everything he could to render German-French relations as satisfactory as possible, was in reality one of the grave-diggers of a Franco-German understanding.* It would be paying him too much honor to attribute to him the role of a leading political figure. He was merely a zealous assistant of those circles in Paris whose tendencies he wished to encourage by his reports."

M. Coulondre, the Germans pointed out, helped his influential friends in Paris, who had been taken in tow by the British, to influence the French Government to declare war on Germany.

Continuing, the German pronouncement added that M. Coulondre was apparently one of the men who played a major role in France's cynical rejection of Adolf Hitler's peace offer on October 6, 1939.

In its first three official replies to the *Yellow Book*, Germany conclusively demonstrated that France had agreed to a new basis for French-German relations. France recognized Eastern Europe as a German sphere of interest, and apparently was willing to end her system of anti-German alliances. As this and the earlier statements prove, France refused to live up to the understanding and joined with England in efforts to build up an anti-German front in Eastern Europe.